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Abstract 
 
This PhD thesis focuses on the philosophical foundations of Neuroeconomics, an 
innovative research program which combines findings and modelling tools from 
economics, psychology and neuroscience to account for human choice behaviour. The 
proponents of Neuroeconomics often manifest the ambition to foster radical 
modifications in the accounts of choice behaviour developed by its parent disciplines. 
This enquiry provides a philosophically informed appraisal of the potential for success 
and the relevance of neuroeconomic research for economics. My central claim is that 
neuroeconomists can help other economists to build more predictive and explanatory 
models, yet are unlikely to foster revolutionary modifications in the economic theory of 
choice. 
 
The contents are organized as follows. In chapters 1-2, I present neuroeconomists’ 
investigative tools, distinguish the most influential approaches to neuroeconomic 
research and reconstruct the case in favour of a neural enrichment of economic theory. 
In chapters 3-7, I combine insights from neuro-psychology, economic methodology and 
philosophy of science to develop a systematic critique of Neuroeconomics. In particular, 
I articulate four lines of argument to demonstrate that economists are provisionally 
justified in retaining a methodologically distinctive approach to the modelling of 
decision making. 
 
My first argument points to several evidential and epistemological concerns which 
complicate the interpretation of neural data and cast doubt on the inferences 
neuroeconomists often make in their studies. My second argument aims to show that the 
trade-offs between the modelling desiderata that neuroeconomists and other economists 
respectively value severely constrain the incorporation of neural insights into economic 
models. My third argument questions neuroeconomists’ attempts to develop a unified 
theory of choice behaviour by identifying some central issues on which they hold 
contrasting positions. My fourth argument differentiates various senses of the term 
‘revolution’ and illustrates that neuroeconomists are unlikely to provide revolutionary 
contributions to economic theory in any of these senses. 
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POETIC FOREWORD 
 
 
“Imagine a vast and restless sea, constantly vexed by violent storms.  
In the middle of the sea, you and your friends bravely proceed  
Strenuously fighting against the hostile winds.  
 
Day after day, the motion of the waves impairs your fragile vessel,  
And opens bursts in the hull, and nearly makes the ship shrink: 
Till the day comes, when some members of the crew leave. 
 
Yet, the boat is at open sea and can still proceed, though not to proper speed: 
Shall you follow your comrades, abandoning the vessel for the unknown? 
Or shall you further rest on board, trying to repair the boat? 
 
Before deciding, consider this: the restless marine is the economic realm; 
The waves stand for the behavioural, experimental and neuroscience drifts; 
The little crew on the open sea is the community of economists”. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Revolutionary scientific change has been the focus of intense philosophical 
controversies in the second half of the twentieth century. Before those days, scientific 
progress was usually regarded as a cumulative process whereby novel theories supplant 
and occasionally reduce earlier ones. In 1962, Kuhn publishes The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, which provides an innovative and highly controversial account of 
intertheoretic transitions. Kuhn’s model differs profoundly from the conception of 
scientific change that was popular among logical positivists, who characterized 
scientific progress in terms of logical-mathematical derivations between individual 
theories. 
 
Kuhn focuses not so much on isolated theories, but rather on paradigms, that is 
“disciplinary matrices” including elements such as taxonomies for the investigated 
phenomena and scientists’ methodological commitments (1970a, p.182). In his view, 
scientific disciplines undergo sharply delimited phases of normal and revolutionary 
science. During periods of normal science, scientists take for granted the validity of the 
received paradigm and regard experimental results that bear against it as anomalies 
calling for further investigation. If anomalies accumulate, however, scientists come to 
question the validity of the prevailing paradigm, and the relevant discipline enters a 
period of revolutionary science. 
 
Phases of revolutionary science culminate in scientific revolutions, that is “non-
cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced […] by an 
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incompatible new one” (1962, p.86; see also Kuhn, 1981). According to Kuhn, 
scientific revolutions involve radical modifications in scientists’ beliefs and 
commitments. These modifications are often so profound that the proponents of 
competing paradigms “live in different worlds” (1970a, p.193). 
 
Kuhn’s account of scientific change was soon subject to a number of objections (see e.g. 
Achinstein, 1968, Lakatos, 1970, and Toulmin, 1972). In response to criticisms, Kuhn 
(1970a, 1974 and 1981) came to endorse a less extreme view of intertheoretic 
transitions (see e.g. Sankey, 1993 and 1994). However, his initial model prompted 
animated discussions among the practitioners and the philosophers of various 
disciplines. For instance, some economists (e.g. De Vroey, 1975) took several episodes 
in the history of economic theory to fit with Kuhn’s account, while others (e.g. 
Baumberger, 1977, and Blaug, 1975) argued that a gradualist model of scientific 
progress provides a more accurate characterization of the development of their 
discipline. 
 
In the history of science, scientific revolutions have been claimed to occur both in 
underdeveloped disciplines (e.g. think of the overthrow of the phlogiston theory by 
Lavoisier’s chemical theory) and in mature sciences (e.g. think of the replacement of 
Newton's theory of universal gravitation by Einstein's general theory of relativity). One 
such revolution is allegedly under way at the interface between economics, psychology 
and neuroscience. The story goes as follows. Over the last decade, a growing body of 
research has come together under the name of Neuroeconomics (henceforth, NE), an 
emerging discipline which combines findings and modelling tools from economics, 
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psychology and neuroscience to account for human choice behaviour. Neuroeconomists 
(henceforth, NEs) aim to integrate findings and modelling tools from NE’s parent 
disciplines. In particular, they often speak of implementing revolutionary modifications 
in the accounts of decision making provided by those disciplines (see e.g. Camerer, 
Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005, and Glimcher, 2010). 
 
There are at least two respects in which the emergence of NE promises to constitute an 
especially significant episode of scientific change. The first one concerns the scope of 
NEs’ proposed revolution. Economists, psychologists and neuroscientists have 
separately achieved significant successes in modelling and explaining choice behaviour. 
However, they usually employ dissimilar constructs and pursue different explanatory 
goals (see e.g. Glimcher, 2010, ch.1). The pioneers of NE frequently manifest the 
ambition to develop a single, unified theory of choice behaviour that spans NE’s parent 
disciplines and “transcends the explanations available to neuroscientists, psychologists, 
and economists working alone” (Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004, p.452). A second 
peculiarity of NEs’ intended revolution relates to its purported depth. The proponents of 
NE rarely rest content with integrating particular findings from economics, psychology 
and neuroscience. On the contrary, they often speak of substituting the constructs 
traditionally employed in these disciplines. For instance, after noting that we are able to 
“observe the brain better than ever before”, Camerer claims that NEs “will eventually 
[…] replace the simple mathematical ideas of economics with more neurally-detailed 
descriptions” (2005). 
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The aforementioned assertions point to momentous interdisciplinary rearrangements and 
raise several questions concerning revolutionary scientific change. To give some 
examples, are NEs likely to foster a genuine revolution spanning both natural and social 
disciplines? What obstacles stand in the way of realizing this ambitious project? More 
generally, do scientific revolutions constitute objective advances in the involved 
disciplines, or do they call into question the purported progressiveness of science? What 
implications do scientific revolutions have for the metaphysics and the epistemology of 
science (see e.g. van Fraassen, 1980, Hacking, 1983, Boyd, 1984, Psillos, 1999, and 
Stanford, 2010, for a debate between realist and antirealist interpretations of scientific 
theories)? 
 
The rise of NE provides us with a valuable opportunity to investigate a number of 
philosophically relevant issues besides these ones. Let us briefly consider some of these 
issues in turn. The first one concerns the ideal of interdisciplinary consilience. The 
practitioners of economics, psychology, and neuroscience have developed a wide 
variety of approaches to model human choice behaviour. Regrettably, their models 
usually have quite a narrow scope and are rarely integrated into unified theories at the 
intradisciplinary level. Indeed, even when targeting the same explananda, the 
practitioners of each discipline often rely on dissimilar presuppositions and make use of 
distinct constructs (e.g. compare the homo oeconomicus posited by rational choice 
theory with the agents figuring in bounded rationality and ecological rationality 
models). The situation is even more fragmented at the interdisciplinary level, where we 
presently lack a shared methodology for building a unified account of choice behaviour. 
In this respect, several questions arise regarding NEs’ attempts to integrate evidence and 
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modelling tools from different behavioural sciences. For example, what findings and 
constructs are to be employed in developing NE models? To what extent do the 
methodological divergences between economists, psychologists and neuroscientists 
affect the prospects of NE? 
 
Secondly, the emergence of NE has important applications to philosophical debates 
regarding intertheoretic reduction (see e.g. Nagel, 1961, and Oppenheim and Putnam, 
1958). Interdisciplinary research often prompts intense disputes concerning the nature 
of intertheoretic relations among the practitioners of the involved disciplines. NEs’ 
proposals proved to be especially controversial for several reasons. To give one 
example, their attempts to provide a neural microfoundation to economic theory 
promise to accomplish the first instance of intertheoretic reduction spanning both 
natural and social scientific disciplines. However, NEs’ reductive claims hardly fit with 
some philosophers’ criticisms of intertheoretic reductions (see e.g. Fodor, 1974, Duprè, 
1983 and 1993, and Cartwright, 1999). Moreover, they have been questioned on the 
more pragmatic ground that it is more fruitful to pursue integrative - rather than 
reductive - approaches between NE’s parent disciplines (Craver and Alexandrova, 
2008). Do NEs possess the means to develop a reductive unification of economics, 
psychology and neuroscience? Do they concur on which of these disciplines is best 
equipped to provide the fundamental constructs for the NE theory of choice? What are 
the prospects of a non-reductive unification of NE’s parent disciplines? 
 
Thirdly, the rise of NE constitutes an especially suitable case study for investigating 
how notions of explanation and criteria of explanatory relevance vary across 
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disciplinary boundaries. In the former respect, the question arises as to how exactly the 
conceptions of explanation that are respectively presupposed in distinct natural and 
social sciences differ. What kind of explanations do economists attempt to develop? Are 
they concerned with providing mechanistic accounts of people’s decisions, or do they 
aim to understand the reasons motivating economic agents (see e.g. Knight, 1935, and 
Davidson, 1963)? What kinds of methods are best suited for economists’ explanatory 
purposes (see e.g. Mill, 1843, and Weber, 1904)? As to criteria of explanatory 
relevance, the mere fact that decision making takes place in the brain does not license 
the conclusion that NE findings are relevant for economics. Still, several NEs 
presuppose that understanding how decision making is instantiated at the neuro-
psychological level is ipso facto informative to economists. In doing so, they rely on 
disputable assumptions concerning the explanatory relevance of neuro-psychological 
findings for the economic theory of choice (Kuorikoski and Ylikoski, 2010). 
 
A fourth issue of philosophical significance relates to the pragmatics of modelling in 
science. The proponents of NE frequently argue that economists could develop more 
predictive and explanatory models by incorporating neuro-anatomical and neuro-
physiological insights. However, distinct modelling desiderata (e.g. think of tractability 
and descriptive accuracy) often pull in different directions and make opposing demands 
on modellers. The trade-offs between distinct desiderata, in turn, impose significant 
restrictions on the construction of models spanning different disciplines and levels of 
description. In this respect, one wonders whether - and, if so, on what grounds - 
economists should include several neural insights into their models of choice. This 
question has important implications for the potential significance of NE research, as the 
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trade-offs between the desiderata that NEs and other economists respectively value are 
unlikely to abate with progress in NEs’ observational tools and experimental practices. 
 
A fifth issue concerns the interpretation that models of decision making are given in 
different behavioural sciences. The following contrast is especially profound in the 
current literature at the interface between economics, psychology and neuroscience. On 
the one hand, economists usually rely on as if models of choice (e.g. think of expected 
utility theory) which make no assumptions regarding what neuro-psychological 
processes underlie choice behaviour. On the other hand, many NEs take their models to 
provide descriptively accurate characterizations of the neuro-psychological substrates of 
choice behaviour. In particular, some NEs (e.g. Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005, 
p.10, and Glimcher, 2010, p.126 and 133) urge economists to substitute their as if 
representations with mechanistically informed accounts of decision making. 
Regrettably, the availability of multiple NE models of choice which posit dissimilar 
neuro-psychological processes does not fit well with the realistic interpretation many 
NEs give to those models. 
 
Last but not least, NEs’ contributions raise several questions of normative significance, 
especially regarding economic welfare analyses and policy evaluations. The proponents 
of NE often manifest the ambition to evaluate people’s decisions according to a 
normative perspective. In particular, they aim to ascertain not just what the best way to 
achieve a given objective is, but also what objectives agents should pursue in specific 
situations. In what circumstances, if any, do neuro-psychological findings legitimize 
NEs to influence or interfere with people’s decisions? What sort of paternalistic 
 15 
interventions might be advocated in designing and modifying particular choice 
architectures? To be sure, more accurate knowledge of the neural substrates of choice 
behaviour may enable NEs to develop more informative and reliable indicators of well-
being. Nonetheless, various factors constrain the relevance of NE findings for 
economists’ normative analyses. To give one example, neuro-psychological empirical 
evidence does not per se provide compelling indications as to what agents ought to 
choose in specific decision settings. Furthermore, profound differences remain between 
NEs’ and other economists’ conceptions of well-being. More specifically, standard 
economic theory does not take a position as to what agents’ objective well-being 
consists in. For their part, many NEs relate agents’ objective well-being to their hedonic 
states or the activation patterns of particular neural areas. 
 
In the following chapters, I explore these and other philosophically relevant issues with 
the aim to assess the prospects and the relevance of NE for one of its parent disciplines, 
namely economics. In doing so, I shall mention in passing what impact NE findings 
may have on neuro-psychological research and society at large (e.g. think of futuristic 
forms of neural marketing or the therapeutic benefits derivable from neurally informed 
accounts of addictive behaviour). My focus on economic theory is motivated both by 
the significance that NEs’ contributions allegedly have for the economic account of 
decision making and by the lively debates that some NEs’ assertions have fostered 
among economists. Let me expand on this point. 
 
The pioneers of NE often argue that economists can considerably improve their models 
of choice by incorporating neuro-psychological variables. Some NEs go as far as to 
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advocate the replacement of various fundamental constructs (e.g. constrained utility 
functions, optimization tools) of standard economic theory. NEs’ calls for a neural 
enrichment of economic theory have prompted heterogeneous reactions among 
economic modellers and methodologists. To a first approximation, three prototypical 
positions can be distinguished in the economists’ camp. On the one hand, the sceptics 
doubt (e.g. Harrison, 2008a and 2008b, and Rubinstein, 2008) or even deny (e.g. Gul 
and Pesendorfer, 2008) the relevance of NEs’ contributions for the economic theory of 
choice. On the other hand, the enthusiasts (e.g. Rustichini, 2005) contend that 
incorporating neuro-physiological insights into economic models will have significant, 
and arguably revolutionary, implications. In this highly simplified picture, a halfway 
position is advocated by the moderates (e.g. Smith, 2007, ch.14), who cautiously note 
that it is too soon to judge NEs’ achievements and that the extent to which NE will 
inform mainstream economic theory remains an open empirical question. 
 
When it comes to assessing the potential for success in NE research, many authors 
refrain from judgement by alleging that NE is a relatively young discipline whose 
prospects depend on empirical findings that are still to come. Prima facie, this moderate 
stance may seem preferable to the other two positions, as adopting a ‘wait and see’ 
attitude is less risky than pontificating about the future of economics, psychology and 
neuroscience. However, prudently postponing judgement does not appear to be the best 
way to evaluate the prospects of the NE enterprise. After all, the fact that the case for 
NE is “mostly based on promise” (Camerer 2008a, p.62) does not prevent one from 
examining the grounds on which such promise rests. Indeed, one may argue that 
precisely because the advancement of NE depends on somewhat speculative 
 17 
assumptions, it is especially important to discriminate between fruitful research avenues 
and misleadingly attractive dead ends. 
 
The central claim of this thesis is that NEs’ contributions help economists build more 
predictive and explanatory models of choice, yet are unlikely to foster revolutionary 
modifications in economic theory1. As I shall illustrate below, the reasons for my 
scepticism run deep in the methodological foundations of NE’s parent disciplines and 
involve a number of interrelated philosophical issues. To be clear, I am aware that 
methodological debates occasionally degenerate into self-referential speculative 
exercises, and I share the reluctance of many NE practitioners to engage in hair-splitting 
which might appear to be of little help to the profession. Still, the NE literature is 
growing very rapidly, with profound dissimilarities in the way different authors 
conceptualize and develop their research. In such a context, the opportunity - and 
arguably, the need - arises for a scrupulous methodological appraisal, which enables 
economists, psychologists and neuroscientists to more accurately assess the merits of 
NEs’ proposals. 
 
My investigation can be broadly divided into two parts. In chapters one and two, I place 
the emergence of NE into dialectical context, present the main investigative tools of 
NEs and reconstruct their case in favour of a neural enrichment of economic theory. In 
chapters three to seven, I combine recent neuroscientific findings with considerations 
from economic methodology and philosophy of science to develop a systematic critique 
of NE. In such a context, I examine both what more accurate knowledge of the human 
                                                          
1
 In this enquiry, I shall employ expressions such as “economic theory of choice”, “traditional 
theory of choice”, “economic account of decision making”, etc. to refer to both decision theory 
and game theory. 
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neural architecture may add to our understanding of economic behaviour and whether 
such knowledge justifies a significant import of neural data into economic models of 
choice. In particular, I articulate and defend several lines of argument (see below) which 
aim to demonstrate that economists are provisionally justified in retaining a 
methodologically distinctive approach to the modelling of decision making. Let me 
anticipate briefly the contents of each chapter in turn. 
 
In chapter one, I provide a general framework for understanding and assessing NE 
research. After comparing the main definitions that NE has been given in the literature, I 
identify three major respects in which NEs’ contributions can be differentiated. I then 
relate the emergence of NE to previous research at the interface between economics and 
psychology. Finally, I present the brain-imaging and brain-stimulation instruments that 
NEs frequently employ in their studies. In chapter two, I identify several respects in 
which incorporating neural insights can help economists to improve their models. In 
doing so, I reconstruct the main arguments that have been provided in support of a 
neural enrichment of the economic theory of choice. Moreover, I illustrate how NEs’ 
arguments can be combined in a cumulative case for the neural enrichment of economic 
theory. 
 
In chapter three, I discuss various evidential and epistemological concerns which arise 
in relation to the collection and the interpretation of neural data. Furthermore, I 
critically examine the inferences made in many brain-imaging and brain-stimulation 
studies. In particular, I distinguish between some problems that are likely to be resolved 
thanks to advances in scanner technology and others that are unlikely to abate with 
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scientific progress. In chapter four, I attempt to demonstrate that NEs overestimate the 
extent to which their contributions improve economic models of choice. Moreover, I 
identify some trade-offs between the modelling desiderata that NEs and other 
economists respectively value and argue that these trade-offs severely constrain the 
incorporation of neural insights into economic models of choice. 
 
Chapter five calls into question NEs’ attempts to develop a unified interdisciplinary 
theoretical framework by pointing to the profound dissimilarities (e.g. in terms of 
employed constructs and pursued explanatory aims) between the economic, 
psychological and neuroscientific accounts of decision making. In such a context, I cast 
doubt on the possibility of combining NEs’ contributions in a cumulative case in favour 
of NE by identifying some central respects (e.g. how NE is supposed to inform standard 
economic theory) in which NEs themselves hold contrasting positions. In chapter six, I 
provide a case study which aims to illustrate how the conceptual differences between 
NE’s parent disciplines constrain the relevance of neuro-psychological findings for the 
economic theory of choice. More specifically, I distinguish three notions of utility - 
namely decision utility, experienced utility and neural utility - that are frequently 
mentioned in debates over decision theory. I subsequently examine some critical issues 
regarding their definition and measurability. In doing so, I critique NEs’ calls to replace 
decision utility with experienced and neural utility as a central concept of decision 
theory. 
 
The final chapter relates the ongoing debate between NEs and other economists to the 
philosophical literature on revolutionary scientific change. In particular, I differentiate 
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various senses in which NE has been claimed to revolutionize economic theory and 
argue that NEs are unlikely to prompt revolutionary contributions in any of these senses. 
In the conclusion, I evaluate the prospects of NE in light of Lakatos’ distinction 
between progressive and degenerating research programs. I then summarize the main 
problems impeding the advancement of NE and provide some brief remarks regarding 
the future of NE research. 
 
 
NEs’ contributions are making inroads into both natural and social scientific research, 
attracting increasing attention and financial resources. However, NE presently 
constitutes a highly fragmented discipline, whose relation to economics, psychology and 
neuroscience is hard to characterize precisely. Furthermore, a number of conceptual and 
empirical issues still wait to be sorted out and explored in the NE literature. This 
enquiry aims to provide one of the first philosophically informed methodological 
appraisals of the relevance of NE for economic theory and the potential for success in 
NE research. My overall goal is not just to critique the proponents of NE, but also to 
prompt them to build their case in favour of ‘mindful economics’ on more solid 
empirical and conceptual foundations. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
WHAT IS NEUROECONOMICS? 
 
What is NE? How exactly is it related to the economic theory of choice? At first 
approximation, NE can be characterized as an interdisciplinary enterprise which 
combines findings and modelling tools from economics, psychology and neuroscience 
to account for human choice behaviour. At closer examination, however, profound 
dissimilarities can be found between NEs’ approaches. In this chapter, I provide some 
conceptual and terminological distinctions that will later help us to assess the relevance 
of NE for its parent disciplines. More specifically, section 1.A examines the most 
influential definitions that NE has been given in the literature and differentiates various 
approaches to NE research. In section 1.B, I reconstruct the dialectical context in which 
NE emerged, devoting particular attention to previous developments in research at the 
interface between economics and psychology. In section 1.C, I present the brain-
imaging and brain-stimulation tools that NEs employ in their investigations, 
highlighting the main strengths and limitations of each instrument. 
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1.A DEFINITIONS AND APPROACHES 
 
Over the last few decades, economists have integrated a number of insights from other 
behavioural sciences into their models of choice. The development of interdisciplinary 
research programs such as behavioural and experimental economics represented a 
significant advancement in the economic account of decision making2. In recent years, a 
growing body of research has come together under the name of NE. In spite of its 
relatively recent origin, NE has already been characterized in remarkably different ways 
both by NEs and by other researchers. The following list illustrates the diversity of the 
definitions formulated by the pioneers of the discipline. 
 
i) Some authors speak of NE in distinctively interdisciplinary terms. McCabe (2003a), 
for example, depicts it as “an interdisciplinary research program with the goal of 
building a biological model of decision making” (see also McCabe, 2003b and 2008). In 
a similar vein, Glimcher and Rustichini (2004, p.447) characterize NE as the attempt to 
combine economics, psychology and neuroscience “into a single, unified discipline with 
the ultimate aim of providing a single, general theory of human behaviour” (see also 
Glimcher, 2010, p.393, and Rustichini, 2005, p.203-4). 
 
ii) Other times, NE is presented as a specific application of economic theory to the 
modelling of the human neural architecture. For instance, McCabe (2008, p.346) notes 
that economists’ optimization techniques offer neuroscientists a useful way to 
                                                          
2
 The expression “decision making” is often used to denote both observed choice behaviour and 
the underlying cognitive and computational processes. In what follows, I employ such an 
expression to refer to observed choice behaviour, without taking a position as to whether 
economists qua economists should be concerned with those processes. 
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characterize the workings of the brain and maintains that NE represents “an increasingly 
important route for the export of economic ideas”. For their part, Glimcher, Dorris and 
Bayer (2005, p.253) argue that utility theory provides “the ultimate set of tools” for 
modelling neural areas’ activation patterns. Indeed, they go as far as to claim that while 
economists typically assume that “it is as if expected utility was computed by the 
brain”, neuroscience “suggests an alternative, and more literal, interpretation”, 
according to which “the neural architecture actually does compute desirability for each 
available course of action” (ibid., p.220; see also Platt and Glimcher, 1999). 
 
iii) Some NEs characterize their discipline as an extension of distinct economic research 
programs. For example, Camerer (2003) defines NE both as a “branch” of behavioural 
economics, which “expands behavioral economics by using facts about brain activity”, 
and as “a new kind” of experimental economics, which “expands experimental 
economics by measuring biological and neural processes to understand how people 
choose, bargain and trade” (see also Camerer, 2007, C26, and Camerer, 2008a, p.44). 
Zak (2004, p.1737), instead, argues that NE is a “natural extension” of both behavioural 
economics and the bioeconomic research program3. 
 
iv) Again differently, NE is occasionally regarded as an application of neuroscientific 
techniques and methods to the economic account of decision making. For instance, the 
economist Rustichini (2005, p.201) speaks of NE as “a set of papers that apply the 
concepts, methods, and technical tools of neuroscience to economic analysis”. 
                                                          
3
 The idea is that bioeconomics primarily investigates how past processes of natural selection 
influence contemporary humans’ choice behaviour, whereas NE studies the current neural 
underpinnings of decision making (Vromen, 2007, p.145-6; for further details on the 
bioeconomic research program, see Landa and Ghiselin, 1999). 
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Similarly, Zak (2004, p.1737) depicts NE as “an emerging transdisciplinary field that 
uses neuroscientific measurement techniques to identify the neural substrates associated 
with economic decisions” (see also Sugrue et al., 2005, p.363). 
 
The claims reported above provide dissimilar characterizations of the theoretical 
presuppositions and the explanatory aims of NE. To see this, let us compare the 
contentions presented at points ii and iv above. On the one hand, Glimcher, Dorris and 
Bayer (2005) and McCabe (2008) emphasize the suitability of economic modelling 
tools for representing neural events and processes. On the other hand, Rustichini (2005) 
and Zak (2004) advocate the modification of the economic theory of choice in light of 
neuroscientific insights. A proponent of NE might endorse both of these positions 
without ipso facto incurring inconsistencies. For instance, she may argue - in line with 
Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer (2005, p.215) - that insights from economic theory 
effectively “guide neurobiological experiments which can, in turn, yield new economic 
theories”. Even so, the point remains that considerable differences can be found in the 
way distinct NEs conceptualize their own research. 
 
Indeed, not just NEs but also other economists depict the subject matter and the 
methodology of NE in heterogeneous terms. For example, Payzan and Bourgeois-
Gironde (2005, p.2) view NE as a “joint experimental production between neural 
sciences and experimental economics”. Gul and Pesendorfer, instead, characterize it as a 
research program based on the following two tenets: 
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“Assertion I: Psychological and physiological evidence […] can be used to 
support or reject economic models or even economic methodology. Assertion II: 
What makes individuals happy (‘true utility’) differs from what they choose. 
Economic welfare analysis should use true utility rather than the utilities 
governing choice” (2008, p.3). 
 
The situation appears to be even more intricate when one considers what kinds of NE 
research have been differentiated in the literature. To render this point more vivid, let us 
examine the following three examples. In a recent article, Montague (2007a, p.219) 
argues that there are “two natural [NE]”, one which investigates “the way that neural 
tissue is built, sustains itself through time, and processes information efficiently”, the 
other which primarily examines “the behavioural algorithms running on such a neural 
tissue”. Craver and Alexandrova (2008, p.381-2), instead, differentiate between 
neuroeconomics proper, whose goal is “to explain economic behaviour by revealing 
how brain mechanisms work”, and economic neural modelling, which exports economic 
concepts “in models of brain processes or in the analysis of data delivered by 
neuroscientific techniques”. For his part, Ross (2008a, p.473) distinguishes between 
behavioral economics in the scanner, which uses neuroimaging data to foster the 
replacement of “standard aspects of microeconomic theory by facts and conjectures 
about human psychology”, and neurocellular economics, which relies on economists’ 
constrained maximization and equilibrium analyses “to model relatively encapsulated 
functional parts of brains” (see also Harrison and Ross, 2010). 
 
I am not concerned here with comparing or assessing the above categorizations. For the 
purpose of this enquiry, it suffices to note that different researchers - and, at times, the 
 26 
same author in different papers - propose quite dissimilar definitions of NE and employ 
such a term to refer to distinct bodies of research4. In this respect, one might well claim 
that we should not overemphasize the importance of drawing sharp disciplinary 
boundaries (Montague, 2007b, p.407). This, however, implies neither that the existing 
characterizations of NE are equally appropriate nor that any contribution at the interface 
between economics, psychology and neuroscience can be plausibly regarded as an 
advance in NE. In the remainder of this section, I identify three major respects in which 
NEs’ studies can be differentiated. More specifically, I shall distinguish NEs’ positions 
regarding: (1) the explananda they target; (2) the kind of accounts they aim to develop; 
and (3) how their accounts relate to the economic theory of choice. 
 
1) What are the explananda targeted by NEs? 
 
A first criterion in light of which distinct approaches to NE research can be 
differentiated concerns the explanatory targets of NEs. As anticipated above, most NEs 
are concerned with investigating the neural substrates of choice behaviour. This, 
however, falls short of implying that they pursue the same explanatory goals. In this 
respect, it is useful to distinguish between the proximate and the ultimate explanatory 
targets of NEs. The former expression refers to the neural evidence with which most 
NEs are directly concerned (e.g. think of the activation patterns of particular neural 
areas). The expression “ultimate explananda”, instead, relates to the phenomena that 
NEs aim to explain by means of such neural evidence. As I argue below, two main 
positions can be differentiated with regard to the ultimate explananda of NE studies. 
                                                          
4
 Compare, for instance, the characterizations of NE that Camerer puts forward in his articles 
(e.g. 2005, 2008a and 2008b). Despite invariably speaking of “neuroeconomics”, he employs 
this term in quite different senses. 
 27 
 
On the one hand, NEs frequently manifest the ambition to accurately identify the 
algorithms implemented by the human neural architecture and the inner workings of 
specific neural populations (neural ultimate explananda). For instance, Glimcher, 
Dorris and Bayer (2005, p.215) argue that NE experiments “can be much more than 
efforts to locate a brain region associated with some hypothetical faculty” and “will 
reveal the nature of the economic computations brains perform”. On the other hand, 
NEs often employ neuro-physiological evidence in order to provide more adequate 
explanations of observed decisions (behavioural ultimate explananda). The idea (e.g. 
McCabe, 2003a and 2003b) is that more accurate knowledge of the human neural 
architecture helps us to better account for the heterogeneity of human choice behaviour. 
To be sure, several NEs target both neural and behavioural ultimate explananda in their 
investigations. Still, these two sets of explananda are not coextensional, and various 
authors refer to the divide between them in demarcating separate approaches to NE 
research (see e.g. Craver and Alexandrova, 2008, on “neuroeconomics proper” and 
“economic neural modelling”, and Ross, 2008a, on “behavioral economics in the 
scanner” and “neurocellular economics”). 
 
2) What kind of accounts do NEs aim to develop? 
 
My second question asks what kind of accounts of choice behaviour NEs attempt to 
provide in their studies. In this respect, an instructive distinction can be drawn between 
NEs’ short term and long term goals. Regarding short term goals, most NEs rest content 
with developing neurally enriched models of specific behavioural patterns, ranging from 
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trust and reciprocity (e.g. Zak et al., 2004, 2005 and 2007) to addictive gambling (e.g. 
Ross et al., 2010, ch.1 and 5). When it comes to long term goals, several NEs manifest 
the more ambitious aspiration to provide a unified theoretical framework for modelling 
decision making. For example, Glimcher and Rustichini (2004, p.447) characterize NE 
as the combination of economics, psychology and neuroscience “into a single, unified 
discipline with the ultimate aim of providing a single, general theory of human 
behaviour”. In a similar vein, Rustichini (2005, p.203-4) maintains that NE attempts “to 
complete the research program that the early classics (in particular Hume and Smith) set 
out in the first place: to provide a unified theory of human behaviour”. Indeed, some 
NEs aim to provide - not merely descriptive, but also - prescriptive insights concerning 
people’s decisions. For instance, Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer (2005, p.214) conjecture 
that by combining economic and neuroscientific approaches NEs will develop “a 
methodology for reconciling prescriptive and descriptive economics”5. The idea is that 
NE findings cast light not just on the causal underpinnings of observed decisions, but 
also on what people ought to choose in specific situations. 
 
3) How do NEs’ accounts relate to the economic theory of choice? 
 
The pioneers of NE often speak of building an interdisciplinary theoretical framework 
spanning NE’s parent disciplines. The idea is to provide “a mechanistic, behavioral, and 
mathematical explanation of choice that transcends the explanations available to 
neuroscientists, psychologists, and economists working alone” (Glimcher and 
                                                          
5
 See alsoVromen (2010a, p.30-1) on the possibility of combining neuro-psychological research, 
which identifies “the evolutionary problems that our brains evolved to solve”, and standard 
economic theory, which offers a “normative benchmark” by specifying the optimal solution to 
those problems. 
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Rustichini, 2004, p.452). However, NEs advocate heterogeneous views concerning the 
interdisciplinary relationship that purportedly holds between NE and its parent 
disciplines. In particular, two main positions can be contrasted with regard to how NE 
supposedly relates to the economic theory of choice. Let me expand on this divide. 
 
In a 1998 article, the economist Rabin distinguishes two ways in which psychological 
findings can inform the economic account of decision making. On the one hand, he 
takes some of these findings to suggest partial modifications to rational choice models 
without challenging the way in which those models are typically constructed, i.e. 
maximization of a utility function under variously definable constraints. On the other 
hand, he contends that the difficulties people encounter in evaluating their own 
preferences and experienced well-being point towards “a more radical critique” of 
economic theory, which casts doubt on economists’ use of “coherent” and “stable” 
utility functions (Rabin, 1998, p.12, italics mine; see also Rabin, 2002). 
 
In their 2005 manifesto, Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (p.10, italics mine) propose a 
similar distinction concerning how neuroscientific findings can inform the economic 
theory of choice: 
 
“In the incremental approach, neuroscience adds variables to conventional 
accounts of decision making or suggests specific functional forms to replace ‘as if’ 
assumptions that have never been well supported empirically […] The radical 
approach involves turning back the hands of time and asking how economics might 
have evolved differently if it had been informed from the start by insights and 
findings now available from neuroscience”. 
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These assertions point to what is commonly regarded as a fundamental divide between 
distinct approaches to NE research. However, the above passage can be interpreted in a 
variety of ways, and not all of these readings are equally persuasive. In particular, a 
literal interpretation does not appear to be particularly plausible. To see this, let us 
consider the aforementioned characterizations of the incremental and the radical 
approach in turn. 
 
i) Concerning incremental NE, it remains obscure what exactly Camerer, Loewenstein 
and Prelec mean when they prefigure (2005, p.10) the replacement of “as if assumptions 
that have never been well supported empirically”. To be sure, one may well complain 
about the purported ad hocness or non-falsifiability of some economists’ as if defences 
of rational choice theory. Moreover, the mere fact that virtually any decision can be 
rationalized in terms of some as if representation falls short of implying that all 
economists’ as if models plausibly account for observed choices. Even so, there are at 
least two reasons to doubt NEs’ calls (e.g. Camerer, 2008a, p.47, and Rustichini, 2005, 
p.203) to evaluate economic models of choice in terms of their neuro-computational and 
neuro-cognitive plausibility. Firstly, economic models of choice are not meant to 
accurately characterize the neuro-computational and neuro-cognitive substrates of 
people’s decisions. And secondly, there are several criteria besides neuro-computational 
and neuro-cognitive plausibility in terms of which a model can be assessed (e.g. think of 
tractability). In this respect, it remains unclear why economists should adopt the 
evaluative standards employed by modellers whose methodological presuppositions and 
explanatory aims sharply differ from their own. 
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ii) Even more puzzling is the counterfactual scenario that Camerer, Loewenstein and 
Prelec (2005) depict in presenting the radical approach. More specifically, their 
characterization of radical NE appears to be vulnerable to at least three criticisms. 
Firstly, one wonders whether it makes sense to ask how economics might have evolved 
if current neuroscience had influenced it from “the start”. What does “the start” of 
economic theory stand for? How are we supposed to identify it? Secondly, it is hard to 
see how we could reliably ascertain how economics might have evolved, had it been 
informed by the insights now available from neuroscience. Maybe economists would 
have developed quasi-infallible neurally informed models with tremendous predictive 
credentials. Or perhaps they would have fallen prey of irredeemable confusion due to 
pan-explanatory hubris. In short, the range of possibilities is so wide that favouring one 
particular counterfactual scenario would appear to be quite arbitrary. Finally, it remains 
obscure how exactly speculating about counterfactual developments of economic theory 
is supposed to inform the current debate over the relevance and the prospects of NE. 
After all, the point is that we now have some powerful neuroscientific tools at our 
disposal, and it is the current availability of these instruments which raises issues of 
methodological significance. 
 
At this stage, one may wonder whether a more plausible characterization of the 
incremental/radical divide can be provided. As I argued elsewhere (Fumagalli, 2010, 
Sec.I), incremental NEs typically rest content with enriching specific economic models 
in light of neuro-physiological findings, whereas radical NEs aim to implement 
substantial changes in economic theory. On this account, what the difference between 
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incremental and radical NE amounts to partly depends on which conception of scientific 
theories and models one endorses. I shall expand on this issue in chapter two. For now, 
we can explicate the distinction between incremental and radical NE as follows. On the 
one hand, incremental NEs work on the assumption that traditional economic theory and 
its axiomatic apparatus offer a suitable basis for modelling people’s decisions. On the 
other hand, radical NEs urge economists to adopt a mechanistic approach to the 
modelling of choice behaviour and speak of complementing or even replacing 
economists’ constructs such as preference relations and standard equilibrium concepts6. 
 
One might rebut that the above characterization misrepresents radical NE as an 
implausibly ambitious project. Nonetheless, the advocates of NE frequently put forward 
enthusiastic comments in relation to such a far-reaching enterprise. For instance, 
Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2005, p.10 and 15) boldly assert that neuroscience 
“points to an entirely new set of constructs to underlie economic decision making” and 
that NEs will “substitute familiar distinctions between categories of economic behavior 
[…] with new ones grounded in neural detail” (see also Camerer, 2005). Similarly, 
Rustichini (2003) optimistically speaks of NE as a “revolution” which will soon provide 
“a theory of how people decide in economic and strategic situations”. In this 
perspective, it is not surprising that most economists - while cautiously welcoming the 
proposals of incremental NEs - oppose the contributions of radical NEs. For radical NEs 
                                                          
6
 The incremental/radical divide cuts across other informative distinctions regarding NE 
research. To see this, suppose that you wanted to classify NEs’ proposals in terms of their 
relevance for the economic theory of choice. On the one hand, an incremental modification may 
have a considerable significance (e.g. think of a neuro-physiological variable whose 
incorporation enabled NEs to more accurately predict people’s decisions in heterogeneous 
choice settings). On the other hand, a radical contribution might have limited relevance for the 
economic theory of choice (e.g. think of an innovative model which can be applied only to 
highly controlled experimental settings). 
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attempt to alter or even replace some fundamental tenets and constructs of economic 
theory. 
 
To recapitulate, the proponents of NE advocate dissimilar conceptions of the theoretical 
presuppositions and the explanatory aims of their research. In particular, their use of the 
term NE is suggestive of a degree of unification and commonality of purpose that is not 
present in the current NE literature. In this respect, one might insist that some 
approaches to NE research can be consistently endorsed. However, NEs’ accounts are 
exceedingly heterogeneous to be plausibly considered as expression of one and the same 
approach. Indeed, it appears that NE is currently best characterized as - not so much a 
single, unified discipline, but - a composite research program consisting of a cluster of 
approaches. In what follows, I shall use the term NE to refer to this cluster of 
approaches unless stated otherwise. This use of the term is sufficiently general to 
encompass most of the existing characterizations of NE. Moreover, it can be made 
sufficiently precise to enable us to assess the significance of specific contributions in 
NE research. 
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1.B GENESIS 
 
The first publications explicitly devoted to NE appeared just a few years ago, following 
some pioneering studies of the neural correlates of choices (e.g. Platt and Glimcher, 
1998 and 1999)7. The rise of NE has been favoured - and, arguably, made possible - by 
a series of advances in its parent disciplines. In this section, I place the emergence of 
NE in dialectical context, relating it to earlier developments in research at the boundary 
between economics and psychology. After presenting standard utility theory, which 
provides economists with the basic mathematical tools for modelling decisions in risky 
and uncertain situations, I examine some attempts to incorporate psychological insights 
into traditional economic models. In the next section, I shall consider some recent 
advances in brain-imaging and brain-stimulation technology which enabled NEs to 
investigate the neural substrates of choice behaviour to an unprecedented level of detail. 
 
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) was introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944) following previous work by Ramsey (1931) as a tractable and formally rigorous 
framework for modelling choices in conditions of risk (see Stigler, 1950, for a review). 
EUT was generalized by Savage (1954) into subjective expected utility theory, which 
applies to conditions of uncertainty8. Standard EUT rests on a representation theorem 
according to which, if an agent’s preferences satisfy three intuitively appealing axioms, 
then there exists a unique probability function and a utility function U(.) unique up to 
                                                          
7
 See also TenHouten (1991, p.390) for an early mention of NE as “the study of the neural 
substrates, and associated mental phenomena, of productive and consumptive economic and 
socioeconomic behaviour”. 
8
 An agent faces a situation of risk when she ignores which state of affairs will occur but knows 
both all the potential consequences of her actions and the probability that each consequence has 
of occurring. An agent faces a situation of uncertainty when she ignores not just which state of 
affairs will occur, but also the probabilities that some consequences have of occurring. 
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positive linear transformations, such that for any two acts x and y, x ≥ y iff U(x) ≥ U(y). 
In this way, choice behaviour can be modelled as if the agent exhibiting it was 
maximizing the expected utility of her actions. 
 
The axioms at the basis of standard EUT are the ordering axiom, the continuity axiom 
and the independence axiom. More specifically, the ordering axiom requires that 
agents’ preferences satisfy the properties of completeness and transitivity. An agent’s 
preferences are complete if and only if the agent is always able to express definite 
preferences regarding the options she faces, i.e. for any two acts x and y, x ≥ y V y ≥ x. 
An agent has transitive preferences if and only if, for any options x, y and z, (x ≥ y ^ y ≥ 
z) → x ≥ z. The continuity axiom demands that, if an act x is preferred to another act y 
but is not preferred to a third act z, then there exists a compound lottery over y and z 
which is indifferent to x. Formally, if z ≥ x ≥ y, then there exists α є [0, 1] such that x ~ 
[αy; (1-α)z]. Finally, the independence axiom requires that adding a common 
component to each side of a choice relation does not change the agent’s preferences. In 
other words, if an act x is preferred to another act y, then the compound lottery over x 
(with probability α) and z is preferred to the compound lottery over y (with probability 
α) and z, i.e. if x ≥ y, then [αx; (1-α)z] ≥ [αy; (1-α)z] ∀ α є [0,1]. 
 
EUT was soon accepted as part of mainstream economic theory. During the Fifties, 
however, its descriptive validity was called into question by a number of findings. Let 
us examine three clusters of anomalies in turn. A first group of findings cast doubt on 
the descriptive validity of the EUT axioms. For instance, contrary to the ordering axiom, 
agents are rarely able to express complete preferences and often exhibit intransitive 
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preferences (Loomes and Sugden, 1983, and Tversky, 1969). Moreover, people’s 
preferences occasionally violate the continuity axiom and the independence axiom (see 
e.g. Allais, 1953, and Tversky and Thaler, 1990). These findings prompted some 
authors to question also the normative tenability of specific tenets of EUT. For instance, 
Levi (1986) argues that there is nothing inherently irrational about having incomplete 
preferences when one faces situations of uncertainty. For their part, Allais and Hagen 
(1979) provide a normative critique of independence, and Sugden (1991, sec.IV) doubts 
that the transitivity axiom is a necessary requirement for rationality. 
 
A second cluster of anomalies document that - contrary to EUT - people’s preferences 
are frequently sensitive to several factors besides the expected utility associated with the 
examined options. For example, agents’ choices can considerably vary depending on the 
way preferences are elicited (see e.g. Diamond and Hausman, 1994, and Lichtenstein 
and Slovic, 1971) and how the description of the available options is framed (see e.g. 
Simonson and Tversky, 1992, and Tversky and Kahneman, 1981 and 1986). 
 
A third series of findings point to the mistakes and biases affecting agents’ probabilistic 
estimates. This evidence casts doubt on the EUT tenet that agents act as if they were 
computing the expected value of each action by impeccably applying the rules of 
probability calculus and Bayesian updating9. For instance, many people overestimate 
the representativeness of the sample on the basis of which they formulate their 
                                                          
9
 According to Bayes’ Theorem, when an agent receives new information I concerning an event 
E, she updates her probabilistic estimates in accordance with the formula P (E|I) = P(E) P(I|E) / 
P(I), where P(E), P(I|E) and P(E|I) respectively represent the prior probability, the 
verisimilitude and the posterior probability of E. 
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probabilistic evaluations and arrive at different probabilistic estimates depending on the 
order with which they receive information (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
 
When the violations of EUT were first presented, most economists reacted by casting 
doubt on the reliability and the robustness of the collected evidence. The thought was 
that the documented anomalies were more likely to reflect peculiar features of the 
examined choice settings than widespread tendencies of human choice behaviour. EUT, 
however, came under increasing pressure when the widespread and replicable character 
of its failures was documented. For instance, some authors (e.g. Kahneman, Slovic and 
Tversky, 1982, and MacCrimmon and Larsson, 1979) illustrated the robustness of 
various violations of EUT to modifications in the experimental setting and in the 
structure of agents’ incentives. Others (e.g. Bone, Hey and Suckling, 1999, Griffin and 
Tversky, 1992, and Wilson and LaFleur, 1995) demonstrated the persistence of several 
anomalies in presence of experienced agents. These findings prompted many authors to 
question the descriptive validity of EUT. In the words of Tversky and Kahneman, “the 
deviations of actual behavior from the normative model are too widespread to be 
ignored, too systematic to be dismissed as random error, and too fundamental to be 
accommodated by relaxing the normative system” (1987, p.68). 
 
Three main responses have been developed by mainstream economists. Some attempted 
to show that learning and incentives tend to reduce or even eradicate the reported 
violations (see e.g. Chu and Chu 1990, Cox and Grether, 1996, and Smith, 1991). 
Others insisted that EUT offers accurate predictions of decisions made under specific 
conditions. For instance, the proponents of the discovered preference hypothesis (e.g. 
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Binmore, 1999, and Plott, 1996) alleged that standard economic theory captures only 
the main causal factors influencing economic behaviour and interpreted its violations as 
resulting from some of the omitted factors. Still others refined the axiomatic apparatus 
of EUT so as to reconcile such a theory with the collected findings. For instance, some 
authors (e.g. Aumann, 1962) relinquished completeness, others weakened (e.g. Chew, 
1983, and Gul, 1991) or abandoned (e.g. Machina, 1982 and 1987) independence, still 
others (e.g. McClennen, 1990) relinquished both completeness and independence. Over 
the last decades, various modified versions of EUT have been developed along similar 
lines (see Starmer, 2000, for a detailed review). 
 
The proponents of NE are frequently sceptical about the defences and the theoretical 
refinements put forward by mainstream economists. In particular, they criticize most 
modified versions of EUT for being ad hoc or underconstrained. Before examining 
NEs’ instruments and studies, let us consider three lines of research at the interface 
between economics and other behavioural sciences which prelude NEs’ contributions. 
 
A first series of models, developed since the late Fifties, relate to the concept of 
bounded rationality. The idea (e.g. Simon, 1955 and 1957) is to construct more 
predictive economic models by taking into account psychological findings about 
decision making processes. The rationale in favour of this approach can be explicated as 
follows. Human individuals lack the cognitive and computational capacities required to 
make optimal decisions. In particular, they approximate the predictions of standard EUT 
only when their cognitive and computational limitations have a negligible impact on 
their behaviour. Hence, if economists are to build predictive models of choice, they 
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have to take into account the cognitive and computational limitations of real life 
economic agents. To give one example, the satisficing approach represents agents who - 
lacking the cognitive resources to compute optimal solutions - rest content with 
decisions that are sufficiently good for their purposes. 
 
A second series of models relinquish the axiomatic foundations of EUT and define 
agents’ utility functions in light of specific behavioural and psychological findings. By 
way of illustration, consider prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; see also 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, on cumulative prospect theory). In prospect theory, 
agents’ utility depends not only on their absolute levels of consumption, but also on 
how close these levels are to some specified reference point (see e.g. Markowitz, 1952). 
More specifically, Kahneman and Tversky propose a value function which: is concave 
in the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses to reflect agents’ decreasing 
sensitivity to gains and losses; is steeper in the domain of losses to capture agents’ 
aversion to losses; and has a flex point in the origin to reflect the fact that agents tend to 
be risk seeking when a prospect’s outcomes are all positive and risk averse when those 
outcomes are all negative. 
 
A third, more radical departure from traditional economic theory is represented by the 
heuristics and biases approach. The proponents of this approach relinquish the idea that 
decision making results from a unique optimizing strategy and model people’s choices 
as the result of many context-dependent decision rules (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 
1982, and Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). More recently, the so-called ecological 
rationality approach has been developed, which postulates that individuals routinely 
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make decisions on the basis of fast and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). In this 
context, decisions are regarded as rational to the extent that they are well-adapted to the 
opportunities and risks presented by the choice situation faced by the agent (Goldstein 
and Gigerenzer, 2002). This view sharply differs from economists’ traditional 
conception of rationality as conformity to context-independent rules of logic and 
probability theory. 
 
Over the last decade, NEs have urged other economists to incorporate not just 
psychological, but also neuro-biological insights into their models of choice. The 
proponents of NE share with behavioural economists the ambition to broaden the range 
of variables included in economists’ models. In particular, both NE and earlier research 
at the boundary between economics and psychology can be regarded as manifestations 
of a long-lasting trend to build more predictive models by extending the evidential base 
of economic theory (Payzan and Bourgeois-Gironde, 2005, p.7; see also Rustichini, 
2005, p.201-4). 
 
Having said that, it would be overly simplistic to regard NE as the mere continuation of 
behavioural and experimental economics with technologically more sophisticated 
instruments. For NEs rely on findings and methods from cognitive and computational 
neuroscience which transcend the reach of earlier contributions at the interface between 
economics and psychology (Montague, 2007a, p.219). Indeed, NEs frequently critique 
those contributions. For instance, Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer (2005, p.213-4) allege 
that bounded rationality models “have little or no predictive power outside of their 
bounded domains”. Similarly, Glimcher (2010, p.114 and 120) contends that prospect 
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theory “has too many interacting parameters [for being] a truly falsifiable theory” and 
criticizes the heuristics and biases approach for postulating hypothetical heuristics ad 
nauseam. 
 
To recapitulate, standard EUT enables economists to represent agents’ decisions across 
many choice settings in highly tractable terms. Such a theory, however, has various 
descriptive shortcomings, which prompted economists and other researchers to modify 
it in several ways. Some of these refinements (e.g. think of generalized expected utility 
theory) testify the flexibility of economists’ mathematical tools. Others point to more 
radical modifications of standard economic theory, which draw on evidence and 
modelling tools from other behavioural sciences. In this perspective, the anomalies and 
paradoxes faced by traditional economic theory can be regarded as both “signs of 
fundamental weaknesses” and a “fertile source of theoretical progress” (Sugden, 1992, 
p.x). 
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1.C INSTRUMENTS 
 
Scientific revolutions often result from the introduction of innovative technologies in a 
particular field of research. By way of illustration, think of the impact that Galileo’s 
telescope studies had on the controversy between the Copernican and the Ptolemaic 
systems (see e.g. McMullin, 2005). More recently, the development of high-energy 
machines has disclosed unprecedented possibilities of investigation in theoretical 
physics, giving new impetus to cosmological speculations and to the search for 
fundamental particles. The introduction of novel instruments fostered revolutionary 
modifications not just in physics or astronomy, but also in other natural and social 
disciplines. Recent developments in brain-imaging and brain-stimulation technology 
provide us with a striking example of technologically driven revolution in neuroscience. 
Let me expand on this issue. 
 
The human brain is one of the most complex systems that have been hitherto targeted by 
scientists. Its staggering complexity stems from several features of the human neural 
architecture, ranging from the remarkable number and variety of neurons (e.g. in terms 
of size and shape) to the heterogeneous functional and anatomical interconnections 
between brain regions. By way of illustration, the cerebral cortex of an adult contains 
approximately 1011 neurons, each having up to 104 synaptic connections, with average 
neural density reaching 105 neurons per mm3 in several areas (Braitenberg and Schuez, 
1998, and Rockel et al., 1980). 
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A neuron (see the figure below) typically comprises a cell body (also called soma) and 
an axon, i.e. a long protoplasmic fiber, covered by myelin sheath, by means of which 
the neuron transmits electrochemical signals to other neurons. Around the cell body, a 
branching dendritic tree receives signals from other neurons, while the axons’ terminals 
release neurotransmitters towards the dendrites of the surrounding neurons. 
Neurotransmission involves a number of neurochemicals (such as serotonin and 
dopamine) which regulate the activity of various neural populations. The junctions 
between the axon sender of one neuron and the receiver dendrite (or the cell body) of 
another neuron are called synapses10.  
 
Source: Carlson (1992, p.36). 
 
The process by means of which the brain collects information from the external 
environment can be divided into three steps, namely: transduction, which converts 
incoming stimuli into membrane voltages and action potentials; encoding and initial 
processing; and cortical processing (Glimcher, 2010, p.144). The activation process of 
                                                          
10
 Most synapses involve no direct contact between distinct neurons (chemical synapses). In 
some cases, however, there is some cytoplasmic continuity between adjacent neurons (electrical 
synapses). The existence of electrical synapses led some to doubt that neurons are more 
appropriately characterized as physically separate units (neuron doctrine) rather than as parts of 
a physically continuous network (reticular theory). For a discussion, see Mundale, 2001. 
Image removed due to copyright being held by another party.
 44 
most neurons, which is mediated by various types of ion channels situated on their 
surface membrane, can be characterized as follows (see the figure below; see also 
Hodgkin and Huxley, 1952, for an early model). When a neuron does not send any 
signal, the voltage difference between the outside and the inside of its membrane 
(resting potential) is approximately -70 mV (intracellular more negative). When a 
neuron sends impulses through its axon, a depolarizing current occurs and the voltage 
difference moves towards 0 mV. When such a difference is about -55 mV, an action 
potential (also called “spike”) is originated, with the voltage difference reaching up to 
40 mV. The threshold at which action potentials take place is approximately the same 
across many neural populations, while their duration varies from 0.1 to a few 
milliseconds. After a spike, a neuron typically enters a period of mechanical recovery 
(refractory period), with the voltage difference between the outside and the inside of the 
neuron returning back towards its initial value (repolarization). At this stage, one 
frequently observes a hyperpolarization, i.e. a state where the voltage difference goes 
beyond -70 mV (Harada and Takahashi, 1983). 
 
Source: http://soe.ucdavis.edu/ss0708/eghbalis/Notes/U12Notes.html 
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Before the introduction of brain-imaging and brain-stimulation instruments, 
neuroscientists investigated the human brain’s functional organization by examining 
subjects who had undergone brain damaging accidents (e.g. Damasio, 1994), invasive 
surgical interventions (e.g. Freeman and Watts, 1942, Gazzaniga and LeDoux, 1978), 
and inborn or degenerative diseases (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995). In such a context, lesion 
studies constituted the main source of evidence until the Seventies. In a typical lesion 
study, one associates the cognitive or computational impairment suffered by a patient 
with a specific brain lesion so as to identify what contribution the damaged region 
provides to normal brain functioning (Glymour, 1994). Regrettably, lesion studies do 
not enable one to develop systematic theories of brain functioning (see section 3.C). 
Thanks to brain-imaging and brain-stimulation tools, neuroscientists elaborated 
increasingly detailed anatomical maps and distinguished various neural populations 
according to functional criteria (Bechtel, 2002a, and Mundale, 1998). 
 
In the remainder of this section, I examine the brain-imaging and brain-stimulation 
instruments that NEs often use in their investigations. For the purpose of this enquiry, I 
gloss over some of the physical and chemical processes underlying the generation of the 
signals targeted by NEs’ instruments. My characterization, however, is sufficiently 
accurate to enable us to assess the evidential and epistemological concerns related to the 
collection and the interpretation of neuro-imaging data. I shall describe the principles 
underlying functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) and positron emission tomography 
(PET) in greater detail, as NEs frequently employ these tools in studying the neural 
substrates of choice behaviour. 
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i) The electroencephalogram (EEG) offers a graphic representation of the electrical 
impulses and currents which primarily originate from the pyramidal cells in the cortex 
(Kutas and Dale, 1997). In a typical EEG measurement, a number of electrodes (ranging 
from 16 to 256) are attached to the surface of a subject’s scalp. The electrodes are 
connected to a differential amplifier, which detects patterns of variation in voltage over 
time. By placing microelectrodes close to the soma or axon of a neuron, one can 
measure the overall synaptic activity in a targeted neural population (local field 
potentials, see e.g. Logothetis, 2002 and 2003). Moreover, so-called evoked response 
potentials (ERPs) can be obtained by presenting subjects with specific stimuli and by 
averaging the obtained responses over numerous EEG trials (Rugg and Coles, 1995, 
ch.1-2). EEG studies can provide detailed information about the timing of neural 
processes and require less demanding statistical analyses than fMRI or PET for 
interpretation (Bechtel and Stufflebeam, 2001). Unfortunately, EEG technology enables 
one neither to accurately locate the spatial origin of the registered signals nor to infer 
the functional roles played by the examined neural areas. For these reasons, EEGs are 
employed most fruitfully in combination with other brain-imaging and brain-stimulation 
instruments11. 
 
ii) The positron emission tomography (PET) enables one to estimate neural areas’ 
activation patterns by measuring the quantity of blood entering them (regional cerebral 
blood flow). Before undergoing a PET investigation, the subject is injected or inhalates 
a limited amount of radiolabeled compound (e.g. labeled glucose) having a short half-
                                                          
11
 Similar remarks apply to magnetoencephalography (MEG), a non-invasive technique which 
measures the magnetic fields generated by small intracellular electrical currents in the brain 
(Cohen and Halgren, 2004, and Hansen et al., 2010). 
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life. The radioactive atoms in the compound quickly decay, releasing positrons. Each of 
these positrons collides with a nearby electron and annihilates with it. As a result, two 
photons are emitted, which travel off the annihilation point in approximately opposite 
directions along a line with random orientation (Vardi, Shepp and Kaufman, 1985, p.8; 
see also Ter-Pogossian et al., 1980). 
 
As shown by the figure below, only some of those photons are detected by the detector 
ring, a cylindrical volume of detectors surrounding the head of the investigated subject. 
For instance, while the annihilation at point x is detected (locations D3 and D67), the 
one at point y goes unnoticed because the photons’ trajectory does not intersect the 
detector ring. On the basis of the observed detections, researchers estimate the 
concentration of the injected compound in different neural areas. This estimate, in turn, 
is interpreted in light of sophisticated computational models to yield graphic 
representations of neuro-physiological activity (Ollinger, 1994, and Ollinger and 
Fessler, 1997). 
 
Source: Vardi, Shepp and Kaufman (1985, p.9) 
 
iii) The functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) is an application of the magnetic 
resonance (MR) technology previously used in clinical research. In order to generate 
Image removed due to copyright being held by another party.
 48 
MR images, one needs both a contrast mechanism for estimating brain regions’ 
activations and a reliable criterion for interpreting the observed signals. MR can 
measure neural activation patterns via blood-volume changes (e.g. Belliveau et al., 
1991), changes in blood oxygenation (e.g. Ogawa and Lee, 1990), tissue perfusion (e.g. 
Detre et al., 1992) and even water diffusion (e.g. Le Bihan, 2007). Most fMRI studies, 
however, focus on variations in blood oxygenation levels. These haemodynamic 
variations are the source of the so-called BOLD (blood oxygenation level dependent) 
signal (Ogawa et al., 1990, and Toga and Mazziotta, 2002, ch.13). 
 
fMRI has higher temporal and spatial resolution than PET (Dobbs, 2005). Its 
functioning can be characterized as follows (Buxton, 2002, and Jezzard et al., 2002). 
The researcher applies a strong magnetic field to the patient’s skull to make the nuclei 
of atoms having odd atomic weight align the axes of their spin. A brief pulse of 
radiowaves is then used to perturb this alignment. When the pulse ends, the nuclei tend 
to go back to their aligned state, releasing radio waves whose frequency reflects the 
features of the targeted atoms (Bechtel, forthcoming)12. 
 
So far, fMRI investigations of decision making processes have predominantly focused 
on individual choices and two-agent interchanges, with very few authors investigating 
multi-agent interactions. In recent years, however, valuable insights concerning the 
neural underpinnings of collective decisions and social interactions have been acquired 
(see e.g. Berns et al., 2005). In this respect, it is worth mentioning the so-called 
                                                          
12
 MR images can be acquired after either multiple excitation pulses or a single pulse (echo 
planar imaging). The quality of MR images is affected both by the time between the excitation 
pulse and the recovered signal (echo time) and by the time between successive pulse sequences 
(repetition time). I do not expand on these details for the purpose of this enquiry. 
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hyperscanning, which allows one to simultaneously monitor neural activations in 
multiple subjects, each in a separate MRI scanner (see Montague et al., 2002, for the 
first application; see King-Casas et al., 2005, and Tomlin et al., 2006, for some 
hyperscan studies of repeated trust games). 
 
iv) The transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) consists in stimulating or deactivating 
specific cerebral regions by means of impulses of magnetic energy. More specifically, 
one applies a time-varying magnetic field and examines the modifications that are 
subsequently induced in the targeted neural areas (Hanks, Ditterich, and Shadlen, 2006). 
TMS can provide informative evidence about the functional role played by specific 
neural regions by selectively and reversibly perturbing their activation patterns (Bechtel 
and Richardson, 2010, p.256-7). TMS investigations can effectively complement fMRI 
studies, which often report the activation of areas whose operations are incidental to the 
execution of the examined tasks. Nonetheless, the reliability of TMS findings is 
constrained by our limited understanding of how TMS affects overall brain activity. For 
example, disrupting activation in the areas engaged by a particular task may stimulate 
activation in other regions whose operations interfere with those of the targeted areas in 
ways that elude experimental controls13. 
 
v) Single neuron measurements are performed by inserting microscopic electrodes 
directly in the brain and measure variations in individual neurons’ voltage. Despite 
having a commendably high spatial and temporal resolution, single neuron 
                                                          
13
 The activation patterns of specific neural areas can be altered also by means of electric 
stimulations (see Olds and Milner, 1954, and Mendelson, 1967, for early applications). Yet, the 
electric fields generated through electric stimulation are less focal and more sensitive to skull 
conductivity than the ones generated via TMS (Saypol et al., 1991). 
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measurements often disrupt activity in the investigated areas and are generally applied 
to non-human species due to ethical considerations. This significantly constrains their 
usefulness for the study of higher cognitive and computational functions. Moreover, 
single neuron measurements enable one to monitor the activity of only few neurons at 
once (Ludvig et al., 2001). Given that performing a task usually activates several 
functionally interconnected areas (see section 3.C), monitoring single neurons rarely 
provides informative insights regarding the functional organization of wider brain 
regions. 
 
To recapitulate, each brain-imaging and brain-stimulation instrument is characterized by 
specific strengths and limitations. By combining different instruments, NEs can acquire 
complementary information about the examined phenomena and provide independent 
evidential support to the findings obtained with a specific technique (Camerer, 2008a, 
and Logothetis, 2008a). To be sure, some brain-imaging and brain-stimulation 
instruments are prone to common biases and experimental confounds (see section 3.B). 
Still, obtaining convergent results by means of techniques involving independent 
auxiliary assumptions increases our confidence in each technique, as it is unlikely that 
those techniques produce similar findings by chance (Bechtel, 2002a, p.S48)14. 
 
                                                          
14
 A related debate has taken place in the philosophy of science regarding the so-called 
derivational robustness of models, i.e. the independence of a model’s implications from the 
assumptions used to derive them (Woodward, 2006; see also Levins, 1968). The following 
contrast is prominent in the literature. On the one hand, some authors (e.g. Kuorikoski, Lehtinen 
and Marchionni, 2010) argue that robustness analysis can be employed as a method for 
confirmation of specific claims about causal mechanisms. On the other hand, others (e.g. 
Weisberg, 2006, and Odenbaugh and Alexandrova, 2011) allege that robustness analysis is best 
regarded as a method of discovery rather than confirmation of hypotheses. 
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Besides combining different brain-imaging and brain-stimulation instruments, NEs 
often attempt to corroborate neural findings by triangulating neural, psychological and 
choice data (see e.g. Houser et al., 2007, and Wilkinson and Halligan, 2004; see also 
Rubinstein, 2007 and 2008, on response times). In particular, some NEs employ 
pharmaceuticals and hormones to investigate the causal underpinnings of choice 
behaviour (see e.g. Bielsky et al., 2005, on the influence of vasopressin on social 
recognition). The idea is to identify how people’s behaviour varies in response to 
diverse perturbations of the neuro-physiological processes associated with decision 
making (see e.g. Baumgartner et al., 2008, Kosfeld et al., 2005, and Zak et al., 2004, 
2005 and 2007, on the role oxytocin plays in promoting interpersonal trust). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CASE IN FAVOUR OF NEUROECONOMICS 
 
The proponents of NE often employ the following two-stage argument in advocating the 
neural enrichment of economic theory. In the first place, they cast doubt on the 
descriptive and normative validity of the traditional economic account of decision 
making. For instance, it is often argued - in line with some economists (e.g. Rustichini, 
2005, p.202, and Schotter, 2008, p.71-2) and philosophers (e.g. Hausman, 2008a, p.130-
9, and Sugden, 1991, sec.I-IV) - that rational choice theory faces frequent, statistically 
significant and robust descriptive failures; that axiomatic approaches typically fail to 
ground an informative account of economic behaviour; and that an exclusive reliance on 
observed choice data would constitute a severe limitation for the economic theory of 
choice. In the second place, NEs highlight various respects in which neuro-
psychological findings may inform the economic account of decision making. 
 
In this chapter, I identify several respects in which neural data have been claimed to be 
importable fruitfully into economic models of choice. I shall focus in turn on 
descriptive accuracy, predictive power, model selection, explanatory insightfulness, 
and applicability to welfare analyses. For each of these desiderata, I reconstruct an 
argument in favour of a neural enrichment of economic models which builds on the 
assertions that NEs put forward in the literature15. In doing so, I provide various 
considerations concerning the pragmatics of economic modelling and examine some of 
the findings that NEs deem to be of great significance for other economists. Moreover, 
                                                          
15
 These arguments are rarely given explicit formalization by NEs. Still, I take my 
reconstructions to provide a faithful characterization of NEs’ positions. 
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I illustrate how the NEs’ assertions can be combined in a cumulative case for the 
neural enrichment of economic theory. Before proceeding, let me provide three 
preliminary caveats regarding the contents of this chapter. 
 
Firstly, scientific models are constructed and applied for a variety of purposes, which 
range from making precise predictions to providing explanatory insights regarding the 
investigated phenomena. The list of attributes I examine does not exhaust the set of 
modelling desiderata valued by economists, yet provides us with an informative basis 
for assessing the merits of NEs’ calls to include neural insights into economic models. 
To be sure, each of these desiderata has been defined in dissimilar ways in the 
literature. As I aim to illustrate below, however, we can provide instructive insights 
into model selection and model evaluation in economics by adopting a sufficiently 
general and uncontroversial characterization of each desideratum16. 
 
My second caveat relates to the notion of model. A variety of things - ranging from 
physical objects (e.g. Black, 1962) to descriptions (e.g. Achinstein, 1968) and set 
theoretic structures (e.g. Suppes, 1960) - can serve as models. In what follows, I focus 
on mathematical models of decision making unless stated otherwise, without expanding 
on further distinctions between conceptions of economic models17. Also, I gloss over 
                                                          
16
 Significant interrelations exist between distinct modelling desiderata. For instance, descriptive 
accuracy is occasionally valued because of the predictive and explanatory gains it yields to 
modellers (see e.g. Camerer, 2007, C28). I shall expand on the interrelations between different 
modelling desiderata in chapter four. 
17
 See e.g. Lucas (1980) and Sugden (2000) on economic models as counterfactual or artificial 
worlds that modellers envision to investigate the properties of their target systems; McCloskey 
(1990) and Morgan (2001 and 2002) on models as a combination of an uninterpreted 
mathematical structure and a corresponding narrative interpretation; Gibbard and Varian (1978) 
and McCloskey (1983) on models as metaphors or caricatures intended to exaggerate or isolate 
specific features of the examined phenomena. 
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the various ways in which the relationship between models and their target systems has 
been characterized in the literature on scientific modelling (see e.g. van Fraassen, 1980, 
on isomorphism, and da Costa and French, 2003, on partial isomorphism; see also 
Giere, 1988, on different resemblance relations). 
 
My third caveat concerns the relationship between economic models and economic 
theory. The proponents of NE advocate the integration of neural insights in relation to 
both economic models and economic theory. The notions of model and theory have 
been characterized in several ways in the economic literature (see e.g. Mäki, 1993 and 
1996, Guala, 1998 and 2002, and Morrison and Morgan, 1999, ch.1-3), with significant 
distinctions being made between them. The following divide is particularly prominent in 
the literature on scientific modelling. On the one hand, the syntactic view (see e.g. 
Carnap, 1938, Braithwaite, 1953, and Nagel, 1961) defines theories as sets of sentences 
in an axiomatized system, with models providing an interpretation which relates the 
formal theory to the objects under investigation. On the other hand, the semantic view 
(see e.g. Suppes, 1967, Suppe, 1977 and 1989, and Giere, 1988) regards theories as 
collections of models rather than sets of axiomatic sentences. On this account, a theory 
is defined in terms of “the class of its models directly, without paying any attention to 
the questions of axiomatizability, in any special language” (van Fraassen, 2000, 
p.179)18. 
 
                                                          
18
 In the words of van Fraassen (1980, p.44): “The syntactic picture of a theory identifies it with 
a body of theorems, stated in one particular language chosen for the expression of that theory. 
[In the semantic] approach the language used to express the theory is neither basic nor unique; 
the same class of structures could well be described in radically different ways”. 
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In what follows, I speak of a neural enrichment of economic models and economic 
theory interchangeably, as the cogency of my considerations does not hinge on the 
difference between these two notions. Prima facie, my doing so might seem to obscure 
a distinction I proposed in section 1.A, according to which incremental and radical NEs 
respectively aim to modify economic models and economic theory. This, however, is 
not necessarily the case, as incremental NEs are concerned with specific models rather 
than entire classes of models (or theories). More generally, the point remains that 
incremental and radical NEs respectively attempt to modify standard economic theory 
to a significantly different extent (see section 1.A). 
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2.A DESCRIPTIVE ACCURACY 
 
Economic modellers often aim to provide descriptively accurate representations of the 
features or the behaviour of their target systems. A model’s descriptive accuracy can be 
evaluated along different dimensions (see e.g. Nagel, 1963, and Musgrave, 1981; see 
also Mäki, 1992, p.329, for a distinction between various respects in which the 
realisticness of economists’ modelling assumptions can be appraised). To render this 
point more vivid, let us distinguish the two following senses of “descriptive accuracy”. 
On the one hand, there is the question whether a model includes all the relevant 
properties or traits of the phenomena of interest. On the other hand, one can assess how 
accurate the model’s characterization of each of those properties is (see Weisberg, 
2007a, for a similar distinction). Now, a model can be regarded as more or less 
descriptively accurate depending on which of these two senses of “descriptive 
accuracy” is considered. For instance, one model may capture most of the properties of 
its target system but fail to characterize these properties accurately. Another model, 
instead, may include just a small subset of the properties of the examined phenomena 
yet offer an accurate characterization of those properties19. 
 
NEs refer to both of these senses of “descriptive accuracy” when they advocate the 
incorporation of neural insights into economic models. More specifically, their 
argument from descriptive accuracy can be characterized as follows: 
                                                          
19
 Various authors speak of “realism” instead of “descriptive accuracy”. For his part, Mäki 
(1988; see also his 1992, 2001, and 2007) advocates distinguishing the terms “realism” - which 
relates to ontological and semantic doctrines in philosophy - and “realisticness” - which 
designates specific attributes of scientific representations. 
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P.1 Standard economic theory fails to provide accurate characterizations of the 
neuro-psychological substrates of people’s decisions. 
P.2 By incorporating NE insights, economists could provide more accurate 
characterizations of the neuro-psychological substrates of people’s decisions. 
P.3 Standard economic theory posits agents having implausible cognitive and 
computational abilities. 
P.4 By incorporating NE insights, economists could construct models which posit 
agents having more plausible cognitive and computational abilities. 
C Economists should incorporate NE insights into their models of choice20. 
 
Let us examine the various steps of this argument in turn. Premise 1 asserts that the 
economic theory of choice fails to provide an accurate characterization of the neuro-
psychological substrates of people’s decisions. For instance, some NEs allege that while 
economists consider agents’ choices as primitives, these choices result from more 
fundamental neuro-psychological processes (see e.g. Glimcher, 2003 and 2010). Others 
contend that although economists regard people’s decisions as the product of conscious 
deliberation alone, human behaviour is shaped by the “fluid interaction between 
controlled and automatic processes, and between cognitive and affective systems” 
(Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005, p.11). The idea is that standard economic 
theory focuses exclusively on people’s rational motives, thereby failing to reflect the 
                                                          
20
 The conclusion of this argument contains the prescriptive term “should” even though it is 
derived from descriptive premises. This is because I suppressed for expository simplicity both 
an intermediate conclusion stating that “economists have some reasons to incorporate NE 
insights into their models of choice” and an implicit premise claiming that “these reasons 
license the claim that economists should incorporate NE insights into their models of choice”. 
Analogous remarks apply to the arguments in the sections below. 
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complexity of decision making processes (Payzan and Bourgeois-Gironde, 2005, p.12; 
see also Camerer, 2007). 
 
Premise 2 states that incorporating neural data enables economists to provide more 
descriptively accurate characterizations of the neuro-psychological processes underlying 
observed decisions. The thought is that brain-imaging and brain-stimulation techniques 
allow us to disclose the workings of the human neural architecture and measure 
variables that economists previously regarded as unobservable. In the words of 
Camerer, NE “is not in opposition to rational choice theory, but sees potential in 
extending its scope by observing variables that are considered inherently unobservable 
in [it]” (2008a, p.45). To be sure, many NEs acknowledge that economists usually have 
to rely on abstractions, isolations and idealizations in order to construct informative 
models21. At the same time, they question the legitimacy of severe simplifications in 
economic modelling and doubt that economists can remain agnostic regarding the 
neuro-psychological substrates of choice. Indeed, some (e.g. Camerer, 1998, p.177, and 
Glimcher, 2010, p.126 and 133) explicitly urge economists to complement or relinquish 
their as if representations in favour of mechanistically informed models (I shall expand 
on this issue in sections 4.A and 7.D). 
 
Premise 3, in turn, asserts that economic models posit agents having implausibly 
sophisticated cognitive and computational abilities. The idea is that the perfect 
calculators with complete preferences and prodigious reasoning skills figuring in the 
                                                          
21
 The idea is that “because of the high premium economics places on the […] quantification of 
evidence, attending to all facets of human nature is neither feasible nor desirable” (Rabin, 1998, 
p.13). See e.g. Cartwright, 1994, and Jones, 2005, on abstractions; Mäki, 1992 and 2009, and 
Sugden, 2000, on isolations; Cartwright, 1983, McMullin, 1985, and Weisberg, 2007a, on 
idealizations). 
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economists’ models do not remotely resemble real life human individuals. This lack of 
descriptive accuracy, in turn, is said to negatively affect both the explanatory and the 
predictive performance of economic models. To give one example, rational choice 
models often assume that a greater availability of options is better for agents. This, 
however, does not fit well with the evidence collected in many studies (see e.g. Sarver, 
2008, on how people often take decisions they later regret when more options are 
available). 
 
Finally, premise 4 alleges that NEs’ investigations provide economists with informative 
insights regarding agents’ cognitive and computational abilities. The thought is that 
since agents’ choices result from underlying neuro-psychological mechanisms, 
acquiring a better understanding of those mechanisms constrains economists’ 
conjectures regarding agents’ cognitive and computational endowment. On the basis of 
these premises, the argument concludes that economists should include neuro-
psychological variables and findings into their models of decision making. In the words 
of Camerer (2007, C35), “the largest payoff from [NE] will not come from finding 
rational-choice processes in the brain for complex economic decisions […] The largest 
innovation may come from pointing to biological variables which have a large influence 
on behaviour and are underweighted or ignored in standard theory” (see also Camerer, 
Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005, p.10, and Park and Zak, 2007, p.54). 
 
In rebuttal to the aforementioned claims, an economist may allege that economic 
models of choice are meant to describe neither the neural substrates of decisions nor the 
cognitive abilities of real life individuals. Indeed, some authors question the very idea 
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that traditional economic theory requires us to identify the modelled agents with 
individual people. As Ross puts it, “from the empirical point of view” the agents 
modelled by economists are “merely sites of consumption; there is no reason at all to 
assume they're people, rather than firms or countries or pension funds. [They] are 
'representative' optimizers whose ontological status is indeterminate” (2008b, p.130; see 
also Kacelnik, 2006, and Ross, 2002). To be sure, Ross (2008c, p.738) concedes that 
economic modellers are typically concerned with “individual optimizers”. Still, he 
insists that the idea that the paradigmatic model of an economic agent is an individual 
human being is “in no way part of or implied by the mathematics” of standard economic 
theory (Ross et al., 2008, p.viii; see also Ross, 2005). 
 
Now, it is true that many economic models can be applied without taking a position 
regarding what entities the posited agents map onto. Yet, the point remains that most 
economic models are meant to target the choice problems faced by real life individuals. 
Furthermore, the vast majority of economists implicitly assume that real life individuals 
constitute the paradigm case of agents. Indeed, it is hard to see how economists could 
assess the merits of their own models if they remained agnostic about what sort of 
entities those models are meant to represent. That is to say, abandoning the idea that 
“the paradigmatic economic agent is a whole adult person” may suffice to block the NE 
critique of economic theory (Ross, 2010, p.639). Still, few economists would be willing 
to relinquish this assumption. For such a presupposition plays a fundamental role in 
both model construction and model evaluation in economics. 
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2.B PREDICTIVE POWER 
 
The predictive performance of an economic model can be evaluated in several respects. 
By way of illustration, let us distinguish between predictive accuracy, which refers to 
the exactness of a model’s observable implications regarding the examined phenomena, 
and predictive robustness, which relates to the stability of a model’s predictive 
performance across distinct choice contexts. These two notions point to different aspects 
of a model’s predictive performance. For instance, some models may enable one to 
formulate very accurate predictions, but only in specific decision settings. Other models, 
instead, may allow one to make just approximate predictions across a wide range of 
choice situations. Moreover, both predictive accuracy and predictive robustness can be 
evaluated along different dimensions. For example, one may deem a model’s 
predictions to be more or less accurate, depending on whether she considers the 
magnitude of the effects anticipated by such model, the timing at which those effects are 
predicted to occur, and so on (Moscati, 2006). 
 
The proponents of NE often criticize economic models of choice by emphasizing their 
predictive shortcomings (e.g. Loewenstein et al., 2008, p.651, and Rustichini, 2005, 
p.202). Moreover, they argue that economists could obtain substantial predictive gains 
by incorporating neuro-anatomical and neuro-physiological insights. For instance, 
Camerer alleges that NEs’ investigations identify neuro-psychological variables that 
predict variations in people’s choices (2008a, p.46; see also Camerer, 2008b, p.370). 
Similarly, McCabe asserts that “by moving the study of decision making a step down, to 
the brain, neuroeconomics will […] make economic theory more predictive” (2008, 
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p.348). For their part, Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer (2005, p.221) go as far as to maintain 
that by revealing the neuro-biological mechanisms underlying people’s decisions, NEs 
will build “a mechanistically accurate economic theory which is by necessity 
predictive”. 
 
NEs have identified several respects in which a neural enrichment of economic models 
purportedly brings predictive benefits to economists. I am not concerned here with 
providing a comprehensive review of NEs’ appeals to predictive considerations. For the 
purpose of this section, I shall focus on the following argument from predictive gains: 
P.1 Neuro-physiological insights enable economists to predict variations in agents’ 
behaviour. 
P.2 Neuro-physiological insights enable economists to improve their out of sample 
predictions. 
P.3 Neuro-physiological insights enable economists to identify missing economic 
variables. 
C Economists should incorporate neuro-physiological insights into their models of 
choice. 
 
Let us consider the various premises of this argument in turn. According to premise 1, 
NEs’ contributions help economists to better account for the heterogeneity in agents’ 
choice behaviour. In the words of Camerer, NE research enables economists to “ground 
economic theory in detailed neural mechanisms which are expressed mathematically 
and make behavioural predictions” (2007, C26; see also Bernheim, 2009, and 
Rustichini, 2009). 
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To be sure, if NEs are to substantiate their calls for a neural enrichment of economic 
theory, their rationale for incorporating neural insights must go beyond the econometric 
platitude that when one increases the set of explanatory variables, the correlation 
between them and the dependent variables is almost bounded to increase22. Fortunately, 
various authors have provided persuasive success stories showing the predictive gains 
yielded by a neural enrichment of specific models of choice. For example, some (e.g. 
Hsu et al., 2005, and Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005) show that differential activation in 
some neural areas can be used to predict agents’ behaviour in conditions of risk and 
ambiguity. Others (e.g. Knutson et al., 2007) illustrate that the activation patterns of 
particular areas can constitute a better predictor of choices than people’s expressed 
preferences (see also the pioneering studies of Libet, 1965, and Libet et al., 1979). Still 
others (e.g. McCabe et al., 2001) predict subjects’ propensity to trust other players in 
game theoretic settings by monitoring the activations of specific areas. 
 
The reasoning underlying premise 2 can be explicated as follows. Economists often 
need to predict choice behaviour in novel decision contexts. Now, one might succeed in 
providing accurate predictions even without having detailed knowledge of the 
mechanistic underpinnings of the modelled phenomena (Woodward, 2003, p.232-3). 
Yet, models which do not take into account the mechanistic underpinnings of their 
target systems often fail to provide reliable and robust out of sample predictions 
(Bechtel and Richardson, 1993, and Craver, 2007; for some definitions of mechanisms, 
                                                          
22
 To give one example, the fact that morning sunshine is significantly correlated with stock 
returns in several countries (see e.g. Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003) falls short of implying that 
economists should import complex meteorological insights in their models of the financial 
market. 
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see Glennan, 2005, p.445, and Machamer et al., 2000, p.3). This remark is especially 
relevant for models examining choice contexts that are subject to rapid and profound 
modifications. In this respect, it would be of little import to contend that economists 
could formulate accurate out of sample predictions without importing neuro-
physiological insights. For these insights can help economists to ascertain not just 
whether observed choices are consistent with their theories, but also why this is the case 
so as to employ their models to different decision problems (Schotter, 2008, p.79). 
 
NEs’ calls to include neuro-physiological insights into economic models can be seen as 
an instance of a more general position, according to which economic models should 
capture the influence of the causal factors underlying the modelled phenomena (Mill, 
1844, ch.1; see also Cartwright, 1998, 1999 and 2007). The idea is that a model’s 
predictions are reliable to the extent that the causal factors it posits resemble those 
operating in the examined target systems (Pemberton, 2005). Analogous claims have 
been put forward by various proponents of NEs. For instance, Fehr and Camerer (2007) 
hold that identifying the neural substrates of observed choices in specific experiments 
helps economists to better predict people’s decisions in other experimental settings. 
Similarly, Rustichini asserts that investigating the algorithmic underpinnings of 
observed choices enables NEs to make more accurate predictions both across different 
decision settings and for more extended timescales (2009, p.50). 
 
Premise 3 points to a third respect in which neuro-physiological findings are said to 
yield predictive benefits to economists, namely the identification of missing economic 
variables (see e.g. Bernheim, 2009). To render this point more vivid, consider the 
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following example. People’s risk preferences cannot always be inferred univocally from 
their observed choices. Now, suppose that the activation patterns of some neural areas 
provide informative insights regarding agents’ risk preferences and that these activation 
patterns are accurately observable. Economists could employ observed neural 
activations as proxies for agents’ risk preferences when these preferences cannot be 
inferred precisely from the available choice data. Neural data could arguably be used to 
predict also hypothetical and counterfactual choices. To be sure, these predictions are 
complicated by the fact that several areas (e.g. those related to imaginative faculties) are 
likely to exhibit differential activations depending on whether agents envision actual, 
hypothetical or counterfactual decisions. Yet, in spite of these complications, NEs might 
succeed in building more predictive models by observing the activation patterns that 
specific areas exhibit while people contemplate hypothetical and counterfactual choice 
problems (Bernheim, 2009, p.14). 
 
On the basis of the previous premises, the argument from predictive gains concludes 
that economists should incorporate neuro-physiological insights into their models of 
choice. To better appreciate the rationale for this claim, let us consider one illustration 
of how including neural insights can increase the predictive power of a standard 
economic model. Economic agents frequently exhibit a significant degree of prosocial 
behaviour in game theoretic settings. Consider, for example, one-shot ultimatum games. 
In a typical ultimatum game, player 1 chooses how to split a given amount M of 
benefits between herself (b1) and player 2 (b2). Player 2, in turn, can either accept or 
reject the offer of player 1. If she rejects it, the benefits are lost to both players. Game 
theoretic reasoning predicts that player 2 should accept any positive transfer and that 
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player 1, anticipating this, should offer the smallest positive amount to her. Yet, subjects 
typically transfer fairly high amounts of benefits (see e.g. Guth et al., 1982). 
 
In a recent article, Vercoe and Zak (2010) propose a neurally informed model to 
account for why many agents offer resources to strangers in one-shot ultimatum games 
where such behaviour does not serve to build their own reputation as altruists. In this 
model, player 1 derives utility not just from keeping some benefits b1, but also from 
offering benefits b2 to player 2, provided that b2 > b*2 (i.e. her offer to player 2 is 
sufficiently high to be accepted) and α (τ) > 0. The term α (τ) represents an empathy 
function, with τ measuring the distress of player 2 perceived by player 1, and constitutes 
an innovation with respect to standard models of ultimatum games. To see this, let us 
focus on player 1. Her decision problem can be formalized as follows: 
 
Max b1,b2 U (b1) + α (τ) U (b2) 
s.t.   b1 + b2 = M,   b2 > b*2 
 
While moderate levels of observed distress increase empathy and assistance to others, 
high levels of perceived distress cause avoidance and inhibit oxytocin release (see e.g. 
Barraza and Zak, 2009). Moreover, various NE studies (e.g. Zak et al., 2004, and 
Kosfeld et al., 2005) associated increases in oxytocin with higher levels of empathy and 
trust (amount of resources an agent transfers in particular games). In light of these 
findings, Vercoe and Zak (2010) take α (τ) to capture the effects of oxytocin release, 
and characterize it as a continuous hyperbolic function with domain and range [0,1] 
such that α (0) > 0, α (1) = 0 and α (τ*) > α (0), with τ * = argmax α (τ). Their model 
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predicts that as α < α (τ*) rises, the benefits that player 1 offers to player 2 increase. By 
physiologically manipulating empathy (infusions of oxytocin and other hormones), 
Vercoe and Zak provide support to the predictions of their model in various 
experimental settings. 
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2.C MODEL SELECTION 
 
Economic modellers frequently value the possibility of deriving testable implications 
from their models. However, the observable implications of economic models of choice 
are typically conditional upon a variety of ceteris paribus qualifications and other 
auxiliary assumptions. Indeed, the very act of deriving testable implications from 
economic models often requires one to introduce subsidiary hypotheses about test 
conditions (Eichner, 1983). For these reasons, empirical and experimental findings 
contrary to a model’s implications can rarely be regarded as direct evidence against the 
model itself as opposed to some of its auxiliary assumptions (Hausman, 1992, p.207; 
see also Duhem, 1906, and Quine, 1953, for analogous remarks regarding scientific 
theories). As Machlup (1955, p.19) puts it: “When the economist’s prediction is […] 
based upon specified conditions, but where it is not possible to check the fulfilment of 
all the conditions stipulated, the underlying theory cannot be disconfirmed whatever the 
outcome observed […] our tests cannot be convincing enough to compel acceptance” 
(see e.g. Blaug, 1992, Hands, 1985a, Hutchison, 1978, and McCloskey, 1983, for a 
debate). 
 
The proponents of NE often criticize economists for relying on “a plethora of competing 
models that are either not tested, or if tested often explain the data equally well” 
(Vercoe and Zak, 2010, p.133). Moreover, they urge economists to select and assess 
their models in light of neuro-cognitive and neuro-computational evidence. Their 
argument from model selection can be reconstructed as follows: 
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P.1 Observed choice behaviour can be accounted for in terms of several competing 
economic models. 
P.2 Economists are often unable to discriminate effectively between competing 
economic models of choice. 
P.3 Neuro-physiological evidence enables economists to better discriminate between 
competing economic models of choice. 
C Economists should rely on neuro-physiological evidence to discriminate 
between their models of choice23. 
 
The proponents of NE frequently argue along these lines in advocating the use of neuro-
physiological data for model selection purposes in economics. For example, after 
contending that economists often provide various axiomatic systems consistent with 
observed choices, Camerer (2008a, p.47) alleges that “neural tests could winnow a 
crowded field of possible theories down to the more plausible theories”. Similarly, 
Rustichini (2009, p.58) complains that economists lack effective strategies for model 
selection and asserts that a “fundamental role” of NE research consists in “pruning the 
multiplicity of models, and to make them closer to the hard experimental test” (see also 
Glimcher, 2010, p.396)24. 
                                                          
23
 Discriminating between distinct models of the same target system is most plausibly 
conceptualized as not so much an all-or-nothing affair, but rather a matter of nuanced 
evaluation. I am not concerned here with providing a precise quantitative measure of the 
effectiveness with which we can discriminate between competing models of choice. An intuitive 
measure relates to a modeller’s ability to identify a narrow set of plausible models out of many 
available candidates. 
24
 Neural insights have been claimed to inform model selection and theory choice in other 
disciplines besides economics. For instance, Greene et al. (2001; see also Greene, 2007) take 
some brain-imaging findings about the neural correlates of moral deliberation to discriminate 
between deontological and consequentialist moral theories (see Berker, 2009, for criticisms). 
Similar debates took place in the literature at the interface between psychology and 
neuroscience. For example, some authors (e.g. Henson, 2005) allege that functional 
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To render these remarks more vivid, let us consider one example of how NE findings 
can inform model selection in economics. As we have seen in section 1.B, prospect 
theory accounts for various violations of traditional EUT by assuming that agents value 
options with respect to specific reference points. Now, reference points can be 
determined in terms of several variables, including the level of consumption to which 
one got used in the past, one’s expectations concerning her future levels of wealth, how 
one’s resources compare with those of other agents, etc. Regrettably, prospect theory 
does not specify how reference points are to be determined, how they vary across choice 
settings, and what reasons we have to believe that agents value options in reference-
based terms. 
 
Recent NE research provides some intriguing insights in this latter respect. For example, 
Glimcher (2010, p.274-8) argues that a reference-based encoding of external stimuli and 
choice options is metabolically more efficient (e.g. in terms of required energy 
consumption) than objective encoding. In his view, current neurobiology speaks against 
the reference-point independent valuation systems implicitly posited by standard EUT. 
These remarks arguably provide economists with an additional reason besides predictive 
considerations to favour prospect theory over traditional EUT models. 
 
A defender of standard economic theory might oppose the use of neural data for model 
selection purposes in economics on the ground that economic theory does not make 
explicit assumptions about the inner workings of the human neural architecture. After 
                                                                                                                                                                          
neuroimaging data enable us to discriminate between alternative psychological theories. Others 
insist that neuroimaging data do not (e.g. Coltheart, 2004 and 2005, and Harley, 2004) or even 
cannot (e.g. van Orden and Paap, 1997, and Uttal, 2001) provide decisive evidence concerning 
the merits of psychological theories. 
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all - the thought would be - why should economic models be evaluated in light of 
findings coming from disciplines having dissimilar methodological presuppositions and 
explanatory aims than economics? In rebuttal to this claim, various authors (e.g. Quartz, 
2008) doubt that economists can remain entirely agnostic concerning the neuro-
physiological underpinnings of choice behaviour. The idea is that even though 
economic models make no explicit assumptions regarding the inner workings of the 
human neural architecture, they do make predictions that can be either confirmed or 
disconfirmed by neuro-physiological evidence. Hence - the reasoning goes - neuro-
physiological data should be used to constrain and discriminate between alternative 
economic models. 
 
To be sure, NE models of choice are constrained not just by bottom-up neuroscientific 
findings, but also by top-down behavioural evidence. By way of illustration, consider 
the pioneering studies of Dorris and Glimcher (2004) on the neural substrates of reward 
evaluation. After observing that the firing rate of monkeys’ LIP neurons correlates with 
the relative expected desirability of saccadic eye movements, Dorris and Glimcher 
allege that “the average firing rates of these neurons may also encode the subjective 
desirability of actions in humans” (2004, p.376). Let us suppose that this was actually 
the case. As noted by Glimcher (2010, p.234-6), it would be mistaken to infer from it 
that the human brain encodes only relative expected subjective values. For any organism 
whose valuation system stored only these values would make intransitive choices much 
more often than humans are observed to do. In this respect, observed behavioural 
patterns constrain NE models by suggesting that distinct kinds of desirability signals are 
presumably encoded in the human brain. 
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2.D EXPLANATORY INSIGHTFULNESS 
 
Economic modellers often aim to not just describe or predict people’s decisions, but 
also explain them. Now, the mere fact that some economic models are predictive or 
descriptively accurate does not imply that they are also explanatory for economists. In 
the philosophy of science, dissimilar accounts of explanation have been advocated. For 
instance, some authors (e.g. Hempel, 1962 and 1965) conceive of explanation as the 
deductive derivation of a sentence describing the explanandum from a set of premises 
containing at least one natural law. Others (e.g. Salmon, 1971 and 1984) characterize 
explanation as the identification of statistical relevance relationships between the 
explanans and the explanandum. Still others (e.g. Craver, 2006 and 2007) relate 
explanation to the uncovering of the mechanistic underpinnings of the investigated 
target systems25. 
 
The proponents of NE frequently contend that, despite being at a relatively early stage 
of development, their discipline provides more explanatorily informative accounts of 
choice behaviour than standard economic theory. For instance, Zak (2004, p.1738) 
boldly asserts that NE research “will allow economists to answer fundamental questions 
they are unable to address”. Similarly, Brocas and Carrillo allege that NE provides “new 
reliable theories capable of explaining […] individual behaviour and strategic choices” 
(2010). In spite of NEs’ contentions, many economists doubt the explanatory relevance 
of neuro-physiological findings for the economic theory of choice. As Rustichini puts it: 
                                                          
25
 Each of these accounts of explanation faces objections. For instance, consider Hempel’s 
deductive nomological model. Pace Hempel, many generalizations appear to be explanatory 
even though they fail to satisfy his model’s conditions, and many derivations that are intuitively 
non-explanatory meet the conditions of the model (see e.g. Kitcher, 1981). 
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“a common criticism that is raised to neuroeconomics is the following. With this 
method we now know, for example, the specific regions in the brain that are active 
when some behavior is observed. This information may be very interesting for a 
neuroscientist […] but what does it add to the understanding of economic behavior?” 
(2005, p.201). 
 
NEs claim that their neuro-physiological findings provide economists with explanatorily 
informative insights in several respects. Their assertions can be combined into the 
following argument from explanatory insightfulness: 
P.1 NEs’ insights help economists to explain the variability in human choice 
behaviour. 
P.2 NEs’ insights help economists to provide singular explanations of economic 
phenomena. 
P.3 NEs’ insights help economists to account for some anomalies of standard 
economic theory. 
C Economists should incorporate NEs’ insights into their models. 
 
Let us consider the various steps of this argument in turn. Premise 1 asserts that NEs’ 
findings enable economists to better account for how people behave in different choice 
situations. This claim fits well with the unificationist model of explanation (e.g. Feigl, 
1970, Friedman, 1974, and Kitcher, 1981 and 1989), according to which scientific 
progress consists in disclosing connections between facts and phenomena previously 
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regarded as unrelated26. In the NE literature, various authors maintain that more 
accurate knowledge of the human neural architecture helps economists to better account 
for the interpersonal and intrapersonal variability of people’s decisions (McCabe, 
2003b, p.294; see also Craver and Alexandrova, 2008, p.396). Two kinds of NE 
contributions can be distinguished in this respect. On the one hand, some authors (e.g. 
van’t Wout et al., 2005 and 2006) illustrate how agents’ decisions change depending on 
the activation patterns of specific neural areas. On the other hand, others (e.g. McClure 
et al., 2004a, 2004b and 2007) document how the activations of particular areas vary 
depending on the features of the available options (e.g. the amount, variance and 
temporal distribution of rewards)27. 
 
An economist may object that in spite of its descriptive failures, standard economic 
theory offers a highly general account of choice behaviour, which enables economists to 
model a wide variety of decisions within a common mathematical framework (e.g. 
Dixit, 1990). One might even argue that economic theory has a degree of generality 
comparable to that of some theoretical frameworks in the natural sciences such as 
Newtonian mechanics and the theory of natural selection (see e.g. Rosenberg, 1992, 
p.231-2). Regrettably, these assertions do not provide economists with a cogent rebuttal 
to the NEs’ argument from explanatory insightfulness. To see this, let us distinguish 
between the notions of generality and explanatory reach. 
                                                          
26
 See e.g. Churchland and Churchland, 1996, on how Newton’s laws of motion unified 
previous accounts of terrestrial and celestial motion. For a critical appraisal of the unificationist 
account of explanation, see e.g. Halonen and Hintikka, 1999. 
27
 In NE game theoretic studies, neural activation patterns have been shown to vary depending 
on: players’ degree of cooperation in past moves (e.g. Rilling et al., 2002, and Sanfey et al., 
2003); players’ perceived fairness (e.g. Rilling et al., 2004a, and Singer et al., 2006); the theory 
of mind possessed by the players (e.g. Rilling et al., 2004b); and players’ reputation (e.g. King-
Casas et al., 2005, and Delgado et al., 2005). 
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In everyday scientific discourse, models and theories are said to be generalizable when 
they can be applied to a vast range of actual and hypothetical situations (see e.g. Gabaix 
and Laibson, 2008)28. Now, NEs may acknowledge that economists’ mathematical tools 
can be employed to model a wide variety of choices and target systems. This, however, 
does not imply that economists’ models of choice have a great explanatory reach, i.e. 
provide explanatory insights regarding a vast range of phenomena. Indeed, various NEs 
complain that economists, psychologists and neuroscientists can offer only “local 
explanations” of choice behaviour, which allow one to make “only very limited 
predictions about how [people] will behave in the future” (Glimcher, 2010, p.14; see 
also Padoa-Schioppa, 2008, p.455, for similar remarks). 
 
Premise 2 states that neural findings can help economists to develop more adequate 
singular explanations of economic phenomena. The thought is that NEs can better 
account for “why a certain fact occurred in a certain way”, providing us with detailed 
insights regarding “the causal and structural relations that produced [it]” (Aydinonat, 
2010, p.159). By way of illustration, let us consider some NE studies which manipulate 
people’s choice behaviour by means of neurochemicals. These studies aim to “identify 
the reasons why different conditions produce different behaviors [by] using drugs to 
cause changes in brain activity” (Vercoe and Zak, 2010, p.143). For example, Kosfeld et 
al. (2005) show how inhaling oxytocin makes subjects more likely to invest more, yet 
without altering their risk preferences (see also Zak et al., 2004). 
                                                          
28
 See also Matthewson and Weisberg (2009, p.182) and Weisberg (2004, p.1076), on the 
distinction between a-generality - which concerns how many actual phenomena a model applies 
to - and p-generality - which relates to how many logically, nomologically or physically 
possible systems are targeted by a model. 
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The significance of these contributions can be appreciated in light of the interventionist 
account of explanation, according to which explanation consists in displaying patterns 
of counterfactual dependence between the investigated target variables and particular 
sets of intervening variables (Woodward, 2003, and Woodward and Hitchcock, 2003a 
and 2003b). The idea is that NE findings help economists provide robust generalizations 
regarding how the examined target variables (e.g. specific agents’ decisions) vary under 
experimentally regimented interventions on specific neuro-physiological variables. 
 
Premise 3 asserts that NEs’ insights explain some of the anomalies faced by standard 
economic theory. For instance, Rustichini maintains that neuro-psychological findings 
enable NEs to account for some inconsistent decisions by explaining them as the result 
of an optimal adjustment of people’s learning mechanisms to the choice situations they 
face (2009, p.55). Similarly, Brocas and Carrillo (2010) claim that “evidence from the 
brain sciences […] can help uncover the ‘true’ motivations for the ‘wrong’ choices and 
improve the predictive power of the theory”29. In this respect, it would be of little 
import to reiterate (see e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008) that economists can 
accommodate a vast array of experimental and empirical results by altering the 
mathematical formulation of agents’ preferences and constraints. For accommodating 
the available evidence does not amount to accounting for it. 
 
To render this point more vivid, let us compare briefly the Ptolemaic model of planetary 
motion and Newton’s gravitational model. The epicycles postulated to reconcile the 
                                                          
29
 Similar claims were put forward by some behavioural economists. For instance, Rabin holds 
that “because psychology systematically explores human judgement, behaviour and well-being, 
it can teach us important facts about how humans differ from the way they are traditionally 
described by economists” (1998, p.11). 
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former with celestial observations accommodate the trajectories followed by specific 
planets, yet do not offer informative insights as to why the planets move as they do. On 
the contrary, Newton’s model provides an explanatorily instructive account of planetary 
motion in terms of gravitational force. By way of analogy, consider some behavioural 
economic models such as prospect theory. These models often fit observed choices 
better than standard EUT. At the same time, they do not provide explanatory insights 
regarding why the anomalies of EUT emerge in the first place. In this respect, NE 
promises to enable economists to better account for people’s decisions by disclosing the 
underlying neuro-psychological mechanisms. 
 
To give one example, consider ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg, 1961). Three main 
explanations of this phenomenon have been proposed in the economic literature. The 
first suggests that when the odds are unknown agents assume that someone may control 
the odds to their disadvantage. The second holds that people treat probabilities as if they 
were outcomes and thus tend to be risk-averse with regard to probabilities as they are 
concerning outcomes. The third account interprets ambiguity aversion as the result of 
people’s reluctance to bet whenever they think that others possess information they 
lack. Now, choice behaviour data rarely enable researchers to discriminate between 
these competing accounts of ambiguity aversion. In a recent study, Hsu et al. (2005) 
document that several neural areas (e.g. the amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex) 
exhibit different activations in conditions of ambiguity as opposed to conditions of risk. 
This finding does not per se discriminate between the first and the third interpretation of 
ambiguity aversion, but casts doubt on the second explanation (see Keren and Gerritsen, 
1999, for some subjective reports in support of those interpretations). 
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2.E WELFARE ANALYSES 
 
So far, we have examined several respects in which incorporating neural insights can 
improve positive economic theory. NEs, however, advocate the neural enrichment of the 
economic account of decision making also on normative grounds. In particular, several 
NEs take neuro-psychological findings to challenge traditional economic welfare 
analyses and policy evaluations. Below I consider the argument from wants / likes 
divergences by means of which some NEs criticize standard welfare analyses. The 
reasoning, which targets economists’ alleged identification between agents’ wants and 
likes, goes as follows: 
 
P.1 Economic welfare analyses focus on people’s wants. 
P.2 People’s well-being depends on their likes. 
P.3 People’s wants and likes diverge. 
C(1) Economic welfare analyses fail to capture agents’ well-being. 
P.4 NEs’ findings accurately measure people’s well-being. 
P.5 NEs’ findings help people choose what promotes their well-being. 
C Economic welfare analyses should rely on NEs’ findings. 
 
Let us examine the various steps of this argument in turn. As stated by premise 1, 
welfare economists are typically concerned with people’s wants. These are usually 
inferred from observed choices or agents’ own reports. According to premise 2, 
however, people’s well-being relates not so much to what they struggle to obtain, but to 
what they actually like. The idea is that satisfying people’s preferences does not 
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necessarily make them better off (Loewenstein et al., 2008, p.666) and that economic 
welfare analyses should target what individuals like rather than what they happen to 
desire and choose (Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005, p.37). In the words of Gul 
and Pesendorfer, many NE studies rest on the assumption that “what makes individuals 
happy […] differs from what they choose” and that economic welfare analyses should 
be based on what makes individuals happy rather than “the utilities governing choice” 
(2008, p.3). 
 
Premise 3 states that people’s wants and likes diverge. The thought is that people’s 
motivations for action are “not always closely tied to hedonic consequences” (Camerer, 
Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005, p.37; see also Camerer, 2006). There are various reasons 
why a mismatch between wants and likes can occur. To give one example, people’s 
preferences are occasionally based on mistaken beliefs and can be prone to 
manipulation (see e.g. Elster, 1983, and Sen, 1987). Moreover, people’s epistemic and 
computational limitations constrain their ability to judge whether they will like what 
they want (see e.g. Bernheim and Rangel, 2008, and Loewenstein and Haisley, 2008). 
Indeed, people often struggle to obtain things they will not like in the long run due to 
self-control problems (see e.g. Loewenstein, 1996, and Ross et al., 2008, on drug 
addicts and pathological gamblers). 
 
The purported correspondence between likes and wants was disputed by some cognitive 
scientists before the advent of NE. For instance, Berridge (1996) challenged the 
assumption that people struggle to obtain what they will like by pointing out that two 
separate systems - one responsible for motivation and desire (wanting system), the other 
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responsible for pleasure and pain (liking system) - underlie people’s behaviour. As 
Berridge’s distinction suggests, satisfying people’s immediate desires may fall short of 
maximizing their longer-term hedonic satisfaction. Moreover, the alternative that would 
maximize an agent’s hedonic satisfaction may fail to be among her preferred options. 
 
On the basis of the first three premises, conclusion 1 doubts that standard economic 
welfare analyses provide informative insights concerning people’s well-being. 
According to premises 4 and 5, identifying the neuro-psychological processes 
underlying decisions enables NEs to measure well-being and help people choose what 
promotes their well-being. The thought is that NE findings help us identify both why 
people often act in ways that do not promote their well-being and what kinds of 
interventions are likely to correct their actions. In this perspective, NE promises to 
integrate two major lines of research at the boundary between economics, psychology 
and neuroscience, namely happiness studies (see e.g. Bruni and Porta, 2005 and 2007) 
and recent investigations on how to design and alter people’s choice architectures. Let 
me expand on this latter point. 
 
Various ways to correct people’s decisions have been proposed in the literature, ranging 
from restricting agents’ choice set to making some options more salient than others. By 
way of illustration, let us consider what kinds of intervention are respectively advocated 
by asymmetric paternalists and libertarian paternalists. The proponents of asymmetric 
paternalism (e.g. Camerer et al., 2003, and Camerer, 2006) argue that it is often possible 
to benefit people who make suboptimal decisions without imposing substantial costs or 
restrictions on those who make optimal decisions. For their part, libertarian paternalists 
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(e.g. Sunstein and Thaler, 2003, and Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) maintain that people 
can be induced to make better decisions without having their autonomy infringed. In the 
words of Loewenstein and Haisley, NE research makes it possible to “steer human 
behavior in more beneficial directions while minimizing coercion” (2008, p.6). 
 
I am not concerned here with settling the merits of these assertions. In section 4.A, I 
shall put forward some cautionary remarks regarding the relevance of neuro-
psychological findings for economists’ welfare analyses. In section 7.C, I shall critically 
assess some NEs’ attempts to measure and promote the well-being of economic agents. 
In doing so, I shall argue that NEs’ calls to ground economists’ normative analyses on 
neuro-psychological findings rest on presuppositions which transcend both the scope of 
traditional decision theory and the evidential reach of NE investigations. 
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2.F THE META-ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF NEUROECONOMICS 
 
As we have seen in the previous sections, economists can improve their models with 
regard to specific modelling desiderata by incorporating neuro-anatomical and neuro-
physiological insights. The arguments we presented above can be combined in a 
cumulative case in favour of NE in a relatively straightforward way. The idea is to take 
the conclusion of each of those arguments and include it as premise in a meta-argument 
whose conclusion is that economists should incorporate NEs’ insights into their account 
of choice behaviour. This meta-argument goes as follows: 
 
P.1  NE insights increase the descriptive accuracy of economic models of choice. 
P.2  NE insights overcome the predictive failures of standard economic theory. 
P.3  NE insights enable economists to discriminate between competing economic 
models of choice. 
P.4  NE insights help economists to better explain people’s decisions. 
P.5 NE insights accurately measure and effectively promote people’s well-being. 
C  Economists should incorporate NE insights into their account of choice 
behaviour. 
 
Prima facie, this meta-argument seems to provide compelling reasons in favour of a 
neural enrichment of economic theory. As I argue in the following chapters, however, 
there are cogent reasons to resist this cumulative case in favour of NE. More 
specifically, I shall articulate several lines of argument which attempt to demonstrate 
that economists are provisionally justified in retaining a methodologically distinctive 
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approach to the modelling of decision making. Let me briefly anticipate these 
arguments in turn. 
 
In chapter three, I critically assess the evidential basis on which NEs’ findings and 
inferences rest. In particular, I argue that many NEs’ claims can be disputed on purely 
evidential and epistemological grounds. The reasoning I present in chapter four can be 
summarized as follows. NEs and other economists respectively value different 
modelling desiderata. These desiderata often pull in opposite directions and make 
contrasting demands on modellers. Those contrasts, in turn, severely constrain the 
incorporation of neural insights into economic models of choice. 
 
In chapter five, I cast doubt on NEs’ attempts to elaborate a single, general theory of 
choice behaviour on two main grounds. The former concerns the profound 
dissimilarities (e.g. in terms of employed constructs and pursued explanatory aims) 
between the economic, psychological and neuroscientific accounts of decision making. 
The latter relates to some central respects (e.g. how NE is supposed to inform economic 
theory) in which NEs themselves hold contrasting positions. In chapter six, I provide a 
case study to illustrate how the conceptual differences between NE’s parent disciplines 
constrain the relevance of neuro-psychological findings for the economic theory of 
choice. In chapter seven, I differentiate various senses of the term “revolution” and 
argue that NEs are unlikely to prompt revolutionary modifications in economic theory 
in any of these senses. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ARGUMENT FROM UNCONVINCING EVIDENCE 
 
The recent advances at the interface between economics, psychology and neuroscience 
have encouraged various NEs to put forward quite ambitious assertions regarding the 
relevance of NE for its parent disciplines. NEs’ claims have prompted a variety of 
reactions among the practitioners of these disciplines. In particular, some economists 
welcome the opportunity to enrich specific models of decision making in light of neuro-
psychological findings. Still, most remain convinced that NE is de facto (e.g. Harrison, 
2008a and 2008b, and Rubinstein, 2008) or even in principle (e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer, 
2008) incapable of triggering revolutionary modifications in the economic theory of 
choice. 
 
In this chapter, I critically assess the accuracy and the reliability of the evidential basis 
of brain-imaging and brain-stimulation findings. Moreover, I identify and discuss some 
epistemological issues which arise concerning the inferences made in those studies. My 
reasoning can be summarized as follows. NEs criticize standard economic theory in 
several respects and speak of introducing profound modifications in economic models 
of choice. For NEs’ criticisms and proposals to be effective, their evidential basis must 
be statistically significant and robust to changes in experimental settings. In many cases, 
however, NEs fail to show that the evidential basis of their claims is statistically 
significant and robust to changes in experimental settings. Hence, many NEs’ claims 
can be resisted on purely evidential grounds. 
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Before proceeding, let me emphasize that my critique is by no means intended to cast 
doubt on the merits of brain-imaging and brain-stimulation studies indiscriminately. On 
the contrary, my aim is to identify the main strengths and limitations inherent in those 
investigations so as to better assess the potential for success in NE research. In sections 
3.A and 3.B, I focus on the issues that respectively arise in relation to the collection and 
the interpretation of neural data. In section 3.C, I assess the reliability of specific kinds 
of inferences that NEs make in their studies. 
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3.A COLLECTION OF DATA 
 
The experimental protocols employed in NE studies differ in a number of respects, 
ranging from the kind of examined organisms to the instruments used to monitor the 
neural areas of interest. The design of specific experiments includes elements such as: 
production procedures, which prescribe what stimuli are to be presented to the subjects 
and the temporal distribution of these stimuli; measurement procedures, which indicate 
what variables are to be monitored in the pre-stimulus, inter-stimulus and post-stimulus 
phase; and detection procedures, which specify what value the measured variables must 
have for the experimenters to legitimately conclude that the phenomenon of interest 
occurred (Sullivan, 2009, p.514). In this section, I examine some evidential and 
epistemological issues which arise with regard to the collection of raw neural data. 
More specifically, I discuss in turn the limited availability and representativeness of 
data, the insufficient spatial and temporal resolution of current NE instruments, and the 
constrained reliability of the proxies targeted in NE studies. 
 
1) Limited availability and representativeness of data 
 
Availability of raw neural data is often claimed to be a crucial prerequisite for the 
verifiability and the reproducibility of NE findings. Regrettably, NEs rarely make raw 
neural data publicly available to other researchers (Harrison, 2008a, and Spiegler, 
2008). In this respect, one may well note that other neuroscientists rarely make raw 
neural data public (Quartz, 2008, p.467). This, however, merely redounds to the 
disputable character of the current experimental practice, which violates the standards of 
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most economic practitioners and fails to incentivize the adoption of rigorous procedures 
for data processing (Ortmann, 2008, p.442). That is to say, precisely because of the 
difficulties involved in interpreting and replicating NE experimental reports (see below) 
it is highly advisable that NEs make raw neural data publicly available. 
 
As to the representativeness of the published results, some authors (e.g. Glaeser, 2008) 
worry that the increasing accessibility of brain-imaging and brain-stimulation 
technology, coupled with the decreasing costs for setting up experimental trials, 
incentivizes selective presentation of findings. To be sure, inter-laboratory competition 
discourages strategic misrepresentations of findings and can alleviate the flaws inherent 
in individual studies (Hubbard, 2003). Yet, the complexity of the experimental designs 
and the inferential steps involved in NE studies render it more difficult to assess the 
representativeness of the published results. More generally, the impression remains that 
the hurry to colonize new areas of investigation led some NEs to overstate the evidence 
supporting their claims. To render this point more vivid, let us consider the limited size 
of the experimental samples employed in most NE studies. 
 
The number of subjects whose brains are monitored in neuroscientific experiments is 
usually quite small, i.e. typically less than twenty (Cabeza and Nyberg, 1997 and 2000). 
The limited size of the experimental samples, in turn, significantly constrains the 
reliability of the conclusions derived from the collected data. Now, while many 
practising neuroscientists acknowledge this concern, NEs frequently gloss over it as if it 
was of negligible importance. For instance, Bhatt and Camerer (2005, p.432) dismiss 
the complaint that a small number of subjects are typically monitored in fMRI 
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investigations by claiming that “for most fMRI studies [16 subjects] is usually an 
adequate sample to establish a result because adding more subjects does not alter the 
conclusions much”. As shown by the history of lesion studies (see e.g. Bechtel, 
forthcoming), one may occasionally gain informative neuro-physiological insights on 
the basis of a small experimental sample. However, it is still an open empirical question 
whether monitoring just a few subjects enables NEs to obtain robust findings in “most 
fMRI studies” (see Thirion et al., 2007, for discussion). Moreover, the mere fact that the 
results of some experiments do not considerably vary when the size of the examined 
sample is increased does not license confidence in the accuracy of those findings. For 
one might get stable experimental outcomes even in cases where the technology 
provides rather inaccurate measurements of the investigated phenomena. 
 
2) Insufficient spatial and temporal resolution 
 
The accuracy of brain-imaging and brain-stimulation reports depends on a number of 
factors. Among these, we find the spatial resolution and the temporal resolution of the 
employed instruments. Spatial resolution refers to a scanner’s capacity to detect the 
elementary units of brain activation (Logothetis, 2008a, p.870). So-called ‘voxels’ 
(volume pixels) constitute the smallest box-shaped part of a three-dimensional scan and 
can be regarded as the basic observational units targeted by neuro-imaging studies. An 
unfiltered voxel in a typical fMRI study contains up to 6 x 106 neurons, with many of 
these having to activate to generate a detectable signal (Bechtel and Richardson, 2010, 
and Logothetis, 2008b). Now, advances in scanner technology will presumably allow 
for significant improvements in signal specificity and voxel size in the future. Still, the 
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point remains that the accuracy of current brain-imaging investigations is subject to 
severe constraints. This, in turn, calls into question NEs’ calls to modify economic 
models of choice in light of the available neuro-physiological findings. 
 
Similar concerns arise regarding the temporal resolution of the signals targeted in NE 
studies. These signals may reflect the integration of up to a few seconds of neuro-
physiological activity (Henson, 2005). Given that neural activations may take place 
within milliseconds, the workings of various neural populations are likely to go 
unnoticed. This problem has been alleviated thanks to the introduction of scanners with 
higher temporal resolution, but affects even the so-called event-related fMRI, where 
several signals can be generated within a second (Rosen et al., 1998). That is to say, 
even the most advanced scanners yield information that is “orders of magnitude 
coarser” than neural firings themselves (Roskies, 2008, p.24). These limitations, in turn, 
call into question the suitability of NEs’ current technology for studying the neural 
substrates of choice behaviour. 
 
3) Unreliable proxies 
 
The signals examined in fMRI and PET studies do not measure neural activity directly. 
On the contrary, they target physiological factors “that are causally related in a rather 
complex way to downstream consequences of neural activity” (Roskies, 2008, p.25). In 
particular, neural activations are usually estimated on the basis of proxies whose 
accuracy and reliability have been questioned on various grounds (e.g. Logothetis et al., 
2001, and Logothetis and Pfeuffer, 2004). To render this point more vivid, let us briefly 
 90 
compare the processes by means of which the signals targeted in PET and fMRI studies 
are generated. 
 
As shown by the figure below, when a neural area activates, one typically observes a 
noticeable increase in cerebral blood flow and in glucose utilization (Fox et al., 1988), 
coupled with a differential increase in oxygen consumption (Fox and Raichle, 1986). 
PET targets variations in regional cerebral blood flow, while fMRI captures 
discrepancies between variations in regional cerebral blood flow and changes in oxygen 
consumption (Kim and Ugurbil, 1997, and Ogawa et al., 1990)30. In particular, the 
BOLD signal targeted by fMRI reflects the mismatch between variations in regional 
blood flow and changes in the amount of oxygen remaining at the site of brain 
activation (Raichle, 1998). 
 
Source: Raichle (1998, p.770) 
 
                                                          
30
 The quantity of blood flowing to a neural area can be estimated thanks to the fact that 
oxygenated blood is diamagnetic (i.e. it weakly counteracts the applied magnetic field) and that 
deoxygenated blood is paramagnetic (i.e. it slightly enhances the magnetic field). For further 
details, see Huettel et al. (2004, ch.1). 
Image removed due to copyright being held by another party.
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Let us focus on BOLD signals. The interpretation of these signals is complicated by the 
fact that their strength does not always reflect a region’s intensity of activation in 
accurate terms. There are various reasons why this can happen (see e.g. Logothetis and 
Wandell, 2004). Let us consider three such reasons in turn. Firstly, BOLD signal 
responses non-linearly vary in strength with the strength of the applied magnetic field 
and increase only marginally in regions having naturally high blood flow (Bechtel and 
Richardson, 2010). Secondly, oxygenation variations in large vessels can conceal 
oxygenation changes in the capillary bed and generate spurious BOLD signals (Klein, 
2010a). And thirdly, excitatory and inhibitory interactions between different neural 
populations (see e.g. Douglas and Martin, 2004) occasionally generate considerable 
dissociations between actual neural activity and the metabolic variations targeted by 
fMRI and PET instruments (Buzsaki et al., 2007, and Logothetis, 2008a). Indeed, 
neuromodulatory interactions can induce larger perturbations in BOLD signals than the 
sensory inputs themselves, with increases in BOLD signals occurring even without a net 
excitatory activity in the examined neural populations (Jueptner and Weiller, 1995, and 
McCormick et al., 2003). 
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3.B INTERPRETATION OF DATA 
 
In this section, I consider some of the evidential and epistemological issues which arise 
in relation to the interpretation of neuro-physiological data. More specifically, I discuss 
in turn the alleged arbitrariness, the derived character and the limited generalizability of 
many brain-imaging and brain-stimulation findings. This list does not exhaust the set of 
concerns related to the interpretation of NE studies31. Yet, it identifies some major 
respects in which we can evaluate the evidential basis of NEs’ investigations. 
 
1) Arbitrary Findings 
 
The definition of the baseline conditions of activation and the identification of 
activation thresholds constitute two major sources of the purported arbitrariness of 
many NE findings. Let us examine these two issues in turn. In a typical brain-imaging 
study, the baseline conditions “consist of lying quietly but fully awake in [the] scanner 
with eyes closed or passively viewing a television monitor” (Raichle, 1998, p.768). 
However, complex physiological and metabolic variations usually take place in the 
human brain even when one is not engaged in specific cognitive or computational tasks 
(Gusnard and Raichle, 2001, and Newman et al., 2001). This, in turn, significantly 
complicates the interpretation of the observed activation patterns (see the point 3 
below). 
 
                                                          
31
 See e.g. Roskies (2007) and Savoy (2001) on how observed activations can be given different 
interpretations depending on one’s background assumptions regarding brain’s structure and 
functioning. 
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With regard to thresholding, the fact that claims of statistical significance are relative to 
the choice of a specific significance level has subtle implications for the interpretation 
of neuroimages. In particular, various authors worry that thresholding at any level of 
significance tends to generate “artificially sharp barriers between ‘active’ and ‘inactive’ 
regions” (Klein, 2010a, p.270). This concern can be partly mitigated by providing 
gradations of color representing different magnitudes of the examined test statistics 
(Hubbard, 2003, p.29). Yet, images reporting dissimilar patterns of activation can be 
obtained by setting different activation thresholds. Moreover, what activations are 
detected at particular significance levels often varies depending on the temporal and 
spatial specificity of the employed scanners (Huettel et al., 2004, and Thirion et al., 
2007). In light of these remarks, the precision of the colourful pictures appearing in 
several NE studies appears to be elusive and to some extent misleading (Hardcastle and 
Stewart, 2002)32. 
 
2) Derived Character of Findings 
 
The experimental reports presented in NE articles are typically obtained after a number 
of data manipulations and statistical adjustments. These manipulations and 
adjustments alter raw neural data in ways which often elude the experimenters’ control 
(see e.g. Bullmore et al., 1995, and Uttal, 2001). In what follows, I focus on the BOLD 
signal targeted in fMRI studies and critically inspect three kinds of intervention 
required to make raw fMRI data amenable to analysis and intersubject comparisons, 
                                                          
32
 See also Weisberg et al. (2008) on people’s tendency to regard specific psychological 
explanations as more compelling even when irrelevant neuroscientific data are presented in their 
support. 
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namely: corrections for the independence of statistical tests, brain averaging and brain 
normalizations. Let us consider these three interventions in turn. 
 
Neuroimages do not report brain activity directly, but rather indicate regions where the 
data license some confidence that the examined areas underwent differential 
activations across experimental conditions (Klein, 2010b, p.187). In a typical brain-
imaging study, thousands of statistical tests for activation are performed across voxels 
(Friston et al., 1995a). The significance test for activation consists of two steps. Firstly, 
one estimates the likelihood that one would observe an area’s activation when the 
experimental tasks do not engage activation in that area (spurious activation). 
Secondly, one compares the estimated likelihood to a predetermined significance level 
for each investigated brain region. The results are summarized in statistical parametric 
maps, which illustrate in what areas the data warrant a confident assertion of 
differential activity across experimental tasks (Klein, 2010a, p.267-8). 
 
Given that the signals coming from spatially contiguous voxels are often correlated, the 
statistical tests performed on these regions are not independent and tend to yield false 
positives (Henson, 2005, p.208). To remedy this problem, researchers correct the 
obtained statistical estimates in various ways (see e.g. Friston, 2003, and Friston et al., 
1995b)33. Even so, several authors (e.g. Kiebel et al., 1999) question the validity of 
those corrections. Indeed, some go as far as to contend that the correlations reported in 
neuroscience studies are endemically inflated (see e.g. Vul et al., 2009, on social 
                                                          
33
 For instance, one can constrain the search for effects in the main fMRI experiment to 
anatomically delimited regions by performing a functional localiser, i.e. an auxiliary fMRI 
experiment which aims to isolate a functionally specialised region of interest before the 
implementation of the main fMRI experiment (Friston and Henson, 2006, and Saxe et al., 2006). 
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neuroscience investigations)34. In such a context, further concerns arise from the fact 
that most fMRI studies rely on voxel-based analyses of time series data, with estimates 
from one stage being taken as data in the next stage. This, in turn, calls into question 
the accuracy of the subsequently reported findings, as standard errors of estimates are 
likely to propagate at later stages (Harrison, 2008a). 
 
With regard to brain averaging, neuroscientists usually average the registered activation 
signals both over different trials for each subject and across different subjects. In this 
perspective, brain images are best regarded as generalizations rather than particulars, as 
there typically is no specific physical brain that those images are intended to represent 
(Roskies, 2008, p.26). In neuroscientific research, averaging is frequently advocated on 
the ground that it minimizes the effects of interfering signals on the registered activation 
patterns (Bechtel and Mundale, 1999). However, due to the interpersonal variability 
exhibited by several areas’ activations, pooling data across subjects usually constrains 
the signal’s spatial precision (Van Orden et al., 2001, p.153). Furthermore, simple 
averaging can decrease or even suppress signals (e.g. suppose that during the 
experiment the monitored region activates in some subjects, but deactivates in others). 
For this reason, neuroscientists usually rely on more complex averaging procedures 
which take into account the temporal covariance of voxels in the functional regions of 
interest (Friston et al., 2006, p.1081). These procedures, however, further complicate the 
interpretation of neural data and constrain the comparability of the results obtained by 
means of different experimental protocols. 
                                                          
34
 These criticisms have not remained unchallenged. For instance, on the basis of some 
simulations Lieberman et al. (2009) argue that fMRI analyses are unlikely to report spurious 
high correlations. Yet, they also concede that “the effect sizes from whole-brain analyses are 
likely to be inflated” (2009, p.306; see also Aron et al., 2006). 
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As to brain normalizations, the idea is to make the image of distinct brains fit on the 
image of a standard brain by aligning several intermediate points of each subject’s 
brain with the corresponding points of the standard brain (Aizawa, 2009, p.503). Brain 
normalizations are typically performed to alleviate the constraints that the anatomical 
differences between individual brains impose on the interpersonal comparability of 
brain-imaging findings. Still, the very act of implementing brain normalizations may 
screen off significant anatomical and functional dissimilarities between the neural 
architectures of distinct subjects. Moreover, employing different normalization 
templates can lead one to interpret observed activation patterns in dissimilar ways (see 
e.g. Ashburner and Friston, 1999, and Gispert et al., 2003). 
 
3) Limited generalizability of findings 
 
A number of concerns arise regarding the generalizability of many NE findings. The 
first worry can be explicated as follows. As we have seen above (point 2), several 
auxiliary assumptions and experimental manipulations are required to interpret raw 
neural data. This, in turn, makes it difficult to compare the evidential reports obtained in 
different experiments. To be sure, not all differences across experimental procedures 
constrain the comparability and the generalizability of the obtained results (e.g. think of 
marginal variations in inter-stimuli intervals). Still, the point remains that most NE 
findings “are highly indexical to the experimental set-up” employed to obtain them 
(Kuorikoski and Ylikoski, 2010, p.223; see Sullivan, 2009, for similar remarks 
concerning laboratory experiments in cognitive neuroscience). To render this point 
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more vivid, below I consider three issues which constrain the generalizability of NEs’ 
findings. These issues respectively concern the functional and anatomical differences 
between the neural architectures of different species, the interpersonal variability of 
neural activation patterns, and the experimental setup of NE studies. 
 
NEs investigate the neural architecture of a variety of species. The decision to focus on 
a given species is guided by both ethical and pragmatic considerations. For instance, the 
ethical concerns related to the non-therapeutic use of invasive techniques limit the 
applicability of single neuron measurements to humans. To remedy this problem, 
various authors employ non-human primates as models for human subjects on the 
alleged ground that “the human brain evolved over time by extending homologous 
functions, and computations, in predecessor brains” (McCabe, 2008, p.352; see also 
Gazzaniga et. al., 2002). 
 
Now, cognitive scientists acquired valuable insights concerning the human neural 
architecture by working on the assumption that the human brain was sculpted by long-
lasting evolutionary pressures (e.g. MacLean, 1990, and Tooby and Cosmides, 1994 and 
2005). Even so, the neuro-anatomical and neuro-physiological dissimilarities between 
humans and other species frequently prevent animal studies from serving as an 
informative basis for investigating higher cognitive functions (Allman et al., 2002). This 
worry is especially pertinent when it comes to examining the neural substrates of 
complex decision making tasks that cannot be studied in non-human primates. To be 
sure, some NEs have recently extended previous findings in non-human primates to 
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more complex decision problems35. Still, even leading NEs occasionally appear to 
naïvely presuppose that the human brain “is basically the primate brain with extra 
neocortex”, with the primate brain being “a simpler mammalian brain with some 
neocortex” (Camerer, 2007, C29). 
 
A second constraint on the generalizability of NEs’ findings relates to the interpersonal 
variability of neural areas’ activation patterns. To explicate this concern, let us consider 
the plasticity of the human neural architecture. The human brain exhibits various kinds 
of plasticity. For instance, cortical plasticity obtains when a given psychological 
function is implemented by anatomically distinct neural areas at different times. 
Synaptic plasticity, instead, consists in the reinforcement or inhibition of specific 
synaptic connections between neurons in response to their past interactions 
(Buonomano and Merzenich, 1998). People’s capacity to recover specific computational 
and cognitive abilities after various traumas prompted some researchers to ascribe high 
cortical plasticity to the human brain (Liepert et al., 2000, and Richardson, 2009). Yet, 
cortical plasticity is normally more limited than synaptic plasticity (Gazzaniga, Ivry and 
Mangun 2002, ch.15)36. Now, due to these kinds of brain plasticity most neural areas 
exhibit some variability in their activation patterns at both the interpersonal and the 
intertemporal levels (Henson, 2005). This variability, in turn, calls into question some 
NEs’ ambition to formulate wide-scope empirical generalizations regarding the neural 
substrates of choice behaviour. 
 
                                                          
35
 See e.g. Dayan and Niv, 2008, and Pessiglione et al., 2006, on the dopaminergic 
underpinnings of learning in humans; see also Knutson and Peterson, 2005, on how dopamine 
circuits respond to the receipt of money. 
36
 See also Goldberg (2005, ch.14) on how the human neural architecture exhibits a varying 
degree of distinct kinds of plasticity across developmental stages. 
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A third constraint on the generalizability of NE findings relates to the experimental 
setup of NEs’ studies. The reasoning goes as follows. The majority of NEs have hitherto 
focused on individual choices and two-person interactions in highly controlled 
experimental settings, where subjects are “sealed off from advisors, artifacts and other 
distributed cognitive resources” they have in real life situations (Wilcox, 2008, p.530). 
This narrow focus, in turn, constrains the generalizability of NEs’ findings. For the 
behaviour of real life economic agents is simultaneously shaped by a number of socio-
cultural factors - ranging from agents’ axiological commitments to institutional 
incentives (see e.g. Hutchins, 1995) - that are only partly controlled for in single NE 
investigations (see also section 4.A). 
 
To be sure, various NEs investigate the neural processes and mechanisms associated 
with the socio-cultural factors which influence people’s behaviour (see e.g. Montague 
and Lohrenz, 2007, and Spitzer et al., 2007, on the neural substrates of social norms 
compliance). Yet, while decisions outside the laboratory are influenced by all these 
factors simultaneously, NEs examine those factors in isolation by screening-off other 
environmental influences. In this respect, NEs may well object that similar problems 
affect many studies in experimental economics and that exploring how people’s brains 
interact with their socio-cultural environment can be “valuable” to economists 
(McCabe, 2008, p.365). Even so, NEs still have to integrate their focus on individual 
cognition with insights regarding “how individuals work in social groups [and] make 
use of environmental scaffolding” (Craver and Alexandrova, 2008, p.397)37. 
                                                          
37
 Various studies in experimental economics (e.g. Smith, 1991) document how specific agents 
violate rational choice predictions when tested as isolated individuals, yet make consistent 
decisions in the context of market institutions. As Arrow puts it, “rationality is not a property of 
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In such a context, the additional worry arises that brain-imaging and brain-stimulation 
techniques do not enable NEs to monitor subjects in the context of their daily lives 
(Bechtel, forthcoming). This concern can be explicated as follows. When a subject lies 
in a scanner, various neural areas (e.g. those involved in spatial awareness and 
emotional responses) are likely to exhibit activation patterns that differ from the ones 
they would undergo outside a scanner due to the fact that the subject is aware of being 
monitored (see e.g. Bechtel and Stufflebeam, 2001). As Ortmann vividly puts it: “Part 
of the noise may come from subjects engaging in thoughts […] like: Why am I lying 
here? What’s that dizziness? […] Is this harmful to my health? Have they lied to me 
after all about the health risks? What if I think nasty/naughty thoughts? Can the 
experimenter decipher them?” (2008, p.437). 
 
The above considerations point to a severe instance of the so-called problem of 
observer interference, according to which the very act of measuring specific 
phenomena alters them in ways which elude experimental controls (e.g. think of the 
Heisenberg principle in particle physics). This problem is rarely acknowledged by 
NEs, but subtly constrains the external validity of their studies (on the external validity 
of experimental results in economics, see Guala, 2003 and 2005, ch.7). To be sure, one 
might object that the aforementioned biases are unlikely to affect many NE studies. 
After all - the thought would be - NEs are rarely concerned with the neural substrates 
of spatial awareness and emotional responses. However, due to the widespread 
anatomical and functional interconnections between neural populations, variations in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the individual alone […] It gathers not only its force but also its very meaning from the social 
context in which it is embedded” (1987, p.201). 
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those areas’ activations may significantly alter activations in the areas monitored by 
NEs, thereby confounding the results of their studies. In particular, significant 
discrepancies are likely to arise both between the activation patterns that some areas 
respectively display when a subject is and is not monitored (conditions I and II) and 
when a subject is and is not aware of being monitored (conditions III and IV). 
 
Now, it would be helpful to know which areas are affected by these variations and how 
exactly these areas’ activations change across conditions I and II and conditions III and 
IV respectively. Regrettably, current brain-imaging and brain-stimulation technology 
enables us to monitor the neural substrates of choice behaviour only in conditions I and 
III. Hence, for all we know, most NEs may have recurrently reported highly context-
dependent evidence which fails to reliably indicate what activation patterns neural 
areas undergo in real life situations. In this respect, it would be of little import to 
conjecture that NEs could supplement their measurements with some account of the 
neural mechanisms that give rise to the observed activations. For any such account 
would be presumably based on the context-dependent data provided by the available 
scanners. In the words of Roskies, the worry arises that the “interpretation of 
neuroimages takes place within a framework largely established by means of the 
technique itself” (2008, p.30). Unfortunately, NEs do not seem to take this concern into 
adequate consideration. Indeed, even leading NEs generally gloss over it when 
presenting and discussing their findings. 
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3.C INFERENCES 
 
NEs draw on a rapidly expanding corpus of neuro-anatomical and neuro-physiological 
findings in developing their models of decision making. Assessing in what respects NE 
can inform its parent disciplines requires us to accurately characterize the inferential 
steps on which NEs’ experimental reports rests. In this section, I examine the scope and 
the limitations of the inferences made in many brain-imaging and brain-stimulation 
studies. More specifically, I focus in turn on functional localizations, the subtraction 
method, single and double dissociations, forward and reverse inferences, function-to-
structure deductions and structure-to-function inductions. 
 
Before considering these inferences in detail, let me put forward some remarks 
regarding lesion studies. Neuroscientists acquired valuable causal and functional 
insights concerning the human neural architecture by examining subjects with brain 
lesions. However, the inferences made in lesion studies are frequently characterized by 
significant limitations. Let us consider three main limitations in turn. To begin with, it 
is difficult to find a high number of subjects having exactly the same brain lesion in 
terms of location, gravity, etc. Investigating subjects with lesions in anatomically 
proximate regions rarely provides informative insights, as minor differences in the 
location and gravity of lesions can generate dissimilar cognitive and computational 
impairments. In this respect, some progress has been made thanks to pharmaceuticals 
which enable researchers to reversibly inactivate spatially delimited neural populations 
(Hubbard, 2003, p.28). Yet, the interpersonal comparability of the reports obtained in 
lesion studies is usually quite limited (Bechtel, 2002a, and Mundale, 1998). 
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Secondly, lesion studies rarely enable one to establish what exactly the damaged regions 
contribute to normal brain functioning. To appreciate this, suppose that some subjects 
can properly perform a cognitive task X before suffering a lesion in area α and lose that 
ability once area α is damaged. It might be tempting to infer that the injured region 
provides a necessary contribution to the normal execution of task X. Yet, the correlation 
between the malfunctioning of area α and subjects’ failure to perform task X does not 
license this conclusion. For instance, the malfunctioning of α could result from the 
impairment of another area β, with the malfunctioning of β precluding the subject from 
performing task X irrespective of whether α is also damaged (Hubbard, 2003, p.29). 
Conversely, significant damages to a neural area may not produce any observable 
cognitive or computational impairment. For example, when some specific region α is 
damaged, other areas β, γ, etc. may implement the operation initially performed by α 
and prevent the functional deficit that would otherwise result. 
 
Thirdly, attempts to acquire functional insights by means of lesion studies are 
complicated by the fact that there are various ways in which lesions impair subjects’ 
ability to perform specific tasks. For instance, a lesion may: damage a neural area whose 
functioning is necessary to the execution of a task; distort modulatory feedback between 
distinct neural regions; occlude blood flow in a way that alters the workings of 
functionally related areas; and so on (see e.g. Bechtel, forthcoming). For this reason, 
even establishing significant correlations between a lesion and some resulting deficit 
may provide limited information concerning the functional role played by the damaged 
area. As I argue below, some of the limitations inherent in lesion studies have been 
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overcome thanks to brain-imaging and brain-stimulation investigations. Yet, even the 
inferences drawn in these investigations are affected by several shortcomings. 
 
1) Functional Localizations 
 
The human brain contains a number of regions specialized for processing specific types 
of signals and contributing to particular cognitive processes. These regions are neither 
functionally nor anatomically insulated, but carry out their operations in interconnected 
networks (Hubbard, 2003, and Medler et al., 2005). The aim of functional localizations 
is not just to identify where specific cognitive operations take place, but also to disclose 
the principles underlying brain organization (Bechtel and Richardson, 2010). The idea 
that distinct neural areas play dissimilar functional roles is grounded in the fact that 
different neural populations have heterogeneous anatomical features (e.g. in terms of 
cytoarchitecture and patterns of neurotransmission)38. Attempts to localize cognitive 
functions to specific brain locations consist of three stages (see e.g. Bechtel and 
Richardson, 1993, and Craver, 2007). Firstly, one decomposes the examined 
experimental task into a set of component cognitive operations that are deemed to be 
sufficient for its execution. Secondly, one identifies the set of neural areas composing 
the investigated brain region. And thirdly, one maps each cognitive operation on 
particular neural areas. 
 
                                                          
38
 The following asymmetry is worth noting (Aizawa, 2009). On the one hand, developing 
accurate anatomical maps constitutes a necessary but insufficient condition for elaborating 
detailed functional categorizations. On the other hand, acquiring a functional understanding of 
the human neural architecture facilitates the completion of neuro-anatomical maps, but is not 
necessary for developing them. 
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Neuroscientists have localized increasingly specific cognitive operations to 
progressively smaller neural areas (Bechtel, 2002b, and Hubbard, 2003). Even so, 
severe limitations affect the localizations drawn in current NE studies. Let us consider 
some of these shortcomings in turn39. The first limitation relates to the fact that the 
human neural architecture exhibits widespread many-to-many mappings between 
anatomical regions and cognitive processes. Two issues are worth mentioning in this 
respect. On the one hand, even the execution of simple cognitive and computational 
tasks usually elicits a distributed pattern of activation in several areas (one-to-many 
mapping). On the other hand, most neural areas respond to diverse stimuli and are 
engaged by dissimilar experimental tasks (many-to-one mapping). To be sure, the range 
of functional roles an area can play once its anatomical connectivity has been fixed is 
quite limited. Yet, a neural population can often perform heterogeneous functions 
depending on what areas interact with it (Price and Friston, 2005, p.268). In other 
words, the fact that an area is involved in the execution of some tasks does not imply 
that such an area is specific to those tasks40. 
 
Several studies document the existence of many-to-many interconnections between 
distinct neural populations. For instance, Cabeza and Nyberg (1997 and 2000) illustrate 
                                                          
39
 A further question arises regarding the alleged implications of functional localizations for the 
thesis that the human neural architecture is modular in character (see e.g. Fodor, 2000, and 
Mameli, 2001, on different versions of the modularity thesis). In cognitive neuropsychology, 
intense disputes took place concerning this issue. In particular, various authors argued that 
identifying the anatomical location where mental operations are performed provides limited 
(e.g. Shallice, 1988) or even no (e.g. Morton, 1984) information for understanding how the brain 
performs those operations. I am not concerned here with assessing these claims. For the purpose 
of this enquiry, it suffices to note that “the question of what defines a region anatomically is 
difficult and unresolved” (Henson, 2005, p.197) and that there are no a priori reasons to think 
that anatomically separate regions correspond to functional modules (Harley, 2004). 
40
 A related distinction can be made between the concepts of pluripotentiality and redundancy. 
Pluripotentiality obtains when an anatomically delimited area can develop so as to perform a 
range of distinct operations. Redundancy, instead, occurs when two neural populations can 
perform the same function. 
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that distributed sets of brain regions are engaged even by simple experimental tasks (see 
also Anderson, 2006 and 2007). For his part, Gerlach (2007) compares various fMRI 
studies of visual processing tasks and finds that not a single area consistently activates 
for a given category across those studies. In such a context, one wonders at what level of 
specificity cognitive operations and anatomically separate areas can be associated. As 
noted by various authors (e.g. Roskies, 2008, p.27), cognitive processes can be 
decomposed and associated with specific brain locations only to a limited extent. For 
instance, researchers are unlikely to localize complex cognitive abilities such as 
language or attention, as these activate large sets of interconnected areas (see Petersen 
and Fiez, 1993). 
 
Functional localizations are further complicated by the kind of connectivity patterns 
exhibited by specific neural areas. To give one example, neural circuitries frequently 
exhibit cascaded (rather than thresholded) and interactive (rather than feedforward) 
interconnections (Van Orden and Paap, 1997). This, in turn, can render it prohibitively 
difficult to perform functional localizations. To see this, consider the following passage 
by Coltheart (2004, p.22): 
 
“Suppose one believes that some cognitive system includes a sequence of three 
modules A to B to C, and one wants to localise one of these, say A, by imaging the 
brains of people as they carry out some task that requires module A. Because of the 
cascaded nature of the system, modules B and C will be activated if module A is, 
even if modules B and C are irrelevant as far as the task is concerned. And because 
of the interactive nature of the system, some of the activity in module A will be due 
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to feedback from modules B and C. […] How could one ever determine which 
parts of the brain activity here are specifically associated with module A?”. 
 
2) Subtraction Method 
 
Neuroscientists often employ the subtraction method in investigating the human neural 
architecture (see Donders, 1969, and Sternberg, 1969). This method can be 
characterized as follows. Given an experimental task T0 whose execution involves 
several cognitive operations, one attempts to design a control task T1 requiring the 
implementation of an additional operation with respect to T0. The activation patterns of 
specific neural areas are monitored during the execution of both tasks. The areas 
exhibiting differential activation, in turn, are deemed to contribute to the execution of 
the additional operation (Petersen et al., 1989). Various criticisms have been formulated 
concerning the subtraction method (e.g. Van Orden and Paap, 1997, and Uttal, 2001; see 
also Friston et al., 1996, and Sartori and Umiltà, 2000, for some attempts to tackle the 
limitations of subtraction studies). Let us examine two criticisms in turn. 
 
The first criticism targets the pure insertion assumption made in most subtraction 
analyses. According to this assumption, one can precisely partition the processes 
occurring between stimulus and response into a series of successive operations, so that 
adding an extra component to a task does not alter the activations that particular areas 
exhibit during the execution of the other components of the task. However, this 
assumption is rarely satisfied. Moreover, it is often difficult to ascertain how exactly 
adding or removing a specific component affects the targeted neuro-cognitive processes 
across experimental settings (see e.g. Aertsen and Preissl, 1991, and Friston et al., 
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1996). This limitation, in turn, constrains the reliability and the robustness of the 
conclusions drawn in subtraction studies. 
 
Secondly, the activation patterns of the neural areas involved in the execution of a task 
may change during an experiment, depending on factors such as the extent to which the 
experimental task is perceived as novel by the subject (Raichle, 1998). In particular, 
neural adaptation - i.e. the response decrease to a stimulus that some neurons exhibit 
when the stimulus is repeated (Krekelberg et al., 2006) - can significantly complicate 
the interpretation of the observed activations. Indeed, standard subtractive designs fail 
to reveal what variations in the observed neural activations arise from changes in the 
experimental tasks rather than from adaptive processes in the targeted neural 
populations. 
 
3) Single and double dissociations  
 
Single dissociations aim to identify what contribution a neural area provides to the 
execution of a cognitive process by means of the following two-stage procedure. Firstly, 
one demonstrates that damaging or stimulating a neural area significantly affects the 
execution of one task, yet not that of another task. Secondly, one infers that the area 
whose functioning has been altered is involved in the execution of the first - yet not the 
second - task. There are various reasons to doubt that single dissociations license the 
conclusion that the examined region contributes to exclusively one of the two tasks. For 
instance, suppose that two tasks X and Y differ in the demands they respectively make 
on a neural area α, so that little damage to α results in the impairment of task X alone, 
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while severe damage to α causes the disruption of both activities. Observing only 
situations where α suffers minor damages could lead one to erroneously infer that such 
an area does not contribute to the execution of task Y (see Bechtel, forthcoming, for a 
similar example). 
 
In order to overcome the inferential limitations associated with single dissociations, 
neuroscientists often attempt to find double dissociations. The idea can be characterized 
as follows. Consider two neural areas α and β and two experimental tasks X and Y. A 
double dissociation obtains when (i) altering the workings of neural area α affects the 
execution of task X (but not Y), and (ii) altering the workings of neural area β affects 
the execution of task Y (but not X). One can easily identify neural areas exhibiting 
dissimilar activation patterns across experimental conditions (single dissociations). 
Double dissociations are more difficult to find, and are often regarded as compelling 
evidence that different areas contribute to the execution of distinct operations 
(Robertson et al., 1993). This, however, is not necessarily the case. To see this, suppose 
that two neural areas α and β are jointly involved in the execution of tasks X and Y. By 
differently altering the workings of areas α and β, one may respectively affect the 
execution of tasks X and Y (double dissociation) even if the execution of those tasks 
involves both neural areas (Hinton and Shallice, 1991). 
 
Most attempts to identify double dissociations rest on two fundamental assumptions, 
namely (i) that the human neural architecture is composed of functionally dissociable 
systems, and (ii) that modifying the workings of each of those systems has observable 
effects on subjects’ experimental performance. However, neither of these assumptions is 
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vindicated by the identification of double dissociations themselves (Van Orden and 
Paap, 1997). In the words of Van Orden et al. (2001, p.114): “we require a reliable 
theory of cognitive modules, before the fact, to guarantee that we observe a pure 
dissociation […] we next require a theory of tasks, to tell us which […] modules are 
required by which laboratory tasks”. In this respect, it is telling how Shallice (1988) 
dismisses his earlier claim (1979, p.191) that double dissociations demonstrate that 
distinct experimental tasks make dissimilar demands on different neural populations. As 
he points out, such reasoning incurs the following fallacy of affirming the consequent: 
“if modules exist, then […] double dissociations are a relatively reliable way of 
uncovering them. Double dissociations do exist. Therefore modules exist” (1988, 
p.248). 
 
4) Forward and reverse inferences 
 
As we have seen in section 2.C, several NEs urge economists to employ neural data for 
model selection and model evaluation purposes. In the neuroscientific literature, various 
authors advocate using brain-imaging data to discriminate between competing neuro-
psychological theories (Hubbard, 2003). A forward inference discriminates between 
alternative neuro-psychological theories on the basis of the activation patterns exhibited 
by specific areas across experimental tasks. The idea can be characterized as follows. 
Given two competing cognitive theories T0 and T1, one designs experimental conditions 
C1 and C2 that differ in the engagement of a hypothetical function F only according to 
T1. If function F affects the activation patterns of a specific area, then observing 
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differential activation in that area across conditions C1 and C2 favours theory T1 over 
theory T0 (Henson, 2005, p.197). 
 
In making a reverse inference, instead, one conjectures that the monitored subject 
engages in a particular cognitive process on the basis of the activation patterns exhibited 
by specific brain regions (Henson, 2006, p.64). More specifically, one concludes that 
activation of area α in a task comparison reveals engagement in cognitive process X 
after observing that in several studies area α was active whenever the subjects engaged 
in cognitive process X (Poldrack, 2006, p.59). In other words, one takes the fact that a 
particular area activates across experimental tasks involving a specific cognitive process 
to corroborate the hypothesis that the area contributes to the execution of such a process 
(Poldrack and Wagner, 2004, p.177; see also Bub, 2000, p.475-6). 
 
The strength of a reverse inference crucially depends on the monitored area’s selectivity 
of activation, i.e. “the ratio of process-specific activation to the overall likelihood of 
activation in that area across all tasks” (Poldrack, 2006, p.20). That is to say, if a neural 
area α is activated in correspondence with a large number of cognitive processes, then 
its activation provides weak evidence that an individual is engaged in a specific 
cognitive process X rather than others. Now, for a reverse inference to be deductively 
valid, the monitored neural area would have to activate if and only if the examined 
cognitive process is engaged. Regrettably, this is hardly ever the case with the neural 
circuits related to decision making processes. Indeed, several areas have been shown to 
activate in relation to a wide range of stimuli (see e.g. Elliott et al., 2000, on the 
orbitofrontal cortex, and Baxter and Murray, 2002, on the amygdala). As a result, 
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reverse inferences in NE studies often amount to fairly weak inferences to the best 
explanation. 
 
Assessing the strength of reverse inferences is complicated by the fact that an area’s 
selectivity of activation is often difficult to estimate precisely. For instance, the size of 
an area can crucially influence its estimated selectivity of activation, as smaller regions 
usually activate more selectively than larger ones. Now, one could in principle increase 
a reverse inference’s strength by focusing on anatomically more restricted brain regions. 
Still, some areas are attributed a greater selectivity of activation for the sole reason that 
they can be studied at a higher resolution than others. In this respect, even looking at 
what areas are shown to activate more frequently across studies does not enable one to 
ascertain their selectivity of activation, as some areas are investigated more often than 
others just because they can be monitored more easily (see e.g. Poldrack, 2006, on the 
BrainMap database at http://www.brainmap.org). 
 
5) Function-to-structure deductions and structure-to-function inductions 
 
In making a function-to-structure deduction, one infers - upon observing dissimilar 
activation patterns in two experimental conditions C1 and C2 - that performing these 
tasks involves at least one different function (Henson, 2005, p.197). A structure-to-
function induction, instead, can be characterized as follows. If the execution of an 
experimental task C elicits activation in region α relative to some baseline condition, 
and region α has been independently associated with function F in different studies, then 
function F is engaged by the execution of C (ibid., p.198). 
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Structure-to-function inductions rest on stronger assumptions than function-to-structure 
deductions. These deductions, in fact, just assume that a cognitive process does not 
originate qualitatively different neural activations across experimental conditions. 
Structure-to-function inductions, instead, presuppose the existence of one-to-one 
mappings between functions and structural units across experimental situations. As I 
argued above (see point 1 in this section), such an assumption is rather demanding and 
rarely holds with the neural circuits associated with decision making processes. To be 
sure, whether a one-to-one mapping between functions and structures can be identified 
partly depends on how exactly the concepts of function and structure are defined. To see 
this, suppose that no systematic mapping was documented between a specific cognitive 
function and some anatomically delimited neural area. By redefining the concept of 
structure in such a way to denote a network of interacting areas, one may succeed in 
redescribing the available evidence as if it supported the existence of systematic 
function-structure mappings. 
 
One might think that this redefinition of the concept of structure “simply dodges the 
question of whether there is a one-to-one function–structure mapping” (Henson, 2005, 
p.217). Yet, pace Henson, the possibility of implementing such a redefinition does not 
render the conjecture of a systematic function–structure mapping “unprovable in a 
logical sense”. For once a precise definition of structure and function is provided, there 
will typically be some fact of the matter as to whether a systematic mapping exists 
between those relata. In this respect, Henson’s claim (2005, p.228) that using imaging 
data to inform psychological theories requires a one-to-one mapping between 
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psychological functions and brain structures faces the following dilemma. On the one 
hand, defining brain structures as anatomically specific locations would render his 
assertion implausible. On the other hand, taking them to be networks of interacting 
neural areas would risk making it disappointingly uninformative. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
To recapitulate, brain-imaging and brain-stimulation studies enable neuroscientists to 
acquire many valuable insights concerning the anatomical and functional organization 
of the human neural architecture. At the same time, various evidential and 
epistemological concerns arise regarding the inferences NEs make in those studies. 
These concerns do not license an unqualified scepticism concerning brain-imaging and 
brain-stimulation research. Still, they cast serious doubts on the accuracy and the 
reliability of the findings that some NEs regard as oracular pronouncements. In the 
words of Ortmann (2008, p.444): “There are too many open questions that have been 
pushed aside […] in the last few years people were rushing into NE to stake claims […] 
This rush is understandable, and individually rational, but came at a cost of questionable 
practices”. 
 
To be sure, showing that some NEs’ studies lack a statistically significant and robust 
evidential basis does not license the claim that NE is incapable of informing its parent 
disciplines. In particular, waving the flag of vulnerability to unnoticed or unknown 
experimental confounds falls short of calling the validity of NE research into question. 
Yet, the point remains that many NEs fail to control for “confounds that are known in 
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the experimental economics literature” (Harrison, 2008a, p.311). Moreover, ambiguities 
and inaccuracies in task descriptions occasionally undermine the informativeness of the 
reported findings (Gold and Buckner, 2002). By way of illustration, consider the study 
of McClure et al. (2004a), where subjects were asked to make choices between 
immediate and distant rewards. As noted by Ortmann (2008, p.440), the contrast those 
authors draw between ‘immediate’ versus ‘delayed’ rewards is misleading, as the 
rewards considered in their experiment are all ‘delayed’ as long as the monitored 
subjects lie in the scanner. 
 
Faced with these criticisms, a proponent of NE may rebut that progress in scanner 
technology and experimental design will provide us with more detailed information 
concerning the neural substrates of decision making. Yet, one should not overemphasize 
the advantages derivable from those advances. Let me expand on this point. Various 
limitations in NE studies will be alleviated or overcome thanks to progress in scanner 
technology and experimental design. For example, NEs can address the concerns related 
to their reliance on small experimental samples by replicating previous studies with 
other experimental populations. Similarly, the spatial and temporal resolution of current 
brain-imaging instruments will soon increase thanks to technological progress. On the 
contrary, some evidential and epistemological concerns are unlikely to abate with 
technological advances. By way of illustration, think of the many inferential steps and 
auxiliary assumptions required to interpret neural data. 
 
One might object that evidence is frequently procured and mediated by means of 
sophisticated instruments in other scientific disciplines as well (Bechtel and 
 116
Stufflebeam, 2001, p.55). Yet, NEs’ studies involve a remarkable number of 
interventions and interpretative steps, which render the subsequent reports very 
sensitive to the experimental setup. In this respect, the availability of a rapidly 
improving technology by no means guarantees that NEs will soon provide clearly 
interpretable insights into the neural substrates of choice behaviour. 
 
In such a context, a further question arises as to whether neuroscience is sufficiently 
mature to provide NEs with an accurate and reliable basis for informing the economic 
account of decision making. This concern can be explicated as follows. Experimental 
findings are getting accumulated, refined and not rarely disconfirmed at a considerably 
high pace in the neuroscientific literature (see e.g. Vul et al., 2009). These rapid 
advances do speak in favour of the progressive character of research programs such as 
neurobiology and computational neuroscience. At the same time, they make it plausible 
to expect that our currently best neuro-psychological theories will be revised in the near 
future. In this respect, one wonders why exactly economists should construct their 
models on the basis of findings and conjectures that are likely to be corrected within a 
few years. 
 
These concerns resemble those raised by various philosophers of science (e.g. Laudan, 
1981, and Stanford, 2010), who questioned the plausibility of realistic interpretations of 
scientific theories on the basis of the profound theory changes occurred in the history of 
several disciplines. In the words of Laudan (1981, p.47), scientific realism “cannot, 
even by its own lights, explain the success of those many theories whose central terms 
have evidently not referred and whose theoretical laws and mechanisms were not 
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approximately true” (see Poincaré, 1905, van Fraassen, 1980, and Worrall, 1989, for a 
critical discussion). Mutatis mutandis, the worry regarding NE research is that the rapid 
theory changes occurred in the history of cognitive and computational neuroscience call 
into question NEs’ currently best available neuroscientific theories. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ARGUMENT FROM MODELLING TRADE-OFFS 
 
As we have seen in chapter two, NEs frequently maintain that economists can improve 
their models with regard to several desiderata by incorporating neural insights. Their 
contentions, however, have not been widely accepted by economists, who frequently 
oppose integrating other disciplines’ findings. In particular, most economists remain 
quite sceptical about NEs’ attempts to implement a neural enrichment of the economic 
theory of choice. As Rubinstein (2008, p.486) provocatively puts it, suppose “we are 
able to map all brains onto a canonical brain. The functions of the different areas of the 
brain are crystal clear to us. The machines used in experiments are cheap enough that 
thousands of subjects can be experimented on. And finally the data is clear and double-
checked. The question would still remain: what is the potential role of brain studies in 
Economics?”. 
 
In this context, two issues of great methodological significance deserve to be discussed. 
Firstly, there is the question why economists are typically unwilling to include neuro-
psychological insights into their models. And secondly, one wonders whether 
economists are justified in adopting such an isolationist attitude. In this chapter, I 
address these two issues in turn and critically assess NEs’ calls to incorporate neural 
insights into economic models of choice. In particular, I argue that NEs can improve 
economic models with regard to individual modelling desiderata, yet are unlikely to 
provide models which supersede the ones employed by economists. 
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The contents are organized as follows. Section 4.A aims to show that NEs 
overemphasize the extent to which their contributions improve economic models with 
regard to specific desiderata. In the other two sections, I focus on the trade-offs between 
the desiderata that NEs and other economists respectively value, devoting particular 
attention to the tractability of economic models. In section 4.B, I reconstruct and 
critique the argument from tractability by means of which economists often resist the 
incorporation of neural insights. In section 4.C, I articulate and defend a refined 
argument from tractability which attempts to show that economists are provisionally 
justified in retaining a methodologically distinctive approach to the modelling of 
decision making. 
 
Before proceeding, let me provide two preliminary remarks regarding the focus of this 
chapter. Firstly, I shall consider not just economists’ modelling practices, but also the 
pragmatic and epistemic goals which govern the construction and evaluation of their 
models. And secondly, I shall predominantly concentrate on neural - rather than 
psychological - methods and findings. This choice is motivated by the significance that 
some recent advances at the interface between economics and neuroscience have for 
the issues I address in this chapter. However, in various places I shall refer to the 
literature on modelling in other behavioural sciences and highlight some parallel 
concerns which arise regarding the integration of these disciplines’ insights into 
economic models. 
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4.A LOCAL AND GLOBAL MODELLING IMPROVEMENTS 
 
The proponents of NE claim that integrating neural insights can improve economic 
models of choice in a number of respects. In this section, I critically assess NEs’ 
contentions regarding the modelling desiderata we examined in chapter two. In doing 
so, I argue that NEs overestimate the extent to which including neuro-psychological 
findings improves economists’ models. More specifically, I distinguish between local 
improvements - which obtain when a model is improved with regard to some specific 
desideratum, individually considered - and global improvements - which occur when the 
trade-off between different desiderata is more satisfactorily resolved. I then illustrate 
that NEs have failed to show that a neural enrichment yields global - as opposed to local 
- improvements in economic models of decision making. 
 
1) Descriptive accuracy 
 
A model can be regarded as descriptively accurate both if it includes most of the 
properties or features of its target system and if it provides a detailed characterization of 
those properties or features (Weisberg, 2007a). According to various NEs, incorporating 
neuro-psychological insights helps economists to increase the descriptive accuracy of 
their models in both of these respects (see section 2.A). The idea is that neurally 
enriched models include a larger subset of the factors influencing people’s decisions and 
posit agents having more plausible cognitive and computational abilities. As I argue 
below, however, NEs have hitherto failed to substantiate the claim that economists 
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should include several neural insights into their models. To see this, let us consider the 
previous two aspects of descriptive accuracy in turn. 
 
To justify their focus on a subset of the variables involved in the investigated choice 
settings, economists may put forward the following reasoning: “Most economic choices 
result from the interplay of a high number of causal factors. For this reason, we 
typically have to include in our models just a small subset of the elements which operate 
in the examined choice settings. Hence, it is not because of some form of neurophobia 
that we resist a neural enrichment of our models, but rather because the very act of 
modelling requires us to elaborate simplified representations of our target systems”. 
 
The thought is that a descriptively accurate representation of economists’ target systems 
would usually include so many variables that it would fail to be intelligible or 
informative. In other words, given that economic phenomena and agents are “too 
complex to be tractable targets for direct examination”, economic models cannot be 
exact replicas of their target systems, but have to resemble those systems only “in 
certain respects and to certain degrees” (Mäki, 2005, p.304; see also Hausman, 1992). 
As Mäki puts it, “on suitable conceptual specifications, a realist economist […] is 
obliged to employ assumptions that are unrealistic in many senses of the word” (1992, 
p.319; see also Mäki, 1994, ch.12). 
 
Analogous considerations apply to the NEs’ complaint that economists model agents 
having implausible cognitive and computational abilities. By way of illustration, 
consider the claim of Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2005, p.32-3) that even though 
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economists typically represent agents having stable preferences, people’s preferences 
are subject to widespread intertemporal and across-contexts variations. Economists’ 
reliance on models positing stable preferences is motivated - not so much by their 
alleged ignorance of preferences’ variability, but rather - by considerations of analytical 
convenience. Moreover, the fact that standard economic theory takes preferences as 
exogenously fixed does not prevent the construction of models which allow for 
preference change (see e.g. Dietrich and List, 2011; see also Loomes and Sugden, 1995, 
on so-called random preference models, where the value of various parameters such as 
risk aversion is randomly determined at every period). 
 
To give another example, several NEs take people’s cognitive and computational 
limitations to cast doubt on standard economic theory. In particular, some contend that 
since both intentions and actions are caused by “prior neural events which are 
inaccessible to consciousness”, people often fail to understand the reasons motivating 
their choices and make decisions which violate the normative axioms of standard 
economic theory (Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005, p.31). Neuro-physiological 
studies provide informative insights concerning the genesis of conscious experiences 
and the purported dependence of agents’ decisions on neuro-biological determinants 
(see e.g. Hohwy, 2007, Lloyd, 2002, and Roskies, 2006)41. Even so, the mere fact that 
we often lack awareness as to when or why we make a decision does not per se render 
our choices more prone to violate the axioms of standard economic theory. In particular, 
one can model an agent’s decisions as the solution to a constrained maximization 
                                                          
41
 See also Libet (1983, 1985, and 1996) for some pioneering studies of the neural antecedents 
of choices. In his view, “even a fully voluntary act is initiated unconsciously […] Cerebral 
neural activity […] precedes the subject's awareness of his/her intention or wish to act […] Our 
sense of agency is apparently illusory” (1996, p.95; see e.g. O’Connor, 2009, for a critical 
evaluation). 
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problem irrespective of whether the agent possesses the cognitive resources to model 
her decisions in those terms (see e.g. Bradley, forthcoming, and Ross, 2008b). 
 
In such a context, the more general question arises as to how economists’ reliance on 
descriptively inaccurate assumptions bears on the merits of their models of choice. By 
way of illustration, consider the idealizing assumption that a perfectly rational agent 
updates her beliefs in light of novel information instantly and with negligible cognitive 
costs. This assumption falls short of providing a plausible characterization of human 
individuals’ cognitive performance (Conlisk, 1996). Even so, it offers a sufficiently 
accurate approximation of people’s behaviour in several decision settings (e.g. think of 
repetitive and simple choices). 
 
Now, it would be excessive to endorse Friedman’s (1953) instrumentalist motto that the 
realism of a model’s assumptions is irrelevant to its explanatory and predictive 
performance (Musgrave, 1981, and Nagel, 1963). Still, the point remains that even 
economic models resting on descriptively inaccurate presuppositions can be explanatory 
and predictive (Gruene-Yanoff, 2009). Indeed, economic modellers often deliberately 
build models which fail to accurately represent the phenomena of interest (see e.g. 
Mäki, 2002, on models postulating fictitious entities). In the words of Matthewson and 
Weisberg (2009, p.182), many models aim not so much to resemble any real target 
system, but rather to “canvass possibility space”, as “sometimes exploration of the non-
actual helps explain the actual” (see also Wimsatt, 1987, and Odenbaugh, 2005). 
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To be clear, it is true that - other things being equal - models which provide 
descriptively accurate characterizations of the investigated target systems are often 
preferred to models which fail to do so. Still, as I argue in section 4.C, descriptive 
accuracy often comes at the cost of other modelling desiderata such as tractability. In 
this respect, many NEs appear to overlook that the possibility of modelling people’s 
decisions without having to incorporate neuro-psychological findings constitutes a 
strength - not a limit - of standard economic theory. Regrettably, NEs often gloss over 
this issue and the implications it has for the evaluation of standard economic models of 
choice. 
 
To render the above remarks more vivid, let us distinguish two ways in which a model 
can resemble its target system (see Glennan, 2005; see also Matthewson and Calcott, 
2011). On the one hand, economic models of choice are meant to be behaviourally 
similar to their target systems in the sense that, given the same inputs (e.g. specific 
choice problems), they approximate their target systems’ outputs (e.g. choices). On the 
other hand, many NE models aim to be mechanically similar to their target systems in 
the sense of providing descriptively accurate representations of the mechanistic 
underpinnings of those systems. Now, a model can be behaviourally similar to its target 
system without being mechanically similar to it. Moreover, increasing the behavioural 
similarity of a model to its target system does not necessarily require one to increase the 
model’s mechanistic similarity as well. That is to say, economists may succeed in 
increasing the descriptive accuracy of their models of choice without including any 
neuro-psychological insight into those models. 
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2) Predictive power 
 
NEs often claim (e.g. Camerer, 2007, C28) that neuro-psychological findings enable 
economists to construct more predictive models42. Prima facie, one may expect NEs’ 
insistence on predictive power to be welcomed by many economists. After all - the 
thought would be - economists of all stripes ascribe a prominent relevance to predictive 
considerations. Still, economists qua economists are not concerned with every 
observable implication of their models, but only with those predictions which relate to 
the phenomena they investigate (see e.g. Friedman, 1953, p.8 and 30; see also Hausman, 
2008b). In what follows, I consider two lines of argument which cast doubt on whether 
constructing more predictive models requires economists to acquire detailed knowledge 
of the neuro-psychological underpinnings of choice behaviour. 
 
The first reasoning points to the fact that economists can often improve their models’ 
predictions simply by examining the behavioural correlates of the neural processes 
investigated by NEs. The thought is that even when differential activations in specific 
neural areas correlate with variations in observed decisions, choice behaviour data 
“screen off the neural details” (Kuorikoski and Ylikoski, 2010, p.223; see also 
Bernheim, 2009). In this respect, the further concern arises that neural data are often 
more difficult to obtain precisely in those situations when also the economic data of 
interest are missing or inaccurate. To put it differently, how likely is it that we can 
                                                          
42
 As specified in section 2.B, I use the expression “predictive power” to refer to both predictive 
accuracy, which denotes the exactness of a model’s observable implications regarding the 
investigated phenomena, and predictive reliability, which relates to the stability of a model’s 
predictive performance across distinct choice contexts. 
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observe people’s brain activity in detail and yet cannot acquire data about their choices 
and preferences? 
 
The second reason to doubt that building more predictive models requires economists to 
import neural data relates to the existence of multiple levels of description of human 
choice behaviour. The reasoning goes as follows. People’s decisions can be accounted 
for in terms of social, psychological, neural etc. mechanisms (e.g. Bechtel, 2008, and 
Craver, 2007). Now, economists can certainly succeed in constructing more predictive 
models by incorporating causal and mechanistic insights. Even so, additional argument 
is needed to substantiate the claim that neural - as opposed to social, psychological, etc. 
- data should be included into economic models. That is to say, one may concede that 
economists can formulate more predictive models by adopting a mechanistic approach, 
and yet resist the claim that the most informative mechanistic insights are acquired at 
the neural level. 
 
A proponent of NE might advocate the neural enrichment of economic models on the 
alleged ground that neural insights provide economists with more predictive benefits 
than other disciplines’ findings. Yet, there are at least two reasons to dispute this claim. 
Firstly, it is doubtful that monitoring people’s neural activation patterns yields 
predictive benefits over sufficiently wide temporal horizons to be useful for the 
economists’ purposes. After all, most NEs’ predictions apply “to rapid transients in 
spike rate in the 50-250 millisecond range” and do not extend to the timescales required 
to inform economists’ models and policy analyses (Montague, 2007a, p.223). And 
secondly, one wonders how generalizable the insights offered by specific NE 
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experiments are. For instance, think of the NE model proposed by Vercoe and Zak 
(2010) that we examined in section 2.B. As this model suggests, some NE studies 
provide valuable predictive insights regarding specific economic decisions. Still, it 
remains hard to see how exactly the results obtained in tightly controlled experimental 
settings would generalize to the rest of economic theory. 
 
3) Model selection 
 
During a trip to Murano (Italy), you visit a glass craftsman in order to buy a present for 
your fiancé. As it happens, you are holding an expensive colourful vase of glass, and the 
vase falls out of your hand. There is a wide variety of models by means of which your 
attempting to catch the vase before it breaks on the ground may be represented. For 
example, your action may be modelled as if you were trying to minimize purely 
monetary losses (money-maximizing-agent), the acoustic noise resulting from the vase’s 
destruction (silence-loving-agent), the number of items which will predictably lie on the 
shop’s floor (mereologically-parsimonious-agent), the physical inertia of your muscles 
(fitness-obsessed-agent), and so on. 
 
As this example suggests, observed choice behaviour can often be modelled in terms of 
many different constrained utility functions. This, however, does not imply that any 
such model accounts for observed decisions in plausible terms. On what basis are we to 
discriminate between competing economic models that are equally compatible with 
observed choices? Several NEs (e.g. Camerer, 2008a, p.47, and 2008b, p.370) regard 
neuro-cognitive and neuro-computational plausibility as suitable criteria for model 
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selection in economics. The thought is to discriminate between distinct economic 
models of choice in terms of their relative fit with the available neuroscientific evidence 
concerning decision making processes. Regrettably, neuro-physiological evidence alone 
rarely enables economists to discriminate between competing models of choice. 
 
To be clear, the mere fact that the available evidence is compatible with dissimilar 
models does not exclude the existence of convincing reasons to accept one of these 
models over its competitors (Laudan, 1990, p.270). Indeed, one can find several 
episodes in the history of science where scientists opted for specific theories even in 
presence of rival theories that also seemed well supported by the available evidence (see 
e.g. Okasha, 2000, on the controversy between the Ptolemaic and the Copernican 
systems, and Zahar, 1973, on the transition between Newtonian and relativistic 
mechanics). Even so, many NEs appear to overemphasize the extent to which neural 
evidence discriminates between competing economic models (see Bernheim 2009, 
sec.1, for a similar remark). To render this point more vivid, let us consider economists’ 
multiple-selves models, which represent people’s decisions as the outcome of the 
interactions of sub-personal entities and processes (see e.g. Ainslie, 1992). 
 
In the economic literature, various kinds of multiple-selves models have been proposed. 
For example, some of these models represent choice behaviour as the solution of a 
bargaining game among multiple sub-agents with conflicting objectives (e.g. Schelling, 
1978 and 1980). Others, instead, model choices as the sequential equilibrium of a 
signaling game between multiple selves each controlling the person’s behavior in 
distinct temporal intervals (e.g. Benabou and Tirole, 2003; Prelec and Bodner, 2003). 
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The proponents of NE take neuro-psychological data to help economists test their 
multiple-selves models and ground them in neuro-psychological detail. The idea is that 
brain-imaging data enable economists to associate the sub-personal entities posited by 
multiple-selves models with specific mental processes or neural areas (Spiegler, 2008, 
p.520; see also Rustichini, 2009, p.53). 
 
Unfortunately, NEs appear to overlook that standard economic theory does not 
presuppose that multiple-selves models provide descriptively accurate representations of 
the neuro-psychological processes underlying choice behaviour (Harrison, 2008a, p.38-
9; see also Ross, 2008c). Indeed, it is an open question whether the sub-personal entities 
postulated by multiple-selves models are more aptly related to psychological - as 
opposed to neural - entities and processes (Vromen, 2010a, p.27). For instance, Brocas 
and Carrillo (2008) model intertemporal choices as the result of a conflict between two 
neural systems that respectively target immediate and delayed rewards. For their part, 
Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue argue that modelling behaviour as the 
interplay of disparate psychological motives enables economists to account for 
intertemporal choices in terms of more “legitimate” and “stable” constructs (2002, 
p.393). 
 
Now, one looks with sympathy at the Feyerabendian spirit of those authors who, 
deeming neuroscience research to be “necessarily speculative” (Camerer 2008b, p.369), 
advocate testing any sort of neural conjecture. Even so, it remains unclear why exactly 
economists should discriminate between economic models of choice in terms of their 
neuro-cognitive and neuro-computational plausibility. After all, those models are not 
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meant to characterize the activation patterns of specific neural areas or the workings of 
the human neural architecture. Moreover, the mere fact that economists occasionally 
face severe problems of evidential underconstraint does not imply that their models 
should be tested against every kind of evidence. As Mäki puts it, “neurobiological data 
would be one obvious candidate, among others, to be given a role in deciding between 
observationally equivalent models of choice” (2010, p.115). 
 
At this stage, the proponent of NE may object that economists cannot remain entirely 
agnostic regarding the neural substrates of choice behaviour on the alleged ground that 
the available neuro-psychological evidence narrows down the set of economic models 
compatible with it (Bernheim, 2009, p.17; see also Vromen, 2010b, p.172). This 
reasoning, however, does not imply that neuro-psychological evidence should be 
employed to discriminate between competing economic models of choice. To be sure, it 
is certainly desirable that economists build models whose observable implications are 
consistent with the findings collected in other behavioural sciences. Yet, this does not 
per se license the demand that economists construct models of choice that are to be 
“tested simultaneously at the neural, psychological, and economic levels of analysis” 
(Glimcher, 2010, p.132). For requiring economists qua economists to simultaneously 
account for economic, psychological and neural data places an unreasonably heavy 
evidential burden on them. In the words of Sunder (2006, p.340), “all sciences must 
make some assumptions about the phenomena at the level of details they do not wish to 
delve into […] Insistence that all such assumptions […] be descriptively valid creates a 
burden that is both unreasonable as well as unproductive” (see also Gul and 
Pesendorfer, 2008, for similar remarks). 
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4) Explanatory insightfulness 
 
Various proponents of NE (e.g. McCabe, 2003a and 2003b) argue that neurally enriched 
models provide explanatorily informative insights regarding choice behaviour. Now, 
what insights prove to be explanatory for a modeller typically depends on a number of 
factors, including what constructs she employs and her modelling purposes. To render 
this point more vivid, let me put forward the following analogy. Suppose that a 
technologically illiterate philosopher wanted to understand why her brand-new 
computer crashed on a given occasion. Providing her with a complicated informatic 
explanation would hardly help her to make sense of her computer’s malfunctioning. 
One might object that such an account does offer an adequate explanation of the 
computer’s breakdown, and that the only reason why the philosopher does not find it 
informative is because she lacks proper training in informatics. Yet, the point remains 
that a full-blown informatic explanation is unnecessarily complicated for the 
philosopher’s purposes. As Putnam (1975, p.94) memorably puts it, one does not need a 
micro-physical explanation to understand why a square peg slightly less than one inch 
high passes through a one inch high square hole but not through a one inch in diameter 
round hole. 
 
Regrettably, few NEs seem aware of the variability that criteria of explanatory 
relevance exhibit across disciplinary boundaries. In particular, several NEs appear to 
presuppose that understanding how decision making is instantiated at lower levels of 
description is ipso facto explanatorily informative for economists. For instance, after 
noting that “all economic activity flows through the brain at some point”, Camerer 
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contends that “it is hard to imagine that understanding brain function could not be useful 
for understanding some aspects of economic choice” (2008a, p.47). This claim does not 
license the conclusion that economists will find neural insights particularly informative. 
After all, there is a sense in which all economic activity flows through genes, gluons, 
etc. at some point. Yet, few NEs would conclude that accounting for choice behaviour 
requires economists to engage in genetic speculations and hyper-detailed particle 
physics. Moreover, the point remains that an explanation “is not necessarily improved 
when the explanans is itself explained” (Kuorikoski and Ylikoski, 2010, p.221). Indeed, 
a lower-level explanation can even be less explanatory than higher-level ones (see e.g. 
Weslake, 2010). 
 
To see this, suppose that we were able to provide an accurate description of the neural 
substrates of agents’ behaviour in a specific choice setting. Such a description, however 
accurate, may fail to be explanatorily informative for economists. For instance, it may 
be exceedingly complex, or it may bear no discernible relation to economists’ 
traditional explanatory goals. In other words, even if NE yields explanatory insights 
beyond those provided by its parent disciplines, it is an open question whether NE 
insights will be explanatorily informative for the practitioners of those disciplines. 
Philosophers of science have provided various remarks along these lines with regard to 
several disciplines. For instance, Woodward (2003, p.232-3) argues that macroscopic 
explanations of phenomena can yield information besides that provided by microscopic 
accounts. Similarly, Weslake (2010, p.290) alleges that explanations can be improved 
by abstracting away from the causal details of the investigated target systems. 
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More generally, the point remains that NEs frequently appear to overestimate the 
explanatory reach of their accounts of choice behaviour. By way of illustration, consider 
McCabe’s assertion (2008, p.348) that NE can help economists to better “understand the 
disparity of economic growth, and material welfare, both between and within nations”. 
One may tell a story of how neural processes happen to influence specific 
macroeconomic phenomena by shaping individuals’ preferences and actions. Still, when 
it comes to accounting for macroeconomic growth and inequality, most NE research 
appears to have marginal relevance. For the correspondences between individual brains’ 
activations and those macroeconomic variables are simultaneously shaped by factors - 
such as social norms, institutional incentives, and people’s axiological commitments - 
whose influence can be only partly controlled in single NE studies (see section 3.B). 
 
At this stage, a proponent of NE may advocate the neural enrichment of economic 
theory by appealing to the causal influence of neural processes on people’s preferences 
and decisions. In the words of Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2005, p.27), “the 
traditional economic account of behavior, which assumes that humans act so as to 
maximally satisfy their preferences, starts in the middle […] of the neuroscience 
account”. Now, it would be implausible to dispute that people’s preferences and actions 
are causally influenced by neural processes and events to which they frequently lack 
conscious access (Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005, p.31; see also Libet, 1965, 
1983, 1985, and 1996). Even so, the mere fact that neuro-physiological processes 
causally influence people’s choices does not license the conclusion that providing an 
adequate explanation of economic phenomena requires one to refer to neural 
mechanisms or processes. 
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The proponent of NE might retort that neuro-physiological findings are more 
informative than biological and psychological ones on the alleged ground that they 
enable economists to answer more questions regarding hypothetical and counterfactual 
variations in people’s choice behaviour. Regrettably, NEs have hitherto failed to 
substantiate this assertion. Moreover, some claims to the contrary have been put forward 
in the literature. For instance, Kuorikoski and Ylikoski (2010, p.223) argue that the 
range of what if questions that can be answered on the basis of the hitherto identified 
correspondences between neural areas’ activations and observed decisions is “very 
limited”. In their view, modelling agents’ choices in psychological terms enables one to 
answer a “broader range of what if -questions concerning possible alterations in the 
agent’s valuations, knowledge and how the relevant information is presented”. 
 
5) Welfare analyses 
 
The argument from wants / likes divergences we presented in section 2.E challenges 
economic welfare analyses by criticizing economists’ focus on agents’ observed 
choices. Now, it would be implausible to deny the existence of divergences between 
people’s wants and likes. Even so, it remains doubtful that these divergences challenge 
the validity of economic welfare analyses. Let me expand on this point. NEs often 
criticize economists for regarding choice behaviour as a search for pleasure and for 
assuming that economic agents only strive to obtain what they like (e.g. Camerer, 
Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005, p.37). These criticisms apply to the conception of 
behaviour advocated by some early neoclassical economists (e.g. Jevons, 1871). Yet, it 
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is at least since the Thirties that economists have been reiterating that their theories are 
“not to be identified with the psychology of the utilitarians, in which pleasure had a 
dominating position” and that our main motivations for action may not relate to our own 
or other people’s pleasure (Ramsey, 1931, p.173; see also Hicks and Allen, 1934). That 
is to say, economists realized long ago that economic theory can be articulated in non-
hedonistic terms and does not rest on any specific assumption as to why people choose 
the options they choose (Robbins, 1935, p.93; see also Binmore, 2008)43. 
 
A proponent of NE may rebut that providing compelling insights concerning people’s 
well-being requires economists to base their analyses on people’s likes. Even so, it 
appears that whether agents obtain what they want is an important constituent of well-
being irrespective of whether agents happen to like the things they wanted. For instance, 
as noted by Sugden (2006, p.217), people often consciously act on preferences that are 
not stable under experience and reflection, yet attribute a high importance to the 
opportunity of satisfying those preferences. More generally, the point remains that NEs 
and other economists respectively endorse fundamentally different approaches to 
welfare analyses. Let me explicate this contrast. On the one hand, standard economic 
theory does not rest on specific presuppositions regarding what constitutes agents’ 
objective well-being or what objectives agents should pursue. On the other hand, many 
NEs relate agents’ well-being to their mental states or the activation patterns of 
particular neural areas. Moreover, they often aim to establish what objectives agents 
should pursue in specific situations. As I argue in section 7.C, these differences 
constrain the relevance of NEs’ findings for traditional economic welfare analyses. 
                                                          
43
 Indeed, it is since the time of Pareto that economists remark that “it is not an essential 
characteristic of [economic] theories that a man choosing between two sensations chooses the 
most agreeable” (1909, ch.3, §11). 
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To be sure, NEs can provide economists with valuable information regarding the neuro-
psychological substrates of choice behaviour, which promises to complement 
economists’ policy evaluations and indexes of well-being. Even so, it remains hard to 
see how exactly NE descriptive findings are supposed to provide compelling insights 
regarding what people ought to choose in a given situation. For economists’ normative 
and prescriptive analyses rest - not so much on “empirical hypotheses about how human 
beings really think and act”, but rather - on deductions from a priori assumptions about 
rational choice (Bruni and Sugden, 2007, p.146-7; see also Knutson and Peterson, 2005, 
p.305). In the words of Glimcher (2010, p.412), using neural measurements to draw 
normative conclusions regarding people’s well-being seems “unwarranted” not just 
because of current limitations in our measurements but also because neural data “are 
explicitly positive in nature”44. 
 
 
To recapitulate, the proponents of NE appear to overestimate the extent to which 
including neural insights helps economists to improve their models of choice. NEs may 
rebut that advances in scanner technology and experimental practices will enable them 
to construct models of choice which supersede the ones currently employed by 
economists. As I argue in the next two sections, however, there are principled reasons to 
doubt this claim. My reasoning can be summarized as follows. Economists and NEs 
                                                          
44
 A similar point was made by Pareto (1971 [1909], Ch.1, §21-26) in explicating the distinction 
between pure and applied economics. In his view, applied economics is a “practice” which can 
be informed fruitfully by the findings of sociology and psychology. Pure economics, instead, is 
“the science of logical action”, and should remain separate from psychology and sociology. See 
also Hume (2005 [1740], BIII, 1.1) for some famous remarks against deriving prescriptive or 
normative conclusions from purely descriptive premises. 
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respectively value dissimilar modelling desiderata, which often make contrasting 
demands on modellers. The trade-offs between distinct desiderata, in turn, significantly 
limit the incorporation of neural insights into economic models of choice. To put it 
differently, NEs persuasively illustrate that including neural insights can foster local 
improvements in economic models of choice. Yet, they usually gloss over the issue 
whether a neural enrichment is likely to yield global improvements in economic models. 
Hence, it remains an open question whether economists will often find it convenient to 
incorporate neural insights into their models of choice. 
 
To be fair, assessing whether some modelling modification constitutes a global 
improvement can prove to be quite difficult due to disagreements regarding how the 
examined desiderata are to be defined and weighed against each other. How one 
addresses these two issues, in turn, significantly depends on several elements, ranging 
from particular disciplinary conventions to the aims of modellers. At any rate, showing 
that including neural insights yields some local improvements for economists is 
insufficient to substantiate the case for adopting a neurally informed approach to the 
modelling of decision making. For these local improvements may fail to compensate for 
the modelling costs involved in a neural enrichment of economic theory. To render this 
point more vivid, in the next two sections I examine some trade-offs between specific 
modelling desiderata and illustrate how these trade-offs constrain the incorporation of 
neural insights into economic models of choice. 
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4.B THE ECONOMISTS’ ARGUMENT FROM TRACTABILITY 
 
In this section, I reconstruct the argument from tractability which motivates many 
economists’ reluctance to incorporate neural insights and then argue that two major 
flaws prevent it from cogently vindicating their position. Before doing so, let me put 
forward some definitional caveats. Economists frequently cite tractability as a virtue of 
their models, yet rarely define it in precise terms. The literature on economic modelling 
nicely illustrates the difficulty inherent in providing an uncontroversial characterization 
of this desideratum. For instance, some authors (e.g. Kahneman, 2003, p.166) relate 
tractability to the number of variables which appear in a given model. Others (e.g. 
Gabaix and Laibson, 2008, p.294, and Hindriks, 2005, p.392, and 2006, p.413) define it 
in terms of the availability of computable analytical solutions. Still others (e.g. Gibbard 
and Varian, 1978, p.673) take tractability to be akin to the simplicity of a model’s 
mathematical formalism. 
 
In light of these discrepancies, one may think that tractability is best understood as a 
cluster concept resembling notions such as parsimony, resolvability and simplicity, 
which are themselves hard to define unambiguously. This, however, does not prevent us 
from adopting a sufficiently precise characterization of such a desideratum. In what 
follows, I regard the number of variables appearing in a model as an approximate 
indicator of its tractability, as this provides us with a convenient rule of thumb for 
comparing alternative modelling frameworks45. 
                                                          
45
 The notion of tractability could be given a more precise definition in specific modelling 
contexts. I do not engage with this definitional issue here, as my aim is to provide an 
approximate indicator of tractability which is both sufficiently precise to assess NE models and 
sufficiently general to capture the heterogeneity of economists’ terminological practice. 
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In everyday discussions, economic practitioners and methodologists often speak of 
tractability as a fundamental modelling desideratum. Nonetheless, they seem to ascribe 
different meanings to such an expression. In this respect, it is instructive to distinguish 
three progressively less stringent senses in which the term “fundamental” may be 
employed, namely: that economists give tractability lexicographic priority over other 
modelling virtues (fundamental-1); that economists attach a higher weight to tractability 
than to any other modelling desideratum (fundamental-2); and that in spite of their 
preference for descriptively accurate and predictively powerful models, economists are 
reluctant to reduce tractability below some minimal threshold (fundamental-3). Now, 
the first two claims are clearly untenable, and fail to fit with a number of episodes in the 
history of economic theory46. The third assertion, instead, accurately reflects the fact 
that many economists - despite valuing attributes such as descriptive accuracy and 
predictive power - take these desiderata into account under the overarching constraint 
that their models remain sufficiently tractable. In what follows, I shall employ the term 
“fundamental” in the fundamental-3 sense unless stated otherwise. 
 
Having said that, the economists’ argument from tractability can be articulated as 
follows: 
P.1 Economists ascribe fundamental importance to the tractability of their models of 
choice. 
P.2 Building a tractable model of choice prevents one from including a large number 
of variables in it. 
                                                          
46
 For instance, consider how the predictive gains offered by generalized expected utility models 
led many economists to alter the more tractable expected utility framework (see e.g. Starmer, 
2000, for a detailed review). 
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C (1) Due to the fundamental importance they ascribe to tractability, economists are 
prevented from including a large number of variables into their models of 
choice. 
P.3 Fostering a neurally informed revolution in the economic theory of choice 
requires NEs to include a large number of neural variables into the economists’ 
models. 
C NEs will not foster a neurally informed revolution in the economic theory of 
choice. 
 
Let us examine each step of the argument from tractability in turn. Premise 1 
emphasizes the great importance that economic modellers attribute to tractability. 
Premise 2, in turn, notes the limitations that tractability imposes on incorporating 
variables into economic models. On the basis of these premises, conclusion (1) asserts 
that the high relevance that economists ascribe to tractability significantly constrains the 
integration of psychological, neural, biological, etc. constructs into their models. That is 
to say, importing neural insights may well help economists to improve their models 
with regard to specific attributes (e.g. think of descriptive accuracy). Yet, there is 
frequently a trade-off between tractability and other desiderata, and economists’ 
preference for tractability limits the degree to which their models can satisfy them. 
 
The existence and significance of trade-offs between distinct desiderata have been 
discussed at length in other disciplines besides economics. For example, in the literature 
on modelling in biology several authors (e.g. Odenbaugh, 2003, and Weisberg, 2004, 
2007a and 2007b) argue that different attributes make contrasting demands on 
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modellers, imposing considerable pragmatic and logical constraints on model 
construction. To be sure, economists and biologists alike hold diverse positions 
regarding the definition and the relative importance of particular desiderata47. Still, in 
spite of these discrepancies, both economists and biologists share a relatively precise 
characterization of various attributes and concur on the existence of specific trade-offs 
between them. Indeed, some authors even propose quantitative frameworks for 
weighing distinct desiderata against each other (see e.g. Harless and Camerer, 1994, for 
a comparison of traditional and generalized expected utility models, and Moscati, 2006, 
for a similar analysis concerning different versions of the neoclassical theory of 
demand). Regrettably, not all NEs seem aware of the trade-offs which hold between 
dissimilar attributes, and various researchers appear to underestimate the constraints that 
these trade-offs impose on model construction in economics48. 
 
In advocating the neural enrichment of economic theory, several authors (e.g. Camerer, 
Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005, p.10, and Rustichini, 2003) speak of introducing 
revolutionary changes into the economists’ account of decision making. In rebuttal to 
their claims, premise 3 of the argument from tractability states that if NEs are to foster 
such a neurally informed revolution, then they have to include several neural variables 
into the economists’ models. As we shall see below, the cogency of this premise rests 
on how exactly the notion of revolution is interpreted. For now, let me anticipate that 
there are different ways in which NE research can promote radical modifications in the 
                                                          
47
 See e.g. Mäki, 1988, 1990 and 1992, on different senses in which the terms “realism” and 
“realisticness” are used in economics; see Weisberg, 2007a, and Matthewson and Weisberg, 
2009, on distinct notions of “generality” in biology. 
48
 For example, as noted by Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer (2005, p.214), several NEs aim to build 
neurally enriched models that are highly parsimonious and predictive in a wide range of 
decision contexts. Parsimony and predictive power so frequently pull in contrasting directions 
that it is an open question whether NEs will manage to accomplish such an ambitious goal. 
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economic theory of choice. In this respect, the question arises as to whether 
revolutionizing such a theory requires NEs to integrate many variables into the 
economists’ models. 
 
Finally, the argument from tractability concludes that the considerable extent to which 
tractability constrains the import of other disciplines’ constructs precludes a neurally 
informed revolution of the economic account of decision making. The idea is that NEs 
may provide economists with informative insights, yet will fail to elaborate models 
which supersede the ones currently employed by economists. In this perspective, what 
Kahneman (2003, p.166) asserted in relation to behavioural economics seems equally 
pertinent to NE research. In his view, “the constraint of tractability can be satisfied with 
somewhat more complex models, but the number of parameters that can be added is 
small”. For this reason, enriched models “cannot stray too far from the original set of 
assumptions”, and “theoretical innovations […] may be destined to be 
noncumulative”49. 
 
Now, let us assess the cogency of the argument from tractability. Prima facie, such 
reasoning might seem to provide economists with a compelling rationale for resisting 
the integration of neural insights into their models. As I argue below, however, two 
crucial flaws (see points i and ii) prevent it from constituting a convincing defense of 
such a conservative position. My first criticism targets the argument’s characterization 
of the relationship between tractability and other modelling desiderata. The second one 
                                                          
49
 Kahneman is far from being a strenuous defender of the traditional economic theory of 
choice. In fact, he was awarded the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics “for having integrated 
insights from psychological research into economic science” (Nobel Press Release, 2002). 
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casts doubt on the third premise of such an argument. Let us examine each of these 
criticisms in turn. 
 
i) As stated by premise 1 of the economists’ argument, economic modellers attribute a 
prominent significance to tractability. This, however, does not per se license the claim 
that they are justified in doing so. To address this concern, economists may attempt to 
vindicate their reliance on tractable models on pragmatic grounds. In particular, they 
may point out that the very act of modelling requires one to elaborate simplified 
representations of the investigated phenomena50. The decision concerning which 
properties or features of the phenomena of interest are to be represented in a model is 
frequently guided both by specific inclusion rules (see e.g. Weisberg, 2007a) and by the 
availability of representational techniques such as abstractions, isolations and 
idealizations. In this latter respect, the issue for economists is not so much whether to 
use abstractions, isolations and idealizations, but rather which of these it is most 
convenient to implement in a given modelling context. As Mäki (1992, p.1) aptly puts 
it: “Faced with the essential complexity of the world, every science is compelled to 
employ methods of modifying or deforming it so as to make it or the image of it 
theoretically manageable and comprehensible. Economics is no exception in this 
regard”51. 
                                                          
50
 Various authors offer less convincing accounts of economists’ predilection for tractable 
models. To give one example, consider the observation by Gabaix and Laibson (2008, p.295) 
that economists elevated modelling attributes such as tractability out of people’s tendency to 
“celebrate the things they do best”. Invoking this psychological propensity hardly accounts for 
the great importance economists attach to tractability. In particular, it fails to substantiate the 
claim that the reason why economists value this desideratum is because of their excellence at 
building tractable models. 
51
 Various kinds of abstractions, isolations and idealizations can be differentiated. For instance, 
Weisberg (2007a) distinguishes between so-called Galilean and minimalist idealizations as 
follows. Galilean idealizations consist in simplifying the characterization of a target system to 
 144
These considerations persuasively elucidate the pragmatic rationale for why many 
economists rely on tractable models. In response to those claims, a proponent of NE 
may concede that it is not feasible to include a large number of neural variables into a 
single economic model. At the same time, she may wonder in what modelling contexts 
and to what extent tractability can be legitimately given priority over other desiderata. 
After all - the reasoning would go - it is true that the trade-offs between distinct 
attributes often need to be resolved on a case-to-case basis, depending on what choice 
problem is modelled and the purposes of the modeller. Yet, the argument from 
tractability does not provide any precise criterion for dealing with those trade-offs. In 
particular, conclusion (1) appears to presuppose - rather than show - that tractability 
considerations alone outweigh the relevance of the modelling benefits (e.g. increased 
descriptive accuracy) that economists may derive by importing neural insights. 
 
ii) As anticipated above, one may question the cogency of premise 3 of the argument 
from tractability by pointing at distinct ways in which NEs could promote revolutionary 
changes in the economic account of decision making. To render this point more vivid, 
let me contrast the following two scenarios. On the one hand, NEs may foster 
revolutionary modifications in the economic theory of choice by introducing into 
economic models several variables that were not previously considered by economists52. 
On the other hand, NEs may revolutionize economic theory from the foundations 
upwards by providing economists with a novel theoretical framework. In this latter 
                                                                                                                                                                          
make it tractable and then systematically de-idealizing it so as to obtain increasingly accurate 
representations. Minimalist idealizations, instead, obtain when one includes in her model only 
the most important causal factors underlying the investigated phenomena. I gloss over these 
differences in the remainder of this enquiry. 
52
 For example, NEs might replace the economists’ intertemporal discount rate with variables 
representing the activation patterns of neural areas whose operations influence agents’ 
intertemporal preferences. 
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respect, no momentous achievement has been accomplished by NEs so far. Nonetheless, 
one can think of a few ways in which NEs might revolutionize economic theory without 
having to include many neural variables into the economists’ models. For instance, NEs 
might prompt economists to employ altogether different constructs by illustrating that 
what was regarded as a unitary phenomenon (e.g. hyperbolic discounting) is more 
plausibly seen as distinct phenomena explained by dissimilar neuro-psychological 
mechanisms (Craver and Alexandrova, 2008, and Ross et al., 2008). That is to say, 
implementing revolutionary changes in the economic theory of choice does not 
necessarily require NEs to integrate many variables into the economists’ models. Hence, 
premise 3 turns out to be untenable and the argument from tractability fails. 
 
To recapitulate, economists may put forward various considerations to justify their 
reluctance to include neural constructs into their models. Even so, the argument from 
tractability proves to be flawed in at least two central respects. In the first place, it 
remains disappointingly silent regarding in what modelling contexts and to what extent 
tractability can be given priority over other desiderata. In the second place, it purports - 
yet fails - to exclude that neurally informed contributions will prompt revolutionary 
modifications in the economic theory of choice. That is to say, economists often doubt 
the opportunity to include neural constructs into their models, but do not always 
vindicate their position by means of a convincing argumentative strategy. Now, these 
critical remarks do not preclude economists from cogently vindicating their opposition 
to import other disciplines’ insights on the basis of tractability considerations. In the 
next section, I present one such line of argument which casts doubt on the NEs’ case for 
incorporating neural constructs into economic models of decision making. 
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4.C A REFINED ARGUMENT FROM TRACTABILITY 
 
In this section, I articulate and defend a refined argument from tractability which 
attempts to demonstrate that economists are provisionally justified in retaining a 
methodologically distinctive approach to the modelling of choice behaviour. My 
reasoning can be formalized in different ways depending on which attributes one 
considers besides tractability. In what follows, I shall prevalently concentrate on 
tractability and descriptive accuracy, with this latter indicating a model’s goodness of fit 
with the structure or the features of its target system53. My focus is motivated both by 
the contrasting demands that descriptive accuracy and tractability place on economic 
modellers and by the importance that NEs and other economists attach to these two 
virtues54. 
 
Before presenting the refined argument from tractability, let me put forward two 
preliminary caveats. Firstly, my reasoning by no means denies that importing neural 
insights may enable economists to build more predictive and descriptively accurate 
models. On the contrary, such an argument is built on the implicit assumption that NEs 
can improve the predictive and descriptive performance of economic models of choice. 
At the same time, it casts doubt on whether these improvements make it convenient for 
economists to integrate many neural variables into their account of decision making. 
                                                          
53
 As noted in section 2.A, various questions may be raised regarding how descriptive accuracy 
is most appropriately defined. My approximate characterization is sufficiently precise to enable 
us to examine the trade-offs I mention in this chapter. 
54
 A reasoning along similar lines could be constructed with regard to other modelling trade-
offs. For instance, it is an open question whether NE will enable economists to elaborate a 
framework which is at once more tractable and general in scope than rational choice theory. As 
Vromen (2010b, p.180) puts it, even if “all the neural circuits linking environmental variables to 
choice behavior can be captured in one general algorithm”, such an algorithm would be far more 
complicated than the utility functions postulated by standard economic models. 
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Secondly, even though tractability and descriptive accuracy typically pull in opposite 
directions, economists may succeed in constructing models which provide both tractable 
and descriptively accurate representations of their target systems. To see this, it is 
instructive to distinguish between various levels - e.g. psychological, neural, biological, 
and micro-physical - at which the descriptive accuracy of a model can be evaluated. 
Now, while the neural substrates of decision making are exceedingly complex to be 
accurately described in tractable terms (neural descriptive accuracy), the psychological 
underpinnings of choice behaviour can be frequently characterized in a fairly accurate 
and tractable manner (psychological descriptive accuracy). In this perspective, we can 
appreciate why economists often exhibit a selective scepticism with regard to the 
incorporation of other disciplines’ insights. For one may coherently argue that various 
psychological findings are “tractable and parsimonious enough that we should begin the 
process of integrating them into economics” (Rabin, 1998, p.13), and yet resist the 
inclusion of neural insights into economic models. 
 
Having said that, the refined argument from tractability can be articulated as follows: 
P.1 If economists are to construct descriptively accurate and neurally informed 
economic models of choice, then they have to incorporate several neural 
variables (tractability cost). 
P.2 Economists should incorporate neural variables only insofar as the modelling 
costs associated with such enrichment are compensated by sufficient modelling 
benefits. 
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P.3 NEs have not shown that the modelling benefits derivable from incorporating 
several neural variables compensate for the modelling costs associated with such 
enrichment. 
C (1) NEs have failed to show that economists should incorporate several neural 
variables into their models of choice. 
P.4 Showing that economists should incorporate several neural variables requires 
NEs to demonstrate that human choice behaviour is more conveniently modelled 
at the neural - rather than some other - level. 
P.5 NEs have failed to demonstrate that human choice behaviour is more 
conveniently modelled at the neural - rather than some other - level. 
C (2) NEs have failed to show that economists should incorporate several neural 
variables into their models of choice. 
C Economists are provisionally justified in resisting NEs’ calls to construct 
descriptively accurate and neurally informed economic models of choice. 
 
Let us scrutinize the various steps which comprise the refined argument from 
tractability. Premise 1 concerns the tractability costs that a neural enrichment of 
economic models is likely to impose on economists. The idea is that developing 
descriptively accurate NE models of decision making would require one to build rather 
intractable representations. To be sure, a proponent of NE may object that some 
processes and features of the human neural architecture can be modelled in tractable 
terms (see e.g. Schultz, 1998, and Schultz, Dayan, and Montague, 1997, on the 
dopaminergic underpinnings of reward evaluation). Yet, accurately representing the 
neural substrates of choice behaviour would typically impose significant tractability 
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costs, as numerous cerebral systems are highly interconnected at the anatomical and 
physiological levels (see e.g. Anderson, 2006 and 2007, and Glimcher, Dorris and 
Bayer, 2005, p.251). 
 
Two issues are worth distinguishing in this respect. On the one hand, a number of neural 
areas activate in a wide range of decision contexts (Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000, and Price 
and Friston, 2005, p.262-5). On the other hand, even the execution of simple 
experimental tasks typically engages several areas, with additional variability resulting 
when it comes to solving complex decision problems (Ortmann, 2008, p.442). As 
Petersen and Fiez (1993, p.513) put it, “a set of distributed functional areas must be 
orchestrated in the performance of even simple cognitive tasks […] Any task or 
‘function’ utilizes a complex and distributed set of brain areas”. To be sure, NEs may 
occasionally succeed in modelling the neural underpinnings of people’s decisions 
without using many variables. Still, accurately representing the neural substrates of 
choice behavior usually requires them to employ several variables. In the words of 
Bernheim (2009, p.7), “precise algorithmic models of decision making of the sort to 
which many neuroeconomists aspire would presumably map highly detailed 
descriptions of environmental and neurobiological conditions into choices”. 
 
At this point, the proponent of NE may protest that both economists and NEs generally 
attach a greater importance to predictive power than to descriptive accuracy. Moreover, 
she may argue that even though tractability considerably constrains the accuracy with 
which one can characterize the neural substrates of choice behaviour, NEs could build 
more predictive economic models without incurring substantial tractability costs (see 
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e.g. Knutson et al., 2007, and Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005, on the possibility of 
increasing the predictive power of some models of choice by investigating the activation 
patterns exhibited by a few neural areas). On this basis, the advocate of NE may 
contend that premise 1 merely highlights a local conflict between two conveniently 
selected desiderata which does not hinder the import of neural insights into economic 
models. 
 
To such a criticism, my rejoinder is three-fold. To begin with, the fact that many 
economists value predictive power falls short of excluding other desiderata from 
playing an important role in economic modelling. Secondly, both economists and NEs 
ascribe a great significance to descriptive accuracy, with some authors going as far as to 
claim that “the ultimate test of a theory” is “the accuracy with which it identifies the 
actual causes of behaviour” (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004, p.4). Finally, it is highly 
doubtful that invoking predictive considerations per se enables NEs to substantiate their 
case for the neural enrichment of economic theory. For even if NEs may succeed in 
increasing the predictive power of some economic models with marginal tractability 
losses, it is an open question whether integrating neural insights will often be so 
advantageous to economists. Let me expand on this issue. 
 
While the first premise of the refined argument from tractability relates to the 
tractability costs involved in a neural enrichment of economic theory, premises 2 and 3 
concern the relationship between the modelling costs and the benefits associated with 
this enrichment. More specifically, premise 2 asserts that economists should integrate 
neural variables only insofar as doing so yields modelling benefits which compensate 
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for the modelling costs imposed by such integration. In this respect, various NEs allege 
that - by taking neural findings into account - economists could elaborate models of 
choice which fare better according to their own modelling criteria (Camerer, 2008a, 
p.59; see Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004, p.3, for an analogous remark concerning 
psychological findings). Regrettably, as stated by premise 3, NEs still have to 
demonstrate that the benefits derivable by integrating neural variables into economic 
models typically exceed the associated modelling costs. This being the situation, their 
pleas in favour of a neural enrichment of the economic theory of choice remain 
inadequately supported (conclusion 1). As Bernheim (2009, p.7) provocatively puts it: 
“What does a standard economist lose by subsuming all of the idiosyncratic, micro-
micro factors that influence decisions, many of which change from moment to moment, 
within a statistical disturbance term?”55. 
 
A proponent of NE may rebut that the above considerations place an excessive burden 
on the NEs’ shoulders. In particular, she might contend that substantiating the case for 
the neural enrichment of economic theory just requires NEs to show that neural data are 
of some value to economists. However, premises 4 and 5 of the refined argument from 
tractability cast serious doubt on such a rebuttal. Let us inspect each of these assertions 
in turn. 
 
                                                          
55
 A proponent of NE might point out that there are already some tractable economic models 
that incorporate neural insights. The existence of these models, however, does not undermine 
premise 3. For such a premise does not deny the existence of neurally enriched and tractable 
economic models. On the contrary, it is best interpreted as stating a typicality claim which 
doubts that economists will usually find it convenient to include many neural insights into their 
models. 
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According to premise 4, it is up to NEs to specify why exactly economists should 
integrate neural - as opposed to psychological, biological, micro-physical etc. - variables 
into their models. This claim relates to the fact that human choice behaviour can be 
modelled at a number of different levels (e.g. psychological, neural, biological, and 
micro-physical). That is to say, there are various processes and entities in terms of 
which agents’ decisions may be represented, and one can typically employ distinct sets 
of constructs to account for decision making. For example, while rational choice 
theorists represent observed choices as the maximization of a utility function under 
some suitably defined constraints, cognitive psychologists account for those data in 
terms of specific heuristics and cognitive mechanisms, computational neuroscientists 
attempt to identify what neural algorithms underlie the observed decisions, and so on. In 
this perspective, NEs’ proposals can be seen as one among several competing 
candidates for modelling human choice behaviour56. 
 
One may protest that most NEs advocate the integration of neural variables - not so 
much as an alternative, but rather - in addition to other disciplines’ insights. In the 
words of Park and Zak (2007, p.54), “augmented economic models will also likely 
include results from sociology, anthropology, psychology, and other fields” (see also 
Camerer 2008b, on the opportunity to triangulate behavioural, psychological and neural 
data). Yet, the point remains that simultaneously including constructs from various 
                                                          
56
 Other ways to conceptualize model construction in NE have been advocated. In particular, 
various authors (e.g. Rustichini, 2009) rely on a tripartition originally proposed by Marr (1982) 
with regard to information-processing systems. The idea is to study human choice behaviour at 
three different levels. The computational level specifies the problem faced by the examined 
agents in terms of some input-output mapping. The algorithmic level explicates how the agents 
represent the input-output mapping and what algorithms transform the inputs into the outputs. 
The hardware implementation level concerns how the computational and algorithmic processes 
associated with people’s decisions are instantiated at the physical level. 
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disciplines into a single economic model would often be prohibitively impractical. In 
other words, given that a limited number of variables can be feasibly imported into one 
economic model, a criterion is needed for assessing the relative relevance of distinct 
disciplines’ insights for the economic theory of choice. Regrettably, as remarked by 
premise 5, NEs have hitherto failed to convincingly support the claim that choice 
behaviour is most conveniently modelled at the neural level. Moreover, they rarely 
indicate what subset of neural data (e.g. neuro-anatomical, neuro-physiological, neuro-
biological) economists should incorporate into their models. This being the situation, it 
is hard to see why economists should integrate neural - rather than higher-level or 
lower-level - insights into their account of decision making57. 
 
At this point, one may wonder how the assertion that human choice behaviour is most 
“conveniently” modelled at the neural level is to be interpreted. In addressing this 
concern, we should avoid imposing overly rigid restrictions as to how the modelling 
benefits and the costs associated with a given enrichment of economic theory are to be 
balanced against one another. For in primis, a modeller’s views on this matter may 
significantly vary depending on her modelling goals and on what choice problem she is 
examining (Landreth and Bickle, 2008, p.420). Secondly, modelling costs and benefits 
cannot always be compared precisely in quantitative - rather than qualitative - terms. 
And thirdly, intradisciplinary conventions frequently diverge regarding what modelling 
attributes are to be valued in a given context, with distinct conventions resolving the 
trade-offs between different desiderata in dissimilar ways (Mäki, 2010, p.108). 
                                                          
57
 I speak of “higher-level” and “lower-level” insights following an entrenched terminological 
convention in the philosophy of science literature. My doing so does not commit me to endorse 
the hierarchical view of the structure of science often held by those who employ these 
expressions. 
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To be clear, these concerns do not preclude us from meaningfully comparing the merits 
of distinct enrichments of economic theory. Still, they persuasively suggest that those 
evaluations are most sensibly implemented in context-relative terms. To appreciate this, 
suppose that we wanted to evaluate alternative enrichments of economic theory by 
means of the following criterion C: 
 
A target system T is more conveniently modelled at level X rather than Y if and only if 
the difference between the modelling benefits (MB) derivable from characterizing T in 
terms of X and the associated modelling costs (MC) is higher than the analogous 
difference related to level Y, i.e. iff [MB (TX) - MC (TX)] > [MB (TY) - MC (TY)].  
 
Criterion C is defined in relation to two distinct levels of description, but can be 
modified to deal with cases where insights from more levels of description are available. 
In this way, it can be used to handle situations where distinct modellers hold dissimilar 
views concerning which and how many levels of description it is most convenient to 
integrate into a model. To render this point more vivid, let us assume that insights from 
three levels of description X, Y and Z were available, with X, Y and Z respectively 
standing for the behavioural (observed choices), psychological and neural level of 
description. Ascertaining how many levels of description it is most convenient to 
include into a model can be seen as the problem of identifying which of the following 
differences is greatest: 
 
[MB (TX) - MC (TX)];   [MB (TY) - MC (TY)];   [MB (TZ) - MC (TZ)];   [MB (TX,Y) - MC (TX,Y)]; 
[MB (TX,Z) - MC (TX,Z)];   [MB (TY,Z) - MC (TY,Z)];   [MB (TX,Y,Z) - MC (TX,Y,Z)]. 
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Now, let us distinguish between those modelling approaches which involve using neural 
data (namely TZ, TX,Z, TY,Z and TX,Y,Z) and those which do not (namely TX, TY and 
TX,Y). Let us call these two sets neurally informed and neurally free approaches 
respectively. Illustrating that adopting some neurally free approach is more convenient 
than integrating neural insights (TX,Z) would fall short of implying that neural insights 
are of little value to economists. For economists may still find it more convenient to 
combine neural with behavioural and psychological insights (TX,Y,Z) than to rely on any 
of the neurally free approaches. Conversely, showing that economists should import 
neural insights would require NEs to demonstrate that employing one of the neurally 
informed approaches is more convenient than adopting any of the currently available 
neurally free approaches. 
 
In such a context, it is worth noting the significance that expected modelling costs and 
benefits may be given when assessing distinct enrichments of economic theory. By way 
of illustration, consider the following comparison between a neural and a psychological 
enrichment. One may argue that behavioural economists have provided other 
economists with far greater modelling benefits than NEs, whose success stories are 
often confined to highly controlled experimental settings. Moreover, she may remark 
that accurately representing the anatomical or functional interplays between distinct 
neural areas would impose on economists substantial modelling costs, which exceed 
those required to construct psychologically realistic models. Now, let us suppose that 
these observations were correct. One might take them to imply that economists will find 
it more convenient to implement a psychological - rather than neural - enrichment of 
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economic theory. However, NEs may object that the modelling benefits promised by 
their contributions - albeit still hypothetical - are so significant that economists should 
opt for a neural enrichment of their models. The idea would be to take into account not 
just current, but also expected modelling benefits and costs, i.e. anticipated benefits and 
costs discounted for their subjectively estimated probability of actualization. 
 
By doing so, we might be able to better assess what enrichments of economic theory are 
likely to be more convenient for economists. Yet, we would also introduce some highly 
conjectural elements into our analysis. To see this, let us briefly consider the 
explanatory benefits derivable from incorporating neural insights into economic models. 
On the one hand, NEs already acquired valuable information concerning the neuro-
physiological underpinnings of human choice behaviour (see e.g. Barraza and Zak, 
2009, Kosfeld et al., 2005, and Zak et al., 2004, for some NE studies of the effects that 
specific hormones have on agents’ decisions). On the other hand, the question remains 
as to how exactly these neuroscientific advances bear on economic theorising. In 
particular, it is doubtful that economists will usually find neurally enriched accounts of 
decision making more explanatorily insightful than psychologically informed ones (see 
section 4.A). 
 
Regrettably, the impression remains that several NEs exhibit an exceedingly optimistic 
attitude regarding the achievements that their studies can be plausibly expected to 
accomplish. To render this point more vivid, let us consider one specific example taken 
from recent NE research, namely the axiomatic model of learning by Caplin and Dean 
(2008; see also Caplin et al., 2010). Caplin and Dean provide a set of axioms defining 
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beliefs and rewards in terms of dopaminergic activity so as to specify “in a simple, 
parsimonious, and nonparametric way the properties that the dopamine system must 
have in order to be characterized as encoding a reward prediction error” (2008, p.670). 
According to Caplin and Dean, their model has a number of “economic applications”, 
which purportedly include “insight into belief formation […] learning theory [and] 
addiction” (2008, p.665). Now, let us suppose that such a model improves our 
understanding of the algorithmic underpinnings of learning and enables us to test the 
reward prediction-error hypothesis of dopamine function (see Caplin et al., 2010). These 
insights are of great interest to cognitive and computational neuroscientists, yet do not 
directly bear on economists’ traditional concerns. As Caplin et al. (2010, p.953) aptly 
acknowledge, their model does not “immediately advance our understanding of choice”. 
 
To recapitulate, my refined argument from tractability challenges NEs to demonstrate 
that the modelling benefits offered by a neural enrichment exceed the corresponding 
modelling costs. Moreover, it provides two main reasons to doubt that choice behaviour 
is more conveniently modelled at the neural - as opposed to some other - level. The first 
reason relates to specific anatomical and functional features of the human neural 
architecture. The idea is that, due to the complexity of the interconnections between 
distinct neural areas, accurately characterizing the neural substrates of decision making 
will require NEs to incur inconveniently high modelling costs. The second reason 
concerns the existence of multiple levels of description of choice behaviour, and calls 
NEs to specify on what grounds economists should integrate neural - as opposed to 
other disciplines’ - constructs into their models (see also Fumagalli, 2011). Regrettably, 
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the proponents of NE frequently gloss over these issues and the implications they have 
for the construction of models spanning different behavioural disciplines 
 
In response to the above remarks, NEs may attempt to substantiate their case for 
incorporating neural insights into economic models by appealing to modelling pluralism 
considerations. The reasoning can be summarized as follows. Due to the existence of 
trade-offs, economists are typically unable to construct models that simultaneously 
possess all the attributes they value. While some of these trade-offs are likely to abate 
with scientific progress, others will persist in spite of it58. Hence, if economists are to 
achieve their diverse modelling goals, they have to elaborate a variety of models 
differing in descriptive accuracy, predictive power, included causal factors, etc. 
 
This rationale for building multiple models has been persuasively advocated in the 
literature on modelling in biology (see e.g. Levins, 1966 and 1968, Roughgarden, 1979, 
Wimsatt, 1987, and May, 2001). The idea is that modellers can employ a mixed 
representational strategy, using distinct kinds of models to achieve different pragmatic 
and epistemic goals (Weisberg, 2007a; see Aydinonat, 2010, p.164, for a similar claim 
in the economic literature). In this perspective, neurally informed models can be seen as 
- not so much substitutes for, but rather - complements to traditional economic models 
of choice. 
 
                                                          
58
 Among the constraints which will not abate with scientific advances, Matthewson and 
Weisberg (2009, p.188) include strict trade-offs, increase trade-offs and Levins trade-offs. Two 
attributes display a strict trade-off “when an increase in the magnitude of one desideratum 
necessarily results in a decrease in the magnitude of the second, and vice versa”. An increase 
trade-off occurs when the magnitudes of two desiderata cannot be simultaneously increased. 
Finally, two attributes exhibit a Levins trade-off “when the magnitude of both of these attributes 
cannot be simultaneously maximized”. 
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Now, by combining neural and other disciplines’ insights, economists may succeed in 
constructing an array of models which - taken collectively - enable them to better attain 
their predictive and explanatory goals. Moreover, a pluralistic approach appears to be 
especially worth pursuing when it comes to modelling phenomena - such as human 
choice behaviour - that are investigated by a range of different disciplines. Nonetheless, 
the above pluralistic remarks do not license the claim that economists should integrate 
several neural constructs into their models. For even if such integration enabled them to 
achieve specific modelling goals in particular contexts, it would remain up to NEs to 
demonstrate that elaborating a neurally informed account of choice behaviour is, in 
general, more convenient for economists than relying on traditional modelling 
frameworks. 
 
To conclude, the emergence of NE raised fundamental methodological issues 
concerning the relevance of neural data for economic modelling and theorising. At 
present, most economists remain fairly sceptical about the alleged significance of NE 
research for the economic theory of choice. As I argued above, including neural insights 
can improve economic models of choice with regard to several desiderata, individually 
taken (local improvements). Yet, substantiating the case for a neural enrichment of 
economic models requires NEs to show that such enrichment will foster global 
improvements in the economic account of decision making. Regrettably, the proponents 
of NE have hitherto failed to do so. Hence, economists are provisionally justified in 
retaining a methodologically distinctive approach to the modelling of decision making. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ARGUMENT FROM DISCIPLINARY HETEROGENEITIES 
 
The proponents of NE often manifest the ambition to combine findings from economics, 
psychology and neuroscience into a “single, general theory of human behaviour” 
(Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004, p.447; see also Glimcher, 2010, p.393, Glimcher, 
Dorris and Bayer, 2005, p.214, and Rustichini, 2005, p.203). Faced with these claims, 
some economists (e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008) point to the fact that these disciplines 
focus on dissimilar evidential bases, employ different constructs and are concerned with 
distinct explananda. The idea is that the profound differences between NE’s parent 
disciplines in terms of variables of interest, methodological presuppositions and 
explanatory goals constrain NEs’ attempts to foster a genuine unification spanning 
economics, psychology and neuroscience. 
  
In this chapter, I examine how the aforementioned differences bear on the relevance of 
NE research for the economic theory of choice. The contents are organized as follows. 
In section 5.A, I reconstruct and critically assess the argument from irrelevance that 
some economists (e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008) employ to demonstrate that 
neuroscientific evidence is evidentially and explanatorily irrelevant to economic theory. 
In section 5.B, I articulate and defend an argument from interdisciplinary heterogeneity 
which casts doubt on NEs’ attempts to develop a unified interdisciplinary framework by 
emphasizing the differences between the accounts of choice behaviour provided by 
NE’s parent disciplines. In section 5.C, I put forward an argument from 
intradisciplinary heterogeneity which identifies some issues (e.g. how NE is supposed 
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to inform economic theory) on which NEs themselves hold contrasting positions and 
shows how these divergences hamper the consolidation of the NE enterprise. 
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5.A THE ECONOMISTS’ ARGUMENT FROM IRRELEVANCE 
 
Faced with NEs’ calls to incorporate neuro-physiological insights into economic models 
of choice, various economists concede that NE evidence can inspire the construction of 
more predictive and explanatory economic models. At the same time, they deny that 
neuro-physiological findings have any significant bearing on the economic theory of 
choice. The idea is that those findings fall outside the domain of economic theory and 
are mostly orthogonal to the professional interests of economists. As Gul and 
Pesendorfer put it, “neuroscience evidence cannot refute economic models because the 
latter make no assumptions and draw no conclusions about the physiology of the brain” 
(2008, p.4)59. The economists’ argument from irrelevance can be articulated as follows: 
 
P.1 Neuroscientists and other economists employ different theoretical constructs. 
P.2 Neuroscientists and other economists target distinct sets of variables. 
P.3 Neuroscientists and other economists pursue dissimilar explanatory goals. 
C Neuroscientific findings are evidentially and explanatorily irrelevant to 
economic theory. 
 
Prima facie, this argument seems to provide economists with an appealing defensive 
strategy, which isolates the economic theory of choice from potentially disconfirming 
neuro-physiological evidence. As I argue below, however, the above reasoning is 
vulnerable to two major objections. Firstly, it fails to show that neuroscientists’ and 
                                                          
59
 The isolationist attitude of Gul and Pesendorfer is not representative of most economists’ 
position. I focus on it as it nicely exemplifies one extreme position in the literature and provides 
a useful point of reference for our discussion. 
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other economists’ accounts of choice behaviour are incommensurable, i.e. have non-
overlapping evidential bases, lack common concepts and pursue altogether different 
explanatory aims60. And secondly, it seemingly overlooks that even if those accounts 
were incommensurably dissimilar, it would not follow that NEs are prevented from 
fostering significant modifications in economic theory. These two objections resemble 
some of the criticisms that were formulated against the so-called Non Overlapping 
Magisteria model (NOMA) of the relationship between science and religion (see Gould, 
1997 and 1999). Let me briefly expand on this parallel before assessing the economists’ 
argument from irrelevance. 
 
According to the NOMA model, science and religion profoundly differ in their 
methodological presuppositions and investigated objects. These differences, in turn, are 
said to preclude the possibility of systematic conflict and fruitful interchanges between 
scientific discoveries and religious beliefs. Now, let us suppose that we could provide 
sufficiently precise characterizations of science and religion. It would seem implausible 
to deny that scientists qua scientists and religious believers qua religious believers 
respectively address different kinds of questions and rely on dissimilar evidential 
standards. For instance, scientists qua scientists attempt to account for the features and 
the workings of physical systems by means of highly controlled and replicable 
experiments. For their part, religious believers qua religious believers are concerned 
with questions of meaning and value that often transcend the empirical realm (see e.g. 
                                                          
60
 In this section, I focus on the evidential bases, the theoretical constructs and the explanatory 
aims associated with the economic and neuroscientific accounts of choice behaviour, without 
considering other respects in which different theoretical frameworks can be deemed to be 
incommensurable (see e.g. Sankey, 1998, on so-called taxonomic incommensurability, which 
obtains when distinct theories provide inconsistent categorizations of their objects of interest, 
and Feyerabend, 1975, p.271, and 1981, xi, who regards two theories as incommensurable only 
if they have inconsistent ontological implications). 
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Ratzsch, 2009). These differences, however, by no means imply that scientific and 
religious accounts of reality are incommensurable. In particular, they do not preclude 
fruitful interchanges of ideas at the frontier between science and religion61. 
 
Now, let us focus on the economists’ argument from irrelevance. It would be hard to 
deny that neuroscientists and mainstream economists respectively use different 
vocabularies, target dissimilar variables and pursue distinct explanatory goals. The 
thought is that economists, even when addressing questions related to those studied in 
psychology and neuroscience, “have different objectives and target different empirical 
evidence” (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008, p.4). In this respect, even leading NEs concede 
that “what is striking about explanations of choice behavior by economists, 
psychologists, and neurobiologists is the different levels at which they operate” 
(Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004, p.448). These remarks, however, do not license the 
claim that the accounts of choice behaviour provided by economists, psychologists and 
neuroscientists are incommensurable. Let me expand on this point. 
 
Assessing the similarity of different theoretical frameworks is more appropriately seen 
as a matter of nuanced evaluation than an all-or-nothing judgement (see e.g. Duhem, 
1906 [1954]). By way of illustration, let us consider the economic, psychological and 
neuroscientific accounts of choice behaviour. One may argue that differences in the 
employed constructs and the pursued explanatory goals are greater between economics 
and neuroscience than between economics and psychology (e.g. think of the role that 
psychological constructs such as beliefs and desires play in some economists’ accounts 
                                                          
61
 See e.g. Harrison, 2007, on the role that religious beliefs played in fostering the development 
of several scientific disciplines and the constraints that scientific discoveries impose on specific 
religious beliefs. 
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of behaviour). Indeed, some authors (e.g. Kuorikoski and Ylikoski, 2010) go as far as to 
assert that neuroscientific findings are explanatorily and evidentially irrelevant to 
economic theory unless they are interpreted in light of psychological background 
knowledge62. Even so, the point remains that Gul and Pesendorfer overstate the 
heterogeneity of NE’s parent disciplines and presuppose - rather than show - that the 
accounts of behaviour provided by those disciplines are totally disconnected (Vromen, 
2010b). In particular, their attempt to block NEs’ calls to include neuro-psychological 
insights into economic models rests on an unsustainably narrow conception of standard 
economic theory (Moscati, 2008). This, in turn, calls into question the a priori 
opposition of Gul and Pesendorfer to a neuro-psychological enrichment of economic 
theory. As Mäki (2010, p.115) puts it, “economics has no immutable essence such that 
[…] only data pertaining to observable choice behaviour would be relevant”. 
 
Gul and Pesendorfer are not the first authors who overemphasize the conceptual divide 
between different sciences or theoretical frameworks. By way of illustration, let us 
consider the debates which took place among philosophers of science regarding how 
frequently cases of conceptual incommensurability between scientific theories occur. 
According to Kuhn (1962 and 1982) and Feyerabend (1962), intertheoretic transitions 
involve radical modifications at both the intensional and the extensional level. The idea 
is that central theoretical terms are often ascribed altogether different meanings and/or 
reference by the proponents of rival theories (e.g. compare the concept of mass in 
Newtonian and relativistic mechanics). Yet, as noted by various authors (e.g. Devitt, 
1979, Field, 1973, and Fine, 1967), significant referential continuity can be found across 
                                                          
62
 Similar claims have been put forward with regard to the relationship between folk psychology 
and neuroscience. For instance, McCauley (1996, p.445) alleges that any influence neuroscience 
has on folk psychology will be mediated by progress in social and cognitive psychology. 
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theory change, and scientists can usually compare theories in terms of a shared 
vocabulary. 
 
Having said that, let us assess the implications that the alleged incommensurability of 
economics and neuroscience can be taken to have for the relevance of NE for economic 
theory. Suppose - for the sake of argument - that economists and neuroscientists 
respectively provided incommensurable accounts of choice behaviour, i.e. targeted 
altogether different variables, employed altogether different theoretical constructs and 
pursued altogether different explanatory goals. Even this, by itself, would not exclude 
that neuroscientists may offer informative insights and pose critical challenges to 
economists. For some NEs may still rely on neuroscientific concepts and findings to 
foster modifications in the economic account of decision making. In this respect, 
various authors (e.g. McCabe, 2008, p.350) concede that NEs themselves and other 
economists are respectively concerned with dissimilar constructs and explananda, and 
yet insist that NE findings inform fruitfully economic modelling and theorising. 
 
A proponent of the argument from irrelevance might insist that no significant 
interchange can take place between genuinely incommensurable theoretical 
frameworks. This rebuttal, however, does not appear to withstand scrutiny. For, as 
illustrated by several episodes in the history of science (see e.g. Kuhn, 1962, and 
Feyerabend, 1962), the incommensurability of two theoretical frameworks does not per 
se exclude that significant - or even revolutionary - interplays may occur between them. 
To put it differently, even if economists and neuroscientists offered incommensurable 
accounts of decision making, neurally informed contributions could still foster 
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substantial modifications in economic theory. For instance, NEs may extend the set of 
questions economists traditionally address or foster an eliminative reduction of the folk 
psychology constructs underlying some economists’ models of choice (I shall expand 
on these issues in section 7.B). 
 
To recapitulate, the argument from irrelevance emphasizes various respects in which 
neuroscientists’ and economists’ accounts of choice behaviour differ. Even so, it fails to 
show that these accounts are incommensurably dissimilar. Moreover, even if those 
accounts were incommensurable, it would not follow that NEs cannot foster 
revolutionary modifications in the economic theory of choice. Having said that, the 
profound differences in the accounts of choice behaviour that are respectively provided 
in economics, psychology and neuroscience do constrain the relevance of NE findings 
for these disciplines. In the next section, I articulate and defend an argument which 
draws on those differences to question the prospects of NEs’ attempts to construct a 
unified interdisciplinary framework for modelling decision making. 
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5.B AN ARGUMENT FROM INTERDISCIPLINARY HETEROGENEITY 
 
My argument from interdisciplinary heterogeneity questions NEs’ attempts to develop a 
unified interdisciplinary framework by emphasizing the differences between the 
accounts of choice behaviour provided by NE’s parent disciplines. Before presenting the 
argument, let me provide some terminological clarification regarding the notion of 
unification to which I refer below. The term “unification” can be employed to denote 
various kinds of accomplishments, ranging from the development of a common 
vocabulary or taxonomy to the construction of a shared mathematical framework to 
model the phenomena of interest. In this section, I employ the expression ‘unified 
theoretical framework’ to refer to a collection of studies which (i) share a sufficiently 
precise definition of NE, (ii) are inspired by reasonably similar explanatory aims, and 
(iii) reflect consistent views concerning the relationship between economics, 
psychology and neuroscience. My reasoning can be characterized as follows: 
 
P.1  Economists, psychologists and neuroscientists employ different theoretical 
constructs. 
P.2 Economists, psychologists and neuroscientists target distinct sets of variables. 
P.3  Economists, psychologists and neuroscientists pursue dissimilar explanatory 
goals. 
C (1) Developing a unified NE account of decision making requires major changes in 
the models provided by NE’s parent disciplines. 
P.4 NEs have not shown that developing a unified NE account of decision making 
yields high modelling benefits to the practitioners of NE’s parent disciplines. 
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C NEs have not shown that the practitioners of NE’s parent disciplines should 
develop a unified NE account of decision making. 
 
Let us examine the various steps of this argument. Premises 1 and 2 respectively state 
that economists, psychologists and neuroscientists employ dissimilar constructs and 
target different variables when building their models. The thought is that economists are 
concerned with higher-level phenomena than the ones investigated in neuro-psychology 
(Vromen, 2007, p.162). Moreover, while economists often build their models upon 
axiomatic foundations and a priori assumptions about rational choice behaviour, many 
psychologists and neuroscientists develop their models on the sole basis of empirical 
findings (Vercoe and Zak, 2010). To be sure, some NEs (see Caplin and Dean, 2008, 
and Caplin et al., 2010) have recently developed axiomatic models that target both 
economic and neural data. Still, NEs and other economists usually make a different use 
of the axiomatic method. For instance, as noted by Rustichini (2009, p.50), “the 
functional representation of choice in decision theory is not considered a testable 
hypothesis, whereas the algorithmic specification [targeted by many NE studies] is. This 
difference gives a new role to the axiomatic method”. 
 
A proponent of NE might deny that the aforementioned differences constrain the 
relevance of NE research for economic theory on the alleged ground that NEs and other 
economists frequently rely on the same set of theoretical constructs. After all - the 
thought would be - both NEs and other economists use concepts such as choices, utility, 
preferences, and so on. Now, it would be implausible to deny that NEs and other 
economists employ some common constructs in building their models. Yet, the point 
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remains that NEs and other economists often use these constructs in different ways and 
ascribe dissimilar meanings to them. To render this point more vivid, let us consider the 
concept of rationality. NEs and other economists frequently rely on dissimilar 
conceptions of what it means for a given decision to be rational. The following contrast 
appears to be particularly profound. On the one hand, traditional decision theorists relate 
rationality to the internal consistency of observed choices and remain agnostic regarding 
what neuro-psychological processes underlie people’s decisions (see e.g. Kacelnik, 
2006). On the other hand, many NEs attempt to identify the neuro-psychological 
underpinnings of choices and regard a decision as rational to the extent that it 
maximizes some specific neuro-psychological measure of well-being. 
 
Equally profound discrepancies can be identified with regard to the concept of utility. 
More specifically, traditional decision theorists regard utility as a formal representation 
of preferences to be inferred from observed choices. For their part, many NEs (e.g. 
Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2004 and 2005, Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004, and 
Park and Zak, 2007) relate utility to agents’ hedonic experiences or the activation 
patterns of specific neural areas (see Caplin and Dean, 2008, p.670, for analogous 
remarks concerning the notion of reward). As I argue in chapter six, these conceptual 
differences constrain the extent to which neuro-psychological findings can inform 
standard economic theory. Regrettably, NEs often gloss over those differences as if they 
were of negligible significance for the prospects of NE. 
 
Premise 3 focuses on the explanatory goals that are respectively pursued by economists, 
psychologists and neuroscientists. This contrast can be explicated as follows. On the one 
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hand, economists usually target agents’ observed choices and aim to identify the 
solution to specific decision problems without taking a position as to which objectives 
agents should pursue. On the other hand, NEs investigate the neuro-psychological 
substrates of observed choices and often evaluate people’s decisions according to a 
normatively oriented perspective. In particular, they aim to ascertain - not just what is 
the best way to achieve agents’ objectives, but also - which objectives agents should 
pursue in specific situations (Read, 2007, p.58). 
 
I am not concerned here with establishing whether NEs rely on an inappropriate analogy 
between economists and paternalistic advisors (see e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008, and 
Loewenstein and Haisley, 2008, for a debate). For the purpose of this enquiry, it suffices 
to note that ascertaining what objectives an agent should pursue requires one to address 
issues which transcend both the scope of traditional decision theory and the evidential 
reach of neuro-psychological investigations (e.g. who is entitled to define what 
constitutes agents’ well-being? Which welfare criteria should be used to evaluate 
people’s choices? To what extent may paternalistic interventions legitimately interfere 
with people’s decisions?). 
 
On the basis of the first three premises, conclusion 1 asserts that the NE synthesis 
spanning economics, psychology and neuroscience is likely to involve major 
interdisciplinary rearrangements. The thought is that the profound differences between 
the economic, psychological and neuroscientific accounts of decision making constrain 
NEs’ attempt to integrate evidence, constructs and methods from these disciplines into a 
unified theoretical framework. Let me expand on this issue. 
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Over the last few decades, various models combining economic and psychological 
insights have been developed. By way of illustration, let us consider regret theory (Bell, 
1982, Fishburn, 1982, and Loomes and Sugden, 1982 and 1987). In this theory, the 
utility associated with an option is an increasing function of the payoff yielded by the 
option and a decreasing function of the payoff given up as a result of one’s decision 
(Bell, 1982). This modelling approach enables one to account for the fact that “the 
psychological experience of [having an option] can be influenced by comparisons 
between [that option and the options] one might have had, had one chosen differently” 
(Sugden, 1991, p.762)63. In particular, it offers a psychologically plausible way to 
account for various violations of standard utility theory (e.g. some instances of cyclical 
choice). To see this, suppose that an agent exhibits the preference profile x>y, y>z, z>x. 
If the payoff she derives from choosing option x turns out to be considerably inferior to 
the payoff she could have obtained by choosing y, the resulting regret may reduce the 
utility she derives from x so much that she comes to prefer z to x. In this perspective, 
seemingly intransitive preferences can be reinterpreted as instances of the preference 
relation x1>y, y>z, z>x2. 
 
As this example illustrates, psychological and economic insights can be integrated 
fruitfully so as to better account for observed choice behaviour. Still, these 
accomplishments are usually confined to specific models or choice contexts. Moreover, 
it remains an open question whether this integrative approach can be extended 
successfully to include neuroscientific - and not just psychological - evidence and 
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 See also the so-called disappointment theory (Bell, 1985, and Loomes and Sugden, 1986), 
where the utility one derives from an option depends on how the payoff associated with such an 
option compares with the payoff she previously expected to obtain from it. 
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constructs. To be sure, various authors have recently tried to reduce the “conceptual 
gap” between the economic, psychological and neuroscientific accounts of choice 
behaviour (see e.g. Caplin and Dean, 2008, for an axiomatic model of learning which 
includes both neural and choice data). However, these integrative efforts have quite a 
limited scope and do not substantiate NEs’ speculations about the development of a 
single, general theory of choice behaviour spanning economics, psychology and 
neuroscience. As Glimcher (2010, p.14) aptly notes, “economists, psychologists, and 
biologists can all offer local explanations [of choice behaviour], but what is striking is 
the unrelatedness of their explanations”. 
 
According to premise 4, developing a unified interdisciplinary framework for modelling 
choice behaviour is unlikely to bring major modelling benefits to the practitioners of 
NE’s parent disciplines. The reasoning can be explicated as follows. Let us suppose - 
for the sake of argument - that NEs shared a precise view of how insights from 
economics, psychology and neuroscience should be integrated into a single, general 
theory of choice behaviour. Even so, it remains an open question whether developing 
such a theory provides economists, psychologists and neuroscientists with informative 
insights. In particular, the proponents of NE have hitherto failed to specify why exactly 
the practitioners of disciplines as diverse as economics, psychology and neuroscience 
should invest time and resources in this grandiose enterprise. On this basis, the 
conclusion of the argument from interdisciplinary heterogeneity challenges NEs to 
substantiate their calls to develop a single, general account of decision making spanning 
different behavioural disciplines. 
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Below I examine and critique two lines of argument by means of which the proponents 
of NE have tried to vindicate their attempts to develop an interdisciplinary account of 
choice behaviour. The first argumentative strategy calls into question the claim that 
providing a unified account of choice behaviour requires major interdisciplinary 
rearrangements. The second one attempts to demonstrate that the explanatory benefits 
offered by such an account make it worth investing in NE research. Before proceeding, 
let me anticipate that there are various respects in which economists’ modelling tools 
can be of help to NEs and other neuroscientists (e.g. think of the applications that 
optimization techniques have in computational neuroscience). In this section, however, I 
focus solely on how NE methods and findings can inform the economic theory of 
choice. 
 
The first reasoning goes as follows. NEs occasionally speak of promoting a progressive 
convergence between - or even the unification of - economics, psychology and 
neuroscience. For instance, Fehr and Camerer (2007, p.419) allege that NE “hopes to 
unify mechanistic, mathematical and behavioral (choice-based) measures and 
constructs”. Similary, Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2004, p.573) conjecture that “a 
biological basis for behavior in neuroscience […] could provide some unification across 
the social sciences”64. Even so, economists, psychologists and neuroscientists could 
build a unified theory of choice behaviour, and yet retain methodologically distinct 
approaches to the modelling of decision making. The idea is that economists, 
                                                          
64
 Analogous views have been advocated in relation to other behavioural sciences. For instance, 
Camerer (1999, p.10575) contends that behavioural economics increases the psychological 
plausibility of economic models, “promising to reunify psychology and economics”. Similarly, 
Gintis (2004, p.37; see also 2007) argues that behavioural sciences’ “incompatible models and 
disparate research methodologies” will be unified thanks to “theoretical tools […] and data 
gathering techniques” that transcend disciplinary boundaries. 
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psychologists and neuroscientists develop a common NE theory of choice behaviour 
and still continue to investigate their respective objects of interest by means of 
traditional methods and approaches. In this way, NEs could allegedly improve NE’s 
parent disciplines on their own terms without having to literally unify them (Camerer, 
2008a, p.59). As Glimcher and Rustichini (2004, p.452) put it, NE aims to develop “a 
mechanistic, behavioral, and mathematical explanation of choice that transcends the 
explanations available to neuroscientists, psychologists, and economists working 
alone”. 
 
To substantiate this line of argument, NEs may point at some successful cases of 
coevolution occurred at the interface between psychology and neuroscience (see e.g. 
McCauley, 1996 and 2007). Moreover, they may argue that promising coevolutionary 
advances are underway between economics and neuroscience (see e.g. Caplin and Dean, 
2008). Now, it would be implausible to deny that neuro-psychological and economic 
accounts of choice behaviour can inform each other in fruitful ways (see e.g. Caplin et 
al., 2010, on how knowledge of dopaminergic circuits restricts the set of learning 
processes that can be plausibly associated with people’s choices, and Glimcher, 2010, 
p.234-6, on how observed choices constrain NEs’ conjectures about what algorithms 
underlie people’s decisions). Even so, there are some reasons to be cautious concerning 
the prospects of coevolutionary approaches to the modelling of decision making. To 
give one example, the mere fact that a mechanistic approach has been adopted fruitfully 
in some branches of neuroscience does not per se imply that economists will find it 
convenient to build mechanistically informed models. That is to say, even if 
coevolutionary strategies have fostered significant advances in specific areas of neuro-
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psychological research, it remains an open question whether the same will happen with 
NE. 
 
In such a context, it would be of little import to allege that since behavioural economists 
managed to include several psychological insights into economic theory, NEs will 
succeed in their coevolutionary crusades. For in light of the differences between NE and 
previous research at the interface between economics and psychology (see section 1.B), 
the results attained by behavioural economists do not per se license the claim that NE 
will foster major advances in economic modelling and theorising. More generally, it is 
still unclear how informative coevolutionary constraints will be across NE’s parent 
disciplines. 
 
Indeed, there are reasons to be quite prudent in this respect. By way of illustration, 
consider Marr’s (1982) tripartition between the computational, algorithmic and 
hardware implementation levels. As remarked by Craver and Alexandrova, “many 
different algorithms can solve the same computational problem, and many different 
hardwares can implement the same algorithms” (2008, p.393; see also Fernandes and 
Kording, 2010, p.345). Hence, NE findings concerning the algorithmic underpinnings of 
people’s decisions may fail to be informative to those economists and neuroscientists 
who aim to provide computational and hardware implementation accounts of choice 
behaviour. 
 
The second ground on which NEs advocated the construction of a unified 
interdisciplinary framework for modelling choice behaviour relates to the benefits that 
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such a framework can be expected to yield to NE’s parent disciplines. As we have seen 
in chapter two, several NEs provide alluring characterizations of the predictive and 
explanatory gains that a neural enrichment of economic theory purportedly offers to 
economists. Regrettably, as we noted in chapter four, the benefits at which many NEs 
hint are still hypothetical or confined to specific choice settings. To be sure, one 
welcomes NEs’ attempts to integrate the accounts of choice behaviour provided by 
NE’s parent disciplines. Yet, the point remains that economists, psychologists and 
neuroscientists have already achieved considerable successes by relying on highly 
specialized modelling tools and research methods. This historical record does not per se 
exclude that neuro-psychological findings can inform fruitfully the economic account of 
decision making. Still, it counsels economists to prudently reflect before embarking on 
ambitious transdisciplinary Russian campaigns. 
 
In this latter respect, various proponents of NE appear to overestimate the relevance of 
neural data and findings for the economic account of decision making. For instance, 
Padoa-Schioppa advocates the adoption of NE models on the alleged ground “that 
neuroscience can contribute to psychology, and that psychology can contribute to 
economics” (2008, p.450-1). Regrettably, it remains an open question whether the 
vague notion of “contribution” to which Padoa-Schioppa refers supports his inference65. 
To give another example, noting that both the equilibrium conditions modelled by 
economists and the neural computations investigated by NEs are “organized by the 
general principle of optimization” (McCabe, 2008, p.350) does not license the claim 
that NE findings are informative to economists. For the practitioners of disciplines 
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 Many notions do not support it. To see this, consider the equivalence relation and the sets 
(1,2), (2,3) and (3,4). Even though some member of A is equal to some member of B and some 
member of B is equal to some member of C, no member of A is equal to any member of C. 
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whose findings are hardly relevant to economic theory employ optimization techniques 
as a fundamental modelling tool (see e.g. Parker and Smith, 1990, and Sunder, 2006). 
 
More generally, it remains an open question whether the very idea of providing a single, 
general theory of human behaviour constitutes a viable research project. After all, it is 
one thing to assert that economists’ account of choice behaviour should be consistent 
with the ones provided by other disciplines. It is quite another thing to claim that 
economists, psychologists and neuroscientists should employ some common set of 
constructs to model people’s decisions. Now, some NEs (e.g. Caplin and Dean, 2008, 
and Glimcher, 2010) have recently attempted to complement traditional decision 
theoretic analyses by identifying and measuring some observable neuro-biological 
magnitude that is systematically related to decision utilities. Still, the point remains that 
economics, psychology and neuroscience presently lack the common basic constructs 
required to provide a unified theory of choice behaviour (I shall expand on this issue in 
chapter six). 
 
To recapitulate, NEs’ contributions may well foster the development of interdisciplinary 
accounts of specific choice patterns or behavioural regularities. Even so, NEs have 
hitherto failed to provide compelling reasons to think that economists, psychologists 
and neuroscientists will find it convenient to develop a common framework for 
modelling decision making. In particular, it remains unclear why the interchanges 
between NE’s parent disciplines should go beyond some limited-scope collaboration. In 
this respect, what Kahneman (2003, p.165-6) asserted in relation to psychology seems 
equally pertinent to recent neuroscientific research. As he points out, “the analytical 
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methodology of economics is stable, and it will inevitably constrain the rapprochement 
between the disciplines”, with “no immediate prospects” of those disciplines “sharing a 
common theory of human behaviour”. 
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5.C AN ARGUMENT FROM INTRADISCIPLINARY HETEROGENEITY 
 
The recent advances at the interface between economics, psychology and neuroscience 
have encouraged NEs to raise several criticisms concerning the economic theory of 
choice. However, the proponents of NE appear to hold contrasting positions with regard 
to the methodological presuppositions and the explanatory aims of their research. In this 
section, I assess the scope and the significance of NEs’ divergences. In particular, I 
articulate and defend an argument from intradisciplinary heterogeneity which questions 
the possibility of combining NEs’ contributions into a single, general theory of human 
choice behaviour. Different versions of this argument can be developed depending on 
which issues one considers. In what follows, I focus on NEs’ disagreements concerning 
(i) the very definition of NE, (ii) how NE is expected to inform the economic theory of 
choice, (iii) the interdisciplinary relationship that supposedly holds between economics 
and other behavioural sciences, and (iv) specific features of the human neural 
architecture. 
 
Before proceeding, let me anticipate that the above list does not include all the issues on 
which NEs hold conflicting positions66. Yet, as I argue below, it specifies four respects 
in which NEs’ divergences hamper progress in NE by fragmenting it in a plethora of 
competing approaches. To be sure, some of these issues are conceptually 
interconnected. For instance, disagreements about how NE is expected to inform the 
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 To give one example, NEs express heterogeneous views concerning the merits of rational 
choice theory. For instance, Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2005, p.10) speak of it as a 
conceptually primitive and empirically inadequate framework for modelling human behaviour. 
Camerer, instead, alleges that the “rational choice approach has been enormously successful” 
(1999, p.10575). For their part, Glimcher and Rustichini go as far as to argue that “classical 
utility theory can be used as a central concept for the study of choice in economics, psychology, 
and neuroscience” (2004, p.449; see also Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer, 2005, p.253). 
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economic theory of choice may arise from the fact that different NEs define their 
discipline in dissimilar terms. Still, they appear to be sufficiently distinct to deserve 
separate discussion. Having said that, my argument from intradisciplinary heterogeneity 
can be articulated as follows: 
 
P.1 NEs define their own discipline in rather different ways. 
P.2 NEs hold dissimilar views as to the extent to which their research is expected to 
inform the economic theory of choice. 
P.3 NEs endorse heterogeneous positions concerning what disciplines will provide 
the foundations of their framework for modelling human choice behaviour. 
P.4 NEs sharply disagree concerning specific features of the human neural 
architecture. 
C Different NEs advocate contrasting modifications of the economic theory of 
choice. 
 
Let us consider each step of this reasoning in turn. Premise 1 remarks that NE has been 
given rather dissimilar characterizations in the literature. As we have seen in section 
1.A, some authors (e.g. Glimcher, 2010, and McCabe, 2003a and 2003b) speak of NE as 
an interdisciplinary enterprise which combines insights from economics, psychology 
and neuroscience into a single, unified theory of choice behaviour. Other times, NE is 
presented as a specific application of economic theory to the modelling of the human 
neural architecture (see e.g. Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer, 2005, and McCabe, 2008). For 
their part, some NEs (e.g. Camerer, 2003 and 2008a) characterize their discipline as an 
extension of behavioural and experimental economics. Still differently, other authors 
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(e.g. Rustichini, 2005, and Zak, 2004) regard NE as an application of neuroscientific 
techniques and methods to the economic account of decision making. 
 
Premise 2 states that NEs hold heterogeneous views concerning the extent to which NE 
is supposed to inform the economic theory of choice. To render this point more vivid, 
let us compare the incremental and the radical approach to NE research we examined in 
section 1.A. On the one hand, incremental NEs enrich specific economic models in light 
of neuro-physiological insights, without challenging economists’ representation of 
decision problems as the constrained maximization of some utility function. On the 
other hand, radical NEs cast doubt on the possibility of modelling decision makers as 
maximizers of a stable utility function and aim to implement substantial changes in the 
economic theory of choice. 
 
The incremental/ radical divide is best depicted not so much as an all-or-nothing 
dichotomy, but as a continuum along which several intermediate positions can be 
differentiated. In this respect, one may wonder whether the accumulation of incremental 
modifications amounts to a radical change in economic theory. This question concerns 
not so much where the boundary between incremental and radical contributions is 
plausibly set, but the permeability of such a boundary. As we noted in chapter two, 
whether one takes the neural enrichment of specific economic models to constitute a 
genuine change in economic theory partly depends on how she conceives of the relation 
between models and theories in economics. Still, the point remains that incremental and 
radical NE respectively aim to modify the economic theory of choice to a significantly 
different extent. In this respect, several NE articles appear to face the following 
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problem. On the one hand, radical contentions are typically too extreme or insufficiently 
qualified to withstand evidential scrutiny. On the other hand, incremental contributions 
rarely warrant the propaganda and the excitement that often accompany NE research. 
 
Premise 3 points to NEs’ disagreements regarding what disciplines provide the 
foundation of their hypothesized framework for modelling choice behaviour. Let us 
consider some examples in support of this assertion. In a recent book, Glimcher argues 
that it is usually the higher-level abstractions that guide lower-level enquiries and 
alleges that “insights from economic theory must provide the organizational structure” 
for NE investigations (2010, p.126; see also Glimcher, 2003). McCabe, instead, 
contends that elaborating informative NE models requires “both a topdown approach 
[…] from economics and a bottom-up approach […] from cognitive neuroscience” 
(2008, p.349). Still differently, Camerer argues that “because economics is the science 
of how resources are allocated by individuals […] the psychology of individual 
behaviour should underlie and inform economics, much as physics informs chemistry” 
(1999, p.10575). For their part, Zak and Denzau go as far as to assert that the “methods 
and findings in the biological sciences need to be incorporated directly into economics 
if the discipline is to continue to produce relevant insights into human behavior” (2001, 
p.32). 
 
Now, it is true that NEs may consistently endorse some of these claims. For instance, 
one could argue - in line with Wilson (1998, p.206) - that “it is in biology and 
psychology that economists and social scientists will find the premises needed to 
fashion more predictive models”. Still, the previous assertions express quite dissimilar 
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positions concerning the interdisciplinary relationship that allegedly holds between NE 
and its parent disciplines (see also Fumagalli, 2010). These divergences, in turn, cast 
doubt on the possibility of combining NEs’ contributions into a cumulative case in 
favour of NE. In section 7.B, I shall assess the plausibility of NEs’ assertions in light of 
the vast literature on intertheoretic reduction67. For now, let me give one reason for 
being cautious concerning some authors’ transdisciplinary fervour. In their articles, the 
proponents of radical NE fall short of specifying why exactly the ongoing cooperation at 
the interface between economics, psychology and neuroscience would prelude major 
interdisciplinary rearrangements. In particular, they are disappointingly vague 
concerning what constructs would replace the ones that are currently employed by 
economists. 
 
As noted by premise 4, NEs often disagree also in relation to several features of the 
human neural architecture. By way of illustration, consider the divergences arisen 
about the functional localizability of specific cognitive processes. Some NEs (e.g. 
Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2004 and 2005) seem to erroneously assume that 
different neural areas are respectively associated with rational and irrational behaviour. 
On the contrary, others (e.g. Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer, 2005, and Preuschoff et al., 
2006) rightly point out that the neural substrates of rational decision making are 
unlikely to be topographically localized. In particular, they question the alleged 
association (i) between evolutionarily older neural areas and emotional circuitry, and 
                                                          
67
 Classic works include Nagel, 1961 and 1974, Schaffner, 1967, Fodor, 1974, and Churchland, 
1981 and 1985. For some recent publications in the philosophy of neuroscience, see e.g. Bickle, 
1998 and 2003, Craver, 2007, Craver and Alexandrova, 2008, and Sullivan, 2009. 
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(ii) between evolutionarily more recent brain regions and higher cognitive functions68. 
As Massey puts it, “the neural anatomy essential for full rationality […] is a very 
recent evolutionary innovation”, and rational abilities “did not replace emotionality as 
a basis for human interaction”, but “were gradually added to pre-existing and 
simultaneously developing emotional capacities” (2002, p.16; see also Anderson, 2006 
and 2007, on how evolutionarily older neural areas are often engaged by many 
cognitive tasks). 
 
On the basis of the previous premises, the argument from intradisciplinary heterogeneity 
concludes that NEs advocate contrasting modifications of the economic theory of 
choice. To be sure, not all NEs’ contrasts call the advancement of NE research into 
question. To see this, consider NEs’ disagreements over specific features of the human 
neural architecture. Most of these divergences will be presumably settled thanks to 
further developments in NE scanner technology and experimental practices. Moreover, 
the mere fact that some issues in neuroscience are still unresolved does not imply that 
economists should “wait until neuroscience has grown more mature before we try to 
accommodate their insights and findings” (Vromen, 2007, p.161). For NEs may succeed 
in building informative neurally enriched models without taking a definite position on 
all of those issues. 
 
NEs could put forward additional reasons to resist deriving far-reaching implications 
from their current disagreements. In particular, they may contend that the existence of 
                                                          
68
 There are various reasons to doubt that two anatomically distinct brain systems respectively 
underlie rational and irrational decisions. For instance, various areas traditionally associated 
with emotions contribute to higher cognitive functions such as the encoding of rewards (see e.g. 
Glimcher, 2009, and McClure et al., 2004b; see also Friston, 2002, on the functional and 
anatomical interdependences between different areas). 
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divergences is quite expectable given that NE is in its first stages of development. 
Indeed, they might even argue that the existing contrasts are signs of a lively and 
promising debate. After all - the reasoning would go - NE is still in its infancy, and it is 
desirable that several approaches compete for defining the canons of its orthodoxy. As 
it is occasionally claimed in methodological discussions: “Don’t bother too much at first 
about the compatibility of different theories. Just wait, and let inter-theoretic 
competition decide which candidates will stand the test of time”. 
 
Prima facie, the aforementioned recommendation seems to offer sensible advice and 
nicely fits with the methodological prescriptions provided by some philosophers of 
science. Consider, for example, the Lakatosian caveat (1970) that research programs 
often grow in an ocean of anomalies and that adopting an exceedingly severe stance 
towards novel conjectures might lead one to prematurely abandon promising research 
avenues69. Yet, as Lakatos’ critique of degenerating research programs persuasively 
illustrates, even someone who advocates letting many flowers blossom is still allowed 
to weed. 
 
A proponent of NE may protest that economics itself, in its early days, was 
characterized in dissimilar terms by prominent economists, and that nevertheless these 
discrepancies did not preclude its progress. However, the mere fact that economics 
progressed in spite of definitional and methodological diversity by no means excludes 
that NEs’ divergences hinder the consolidation of their discipline. To be sure, the 
existence of profound contrasts between NEs does not per se preclude the development 
                                                          
69
 See also Feyerabend (1962, 1970 and 1975) for the claim that developing several competing 
approaches fosters intradisciplinary progress. 
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of informative NE models. For even if distinct NEs hold inconsistent positions on 
several substantial issues, one (or some) of their approaches may still serve as a basis 
for constructing instructive models. Nonetheless, the divergences we examined above 
cast serious doubts on NEs’ attempts to develop a single, general theory of human 
choice behaviour. For those divergences concern - not just different terminological 
options, or secondary aspects of NE research, but - the very definition of NE and how 
NE is supposed to inform economic theory. To put it differently, it is hard to see how 
NEs can provide a unified theoretical framework for modelling human choice 
behaviour, when they agree neither on the explanatory aims of their research nor on 
what constructs will serve as the foundation of their account of decision making. 
 
An additional reason to think that NEs’ divergences hamper progress in their discpline 
relates to the explanatory goals that some leading NEs claim to pursue. If NEs rested 
content with proposing a series of unrelated models, each designed to account for a 
specific phenomenon (see e.g. Kosfeld et al., 2005, and Zak et al., 2005, 2006 and 2007, 
on how oxytocin may affect agents’ trust and generosity in particular choice settings), 
then reconciling their approaches would not seem to constitute a paramount issue. Yet, 
when it comes to providing a “single, general theory of human behaviour” (Glimcher 
and Rustichini, 2004, p.447) and “an entirely new set of constructs” for the analysis of 
decision making (Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005, p.10), reducing the 
fragmentation which characterizes current NE research becomes a particularly pressing 
concern. In this respect, various authors aptly warn against the risk of “giving rise to a 
proliferation of different models that are mutually incompatible not only in terms of the 
details, but also in terms of the overarching approach” (Caplin, 2008, p.359). 
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To conclude, one views with favour NEs’ short term aspiration to integrate insights and 
findings from different behavioural sciences. Still, there are reasons to question their 
long term ambition to provide a unified framework for modelling human choice 
behaviour. The reasoning I presented above can be summarized as follows. The 
accounts proposed by different NEs are characterized by profound dissimilarities, which 
concern the central tenets of NE. By itself, the existence of these contrasts does not 
prevent NEs from constructing informative neuro-psychological models of choice. At 
the same time, it casts serious doubts on their attempts to provide a unified theoretical 
framework for modelling decision making. In particular, the ongoing fragmentation of 
NE research into heterogeneous approaches makes it doubtful that NEs will foster a 
grand unification of the behavioural sciences. In this respect, economists should reflect 
carefully before endorsing NEs’ claims regarding the interdisciplinary consilience - not 
to say unification - of the behavioural sciences (see e.g. Camerer, 1999, p.10575, and 
Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2004, p.573). For some of these claims seem inspired 
more by an unreflective overextension of the methods adopted in particular branches of 
neuroscientific research than by principled reflections concerning how NE is likely to 
inform its parent disciplines. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ON THE FUTILE SEARCH FOR TRUE UTILITY 
 
In this chapter, I provide a case study to illustrate how the conceptual differences 
between NE’s parent disciplines constrain the relevance of neuro-psychological findings 
for the economic theory of choice. In the literature at the interface between economics, 
psychology and neuroscience, several authors argue that economists could develop 
more predictive and explanatory models by incorporating insights concerning agents’ 
hedonic experiences. In particular, some (e.g. Camerer, 2008a, p.45, and Camerer, 
Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005, p.15) go as far as to contend that agents’ utility is 
literally computed by specific neural areas and urge economists to complement or even 
substitute their notion of utility with some neuro-psychological constructs. 
 
Economic modellers and methodologists have ascribed a variety of meanings to the 
concept of utility. Indeed, different authors employed this term in so different senses 
that one wonders whether we can meaningfully speak of utility as a unified concept70. In 
the recent economic literature, three senses of the word stand out as particularly 
prominent. Firstly, contemporary decision theorists typically regard utility as a 
mathematical representation of preferences to be inferred from observed choices71. 
Secondly, other authors employ the term utility to refer to a hedonic magnitude 
                                                          
70
 In this respect, it is telling that several leading economists (see e.g. Pareto, 1909, on 
“ophelimity”, Fisher, 1918, on “wantability”, and Pigou, 1920, on “desirability”) proposed 
giving a separate name to utility to differentiate their analyses from the works of psycho-
physiologists (see Colander, 2007, p.220, for a similar remark). 
71
 As we noted in section 1.B, the idea (see e.g. Savage, 1954) is that if an agent’s preferences 
satisfy specific consistency requirements, then these preferences can be represented by a unique 
probability function and by a utility function unique up to positive linear transformations such 
that of any two options the one with higher expected utility will be preferred. 
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reflecting agents’ experiences of pleasure and pain (see e.g. Kahneman, 2000, p.2, and 
Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin, 1997, p.375). Finally, some speak of utility as a value 
signal that can be directly measured in the activation patterns of specific neural areas 
(Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2004, p.556) and allege that “map-like structures in 
the brain […] are actually the subject of economic theory” (Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer, 
2005, p.238). These three notions are often named decision utility, experienced utility 
and neural utility respectively. Below I refer to the last two notions as ‘true utility’, 
since they are usually employed to indicate some objective quantity rather than a 
mathematical construct such as decision utility. 
 
The contents of this chapter are organized as follows. In section 6.A, I draw some 
conceptual distinctions between the three aforementioned notions of utility and outline 
various methods for measuring experienced and neural utility. In sections 6.B and 6.C, I 
critically assess the thesis that economists should base decision theoretic analyses on 
experienced or neural utility. In doing so, I examine some critical issues regarding the 
definition and measurability of these notions of utility. Moreover, I provide various 
reasons to doubt that economists should replace decision utility with some notion of true 
utility as a central concept of decision theory. My critique can be seen as a response to 
those NEs who advocate the replacement of “the mathematical ideas used in 
economics” with “more neurally detailed descriptions” (Camerer, 2005) and speak of 
“substitut[ing] familiar distinctions between categories of economic behaviour” with the 
ones adopted in other disciplines (Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005, p.15). 
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Before proceeding, let me put forward three preliminary caveats regarding the focus of 
this chapter. Firstly, I do not explore the historical interrelations between distinct 
notions of utility, as the cogency of my considerations does not rest on how one 
reconstructs them. For the purpose of this enquiry, it suffices to note that the possibility 
of measuring experienced utility was prefigured well before the advent of standard 
decision theory (see e.g. Edgeworth, 1881 [1967]), whereas the notion of neural utility 
has appeared in economic discussions only in the last decade. Secondly, the concept of 
utility is amenable to various interpretations besides the three ones I discuss here (see 
e.g. Bradley, forthcoming, on subjective and objective interpretations of utility). I do not 
expand on those interpretations, as they are mostly orthogonal to the focus of my 
investigation. Finally, decision theory can be given both descriptive and normative 
interpretations. In this chapter, I focus prevalently on the former. In the next chapter 
(section 7.C), I shall discuss some normative applications of experienced and neural 
utility measurements to economic welfare analyses. 
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6.A FROM DECISION UTILITY TO TRUE UTILITY 
 
Traditional decision theorists treat agents’ choices as primitives and regard them as 
rational to the extent that the underlying preferences satisfy specific consistency 
requirements (see Bhattacaryya et al., 2011). In such a context, no explicit assumptions 
are made about the neuro-psychological substrates of agents’ preferences. This notion of 
rationality concerns whether one’s preferences are consistent with one another, and 
places no constraints on “the content of any belief and desire taken in isolation” 
(Bradley, forthcoming, p.1; see also Sugden, 1991). Yet, as we have seen in section 1.B, 
even these consistency requirements are occasionally violated by real life decision 
makers. In the recent NE literature, several authors advocate complementing or 
replacing the formal notion of decision utility with specific neuro-psychological 
constructs. The idea is to view agents as “rank[ing] outcomes in terms of some objective 
measure” (Bruni and Sugden, 2007, p.170) and to ground decision theoretic analyses on 
such a measure (Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004, p.452, and Kahneman and Sugden, 
2005, p.161). 
 
Various candidates for substituting decision utility have been proposed. Below I focus 
on experienced utility and neural utility in turn, explicating some major conceptual 
distinctions between them and decision utility. The expression experienced utility is 
usually employed to indicate a hedonic magnitude reflecting agents’ experiences of 
pleasure and pain which is to be measured with psycho-physical methods (Read, 2007, 
p.58). This usage of the term ‘utility’ is more restrictive than the one adopted by early 
utilitarian philosophers (e.g. Bentham, 1789 [1907], propos. I, II and X), who often 
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speak of utility maximization in both a descriptive and a normative sense. Measures of 
experienced utility and decision utility diverge in a wide range of circumstances. For 
instance, for there to be a general correspondence between decision utility and 
experienced utility, agents’ choices must reflect reasonably accurate predictions of the 
hedonic consequences of their actions (Kahneman and Sugden, 2005, p.167). Still, 
people frequently fail to anticipate or take into account the effects various actions have 
on their future preferences (see e.g. Kahneman and Snell, 1990, and Snell et al., 1995). 
 
Three notions of experienced utility can be usefully distinguished, namely: instant 
utility, a moment-based measure which reflects the valence and the intensity of agents’ 
ongoing hedonic experiences (Kahneman, 2000, p.17); remembered utility, a memory-
based measure “inferred from a subject’s retrospective reports of the total pleasure or 
displeasure associated with past outcomes” (Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin, 1997, 
p.376); and anticipated utility, which reflects “a person’s ex ante beliefs about the 
hedonic quality of future experiences” (Kahneman and Sugden, 2005, p.174). In such a 
context, measurements of so-called total utility can be obtained by taking the temporal 
integral of instant utility measurements (Kahneman, 2000, p.17, and Kahneman, 
Wakker and Sarin, 1997, 389). The idea was allegedly anticipated by Edgeworth, who 
suggested that an imaginary instrument - the hedonimeter - could measure individuals’ 
hedonic experiences72. 
 
                                                          
72
 In the words of Edgeworth (1881 [1967], p.101): “imagine an ideally perfect instrument, a 
psychophysical machine, continually registering the height of pleasure experienced by an 
individual… The continually indicated height is registered by photographic or other frictionless 
apparatus upon a uniformly moving vertical plane. Then the quantity of happiness between two 
epochs is represented by the area contained between the zero-line, perpendiculars thereto at the 
points corresponding to the epochs, and the curve traced by the index”. 
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As illustrated by several studies, agents’ decisions significantly correlate with 
remembered utility (e.g. Fredrickson and Kahneman, 1993, and Redelmeier et al., 
2003), and individuals typically prefer to undergo experiences to which they assign 
higher remembered utility (Kahneman et al., 1993 and 1997). Two findings regarding 
the determinants of remembered utility are worth mentioning (see e.g. Kahneman et al., 
1993, and Schreiber and Kahneman, 1996). Firstly, the duration of an episode, even 
when accurately known, has little impact on its remembered utility (duration neglect). 
And secondly, remembered utility highly correlates with the average of the most intense 
value of instant utility recorded during an episode and the instant utility recorded at the 
end of such an episode. As a result, the remembered disutility of an aversive episode 
can be reduced by adding an extra period of discomfort which reduces the peak-end 
average (violation of temporal monotonicity). 
 
The notion of neural utility relates to the activation patterns of particular areas in the 
neural architecture. The idea is that desirability “is realized as a concrete object, a neural 
signal in the human brain, rather than as a purely theoretical construction” (Glimcher 
and Rustichini, 2004, p.452). According to the proponents of neural utility, expected 
utility theory can be employed to represent - not just consistent decisions, but also - 
specific areas’ activation patterns. In their view, “the utility calculations that people 
were assumed to do really happen in the brain” (Park and Zak, 2007, p.50) and 
traditional economic models of choice constitute a “limiting case of a neural model with 
multiple utility types” (Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2004, p.564). Over the last 
few years, various authors have suggested that anatomically delimited neural 
populations compute desirability signals (see e.g. Hare et al., 2008, Kable and Glimcher, 
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2007, Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006 and 2008). In particular, some document that 
specific areas’ activations track variations in relative expected rewards in various 
experiments (Platt and Glimcher, 1998 and 1999, and Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; see 
also Basso and Wurtz, 1997 and 1998). 
 
Two main positions regarding how this evidence should be interpreted can be 
differentiated. According to some authors, the aforementioned findings demonstrate that 
the subjects who behave in accordance with the axioms of expected utility theory “do so 
because they neurally represent something having the properties of utility - a neural 
activation that encodes the desirability of an outcome in a continuous monotonic 
fashion” (Glimcher, 2010, p.133-4; see also Preuschoff et al., 2006). Others (e.g. 
Camerer, 2007 and 2008b, and Quartz, 2008) take the available evidence to provide 
direct support to standard utility theory. Let us focus on this latter interpretation. As 
noted by Vromen (2010a, p.33), it is certainly interesting that expected utility theory can 
be applied to entities and processes that few economists had previously regarded as the 
target of their predictions. Yet, the mere fact that such a theory can be used to describe 
the activation patterns of specific neural areas falls short of implying that it accurately 
predicts agents’ choice behaviour. 
 
Before concluding this section, let me emphasize one important respect in which the 
notions of experienced utility and neural utility differ. The notion of neural utility refers 
to a magnitude that is taken to be measurable objectively in specific areas’ activation 
patterns. The proponents of experienced utility, instead, often leave it ambiguous 
whether agents’ experienced utility is determinable solely by means of third-person 
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measurements or whether it inherently reflects also agents’ first-person evaluations (for 
a recent debate on first-person and third-person perspectives, see e.g. Chalmers, 1996 
and 2004, Dennett, 1991, and Papineau, 2002 and 2003). To be sure, some proponents 
of experienced utility speak of it as a magnitude amenable to objective measurements 
and allege that “in spite of the immense diversity in the occasions that evoke pleasure 
[…] the hedonic attribute that they share is salient and readily recognized” (Kahneman, 
Wakker and Sarin, 1997, p.380). Still, these authors rarely specify what exactly the 
shared hedonic attribute of heterogeneous experiences consists in. As we shall see in the 
next two sections, the conceptual difference between experienced utility and neural 
utility has important implications regarding both the measurability and the interpersonal 
comparability of these notions of utility. 
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6.B EXPERIENCED UTILITY: CONCERNS 
 
The proponents of experienced and neural utility frequently urge economists to employ 
neuro-psychological findings and constructs in developing their models of choice. 
Nonetheless, the notions of decision utility, experienced utility and neural utility differ 
profoundly, and replacing decision utility with neuro-psychological constructs would 
involve major changes in traditional decision theory. In this and the next section, I 
examine several empirical and conceptual concerns arising in relation to experienced 
utility and neural utility measures respectively. In doing so, I argue that the available 
neuro-psychological evidence does not substantiate the thesis that economists should 
substitute decision utility with some notion of true utility. With regard to experienced 
utility, I shall discuss three issues in turn, which respectively concern the measurability, 
integrability and interpersonal comparability of experienced utility. 
 
i) Measurability: the proponents of experienced utility often appear to presuppose that 
such a magnitude is measurable in reliable and accurate terms. Even so, different 
authors seem to hold dissimilar positions regarding what methods are to be used to 
measure it. To see this, consider the characterization of instant utility provided by 
Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997). In their view, instant utility “can be derived from 
immediate reports of current subjective experience or from physiological indices” 
(p.376 and 388). Regrettably, these measures can significantly diverge, and it is unclear 
which of them should be regarded as more accurate and reliable. 
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One might rebut that these concerns can be addressed by developing more robust 
measures of experienced utility. Over the last two decades, several methods for 
measuring agents’ hedonic states have been proposed. Among these, we find the 
experience sampling method (Brandstatter, 1991, Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, and Stone et 
al., 1999) and the day reconstruction method (Kahneman et al., 2004). The former 
consists in asking subjects at random times during the day to answer questions about 
their current affective state. In the latter, each participant is asked to reconstruct her 
previous day into short episodes and then rate each episode in terms of various feelings. 
These methods seem less liable than others to biases and experimental confounds73. 
Even so, subjects’ responses can noticeably vary with their circumstances (e.g. the 
perceived level of experienced utility to which one is accustomed), how the periods 
composing the examined days are framed and how the provided response scales are 
interpreted (e.g. distinct persons may employ the response categories differently). 
 
This variability, in turn, constrains the reliability and the interpersonal comparability of 
experienced utility reports (see also point iii below). By way of illustration, consider the 
following Garden of Eden example. Imagine that Adam and Eve have to provide a 
hedonic report regarding the experience of eating the fruit of the forbidden tree. 
Suppose that both of them are sincere and have adequate access to their inner hedonic 
states. Assume further that Adam states that he ‘really liked’ eating the apple, while Eve 
just says that she ‘liked’ eating it. Their reports by no means license the claim that 
Adam had more hedonic pleasure when eating the apple than Eve did. For Adam and 
                                                          
73
 For example, many happiness reports reflect adaptation to fortunate and unfortunate 
circumstances (Brickman et al., 1978, Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999, and Ubel et al., 2005) 
and life satisfaction measures respond to factors such as agents’ transient mood and the weather 
(Kahneman and Krueger, 2006, and Schwarz and Strack, 1991). 
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Eve may be rating their experiences in terms of dissimilar response scales, i.e. non-
equivalent mappings between linguistic expressions of satisfaction and inner hedonic 
states. Averaging responses over individuals can mitigate the effects of individual 
variability in the use of response scales. Yet, even though researchers attempt to 
“anchor response categories to words that have a common and clear meaning across 
respondents […] there is no guarantee that respondents use the scales comparably” 
(Kahneman and Krueger, 2006, p.18-9; see also Angner, 2011, for a discussion). 
 
In such a context, a further worry arises regarding the intertemporal variability of 
experienced utility measures. To explicate this concern, let me provide the following 
First Date example. When remembered shortly thereafter, a first date can give one an 
unsurpassable pleasure, awakening her noblest and most elevated sentiments. However, 
the remembered utility associated with such an episode can vary dramatically depending 
on how the subsequent relationship unfolds. Moreover, one may continue to derive 
utility (or disutility) from that episode long after it ends by remembering it, by 
experiencing how her inner life has been affected by it, etc. A proponent of experienced 
utility might allege that by taking the temporal integral of these remembered utility 
measures, we could provide a complete measurement of the remembered utility 
associated with such an episode. Still, it remains unclear how informative it would be to 
know what the remembered utility associated with an episode at a given moment is. For 
the value of such a measure can significantly fluctuate depending on factors such as 
what memories the agent happens to recall, the valence she ascribes to those memories, 
etc. 
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ii) Integrability: Kahneman (2000, p.6-8) imposes various requirements on how total 
utility is to be constructed from profiles of instant utility as a measure of what he calls 
“objective happiness”. Among these, we find: separability, according to which “the 
order in which moment-utilities are experienced does not affect total utility”; time 
neutrality, which states that “all moments are weighted alike in total utility”; and so-
called ordinality, which requires that “any two moments of experience can be 
compared, to establish which of them carries the higher hedonic value” (Kahneman, 
Wakker and Sarin, 1997, p.389). As argued by Kahneman (2000), separability and time 
neutrality are necessary - and, together with inclusiveness (see below) and ordinality, 
sufficient - for representing utility profiles as a decumulative function showing the 
amount of time an agent spends at each level of pleasure and pain. Nonetheless, each of 
these assumptions is vulnerable to severe criticisms. Let us consider those assumptions 
in turn. 
 
Separability requires that “the contribution of an element to the global utility of the 
sequence is independent of the elements that preceded and followed it” (Kahneman, 
2000, p.7). Prima facie, this assumption seems vulnerable to obvious counterexamples. 
For instance, the hedonic outcomes associated with taking a nap and reading 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus tonight depend on whether you spent the whole day sleeping 
or compulsively computing Hamiltonians. According to Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin 
(1997, p.391), separability of instant utilities is justifiable provided that one’s measure 
of instant utility “incorporates all order effects and interactions between outcomes” 
(inclusiveness). Regrettably, the proponents of experienced utility leave it unclear on 
what grounds we are to ascertain whether inclusiveness is satisfied. Moreover, it seems 
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doubtful that our measures of instant utility reflect all the affective consequences of 
previous experiences and the anticipation of future events. To give one example, one’s 
past experiences can influence her current hedonic states in ways which often elude her 
awareness and existing physiological indicators of instant utility. 
 
Regarding time neutrality, total utility measures differ markedly from decision utility 
and remembered utility ones, which typically assign more weight to outcomes that 
respectively occur early and late in a sequence. According to Kahneman, Wakker and 
Sarin, a time-neutral perspective is “appealing, both as a rule of personal prudence and 
as a principle of social planning” (1997, p.393). Yet, much controversy surrounds this 
issue. For instance, one may contend that a decrease in the psychological connectedness 
between our present self and our future selves gives us a reason to discount the utility of 
those selves (Parfit, 1982 and 1984). More generally, the inherent temporal situatedness 
of the position from which decision makers evaluate outcomes makes it dubious that the 
temporal distance between an outcome and the moment in which such an outcome is 
evaluated is irrelevant to its evaluation. I am not concerned here with settling the 
controversy over the rationality of discounting the future. Still, the proponents of total 
utility cannot gloss over this issue, if they are to provide decision theorists with a 
convincing case for relying on such a measure. 
 
As to ordinality, Kahneman (2000, p.12) himself acknowledges that whether agents can 
meaningfully compare distinct hedonic states is ultimately an empirical question. I shall 
not expand on the vast literature on incomparability cases (see e.g. Chang, 1997 and 
2002, and Raz, 1986). For the purpose of this enquiry, it suffices to note that people are 
 202
not always able to express definite preferences between heterogeneous experiences (e.g. 
suppose you had to choose between undergoing some excruciating physical pain and 
suffering from a profound depression). Indeed, it appears that situations where people 
are at loss in formulating accurate evaluations of specific “moments of experience” can 
be multiplied ad nauseam. 
 
iii) Interpersonal comparability: according to Kahneman, “a distinctive neutral point 
[neither pleasant nor unpleasant] permits comparisons across situations and persons” 
(2000, p.7). The idea is that although the stimulus giving rise to a neutral experience 
varies across contexts, “the neutral experience itself is constant” and can be used to 
ground meaningful interpersonal comparisons of experienced utility (Kahneman, 
Wakker and Sarin, 1997, p.380; see also Kahneman and Varey, 1991). However, it is an 
open question whether the neutral point can serve this purpose. To be sure, one may 
insist that we often make interpersonal comparisons on the alleged ground that the 
functions relating hedonic states to physical variables are qualitatively similar across 
people (Kahneman et al., 1997, p.380). Yet, appealing to this vague notion of qualitative 
similarity does not license wide-ranging conclusions regarding the interpersonal 
comparability of experienced utility reports (see e.g. Harsanyi, 1955, Arrow, 1977, and 
Griffin, 1986, p.75-124)74. 
 
                                                          
74
 Indeed, it is unclear whether the mere fact that some experiences are deemed to be neither 
pleasant nor unpleasant by an agent makes them the subject of an informative categorization. 
For instance, suppose that you regarded reading The Karamazov Brothers, dreaming of walking 
on Mars and counting blades of grass in your garden as neutral experiences. Is this fact of any 
particular significance when it comes to assessing the desirability, the choice worthiness, etc. of 
these experiences? 
 203
In such a context, one may wonder whether an agent’s experienced utility in a given 
situation can be measured in purely physical terms. This question relates to an issue that 
has been discussed extensively by philosophers of mind, namely whether having 
complete knowledge of an agent’s physical states is sufficient for acquiring complete 
knowledge of her mental states (see e.g. Broad, 1925, Jackson, 1982 and 1986, and 
Nagel, 1974 and 1986). Now, establishing the objective measurability of experienced 
utility in purely physical terms would require one to show that, once all the relevant 
physical data have been collected, there is nothing more to learn regarding what it is like 
to enjoy a particular level of experienced utility. At present, this constitutes an open 
question in the philosophy of mind (see e.g. Chalmers, 1996 and 2004, Dennett, 1991, 
Metzinger, 2000, and Papineau, 2003, for a debate). 
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6.C NEURAL UTILITY: CONCERNS 
 
Let us focus on neural utility. In what follows, I examine in turn some concerns related 
to the informativeness of neural utility measures, the reducibility of measures of 
experienced utility to measures of neural utility, and the underdetermination of neuro-
psychological theories by the available evidence. 
 
i) My first concern relates to the informativeness of neural utility measures. In order to 
identify which areas generate neural utility signals, one typically has to “rely on 
correlations with directly interpretable indicators of [well-being]” such as observed 
choice behaviour or reported expressions of satisfaction (Bernheim, 2009, p.31). In this 
respect, some authors worry that neuro-physiological measures of utility - being 
constructed on the basis of observed choices and reported measures of satisfaction - 
may be incapable of providing insights which correct or disconfirm those data. As 
Bernheim (2009, p.37) provocatively puts it: “why use brain scans to construct noisy 
predictions of a subject’s answers to questions about happiness and/or satisfaction when 
we can simply pose those questions directly?”. 
 
One pressing challenge for the advocates of neural utility is to offer insights concerning 
standard economic variables that economists cannot acquire by examining those 
variables directly (see also Rubinstein, 2008). To address this concern, NEs may 
attempt to identify the functions linking hedonic states to neural states in some 
experimental population and then employ these data with other subjects or the same 
subjects at a later time. Yet, the point remains that identifying which areas generate 
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desirability signals requires one to use behavioural and psychological data. This, in turn, 
constrains the extent to which neuro-physiological investigations can inform decision 
utility and experienced utility measurements. 
 
In recent years, some authors have argued that identifying some neuro-biological 
magnitude that is systematically related to decision utility provides “fundamental 
economic insights” (Caplin and Dean, 2008, p.669; see also Glimcher, 2010). Now, it 
would be implausible to deny that neuro-biological evidence can constrain specific 
models of choice (see e.g. Caplin et al., 2010, on how knowledge of dopaminergic 
circuits restricts the set of learning processes that can be plausibly thought to underlie 
choice behaviour). Yet, it remains unclear how exactly those neuro-biological findings 
bear on standard decision theory. To see this, suppose - following Glimcher (2010, 
p.135-7) - that our current instruments enable us to identify anatomically delimited 
populations of neurons whose mean firing rates are linearly related to decision utility. 
Even so, profound differences remain between the firing rate of some neurons and an 
abstract economic construct like decision utility (e.g. only the former is a cardinal 
object). These differences, in turn, hinder NEs’ attempts to bridge the “current 
conceptual gap” (Caplin and Dean, 2008, p.663) between the economic and the 
neuroscientific accounts of choice behaviour. 
 
ii) Over the last few years, several insights regarding the neuro-physiological correlates 
of experienced utility have been provided. Consider, for example, anticipated utility. 
Some authors (Elliott et al., 2000, and Knutson et al., 2001a) document how particular 
areas differentially activate during anticipation of specific rewards depending on the 
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magnitude of the anticipated outcomes. Others (Knutson et al., 2001b) show that 
various regions exhibit increased activation when subjects anticipate some gain but 
deactivate by the time subjects receive it. Still others (Knutson et al., 2003) illustrate 
how the activations of specific neural populations vary depending on whether a subject 
fails to receive an anticipated reward or expectedly receives no reward. 
 
In commenting over the advancement of neuro-physiological research, Kahneman 
contends that “the prospects are reasonably good for an index of the valence and 
intensity of current experience, which will be sensitive to the many kinds of pleasure 
and anguish in people’s lives” (2000, p.13). Now, neuroscientists will certainly provide 
increasingly accurate characterizations of the neural underpinnings of experienced 
utility. Still, it is doubtful that measuring the activations of specific neural areas enables 
us to adequately account for the remarkable diversity of people’s hedonic experiences. 
My point is not just that the neural substrates of some hedonic states are topographically 
and functionally too complex to be captured by current neuro-physiological 
investigations. Rather, my main concern is that any claim to have disclosed the neural 
constituents of people’s subjective experiences would be philosophically naïve. After 
all, one may well reiterate that experienced utility measures supervene on neural utility 
ones, i.e. that every change in agents’ hedonic states reflects some modification in their 
neural areas’ activation patterns. Yet, it is an open question whether experienced utility 
measures, which relate to people’s subjective experiences, can be thoroughly reduced to 
third-person neural utility data. Let me expand on this point. 
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In the philosophy of mind and of cognitive sciences, several anti-reductionist lines of 
argument have been developed. For example, some authors (e.g. Fodor, 1974) question 
the prospects of intertheoretic reductions by pointing to the multiple realizability of 
mental states at the physical level. Others, instead, deny that materialistic neuroscience 
can account for the phenomenological features of our mental states (e.g. Nagel, 1974, 
and Jackson, 1982), the semantic content of our thoughts (e.g. Searle, 1980 and 1990), 
or the holistic character of the mental (e.g. Davidson, 1980). I am not concerned here 
with assessing the merits of these arguments. Still, one does not have to be a Cartesian 
substance dualist to doubt the reducibility of experienced utility measures in terms of 
neural utility ones. To give one example, the inherent vagueness of many phenomenal 
accounts of conscious experiences severely constrains their susceptibility to neuro-
physiological reduction. In the words of Papineau (2003, p.208-9), scientific research 
can “narrow down the possible material referents of phenomenal concepts” (e.g. being 
in pain). Yet, due to the vagueness of our phenomenal concepts, there will typically 
remain several candidate material referents for each of those concepts. 
 
iii) The practitioners and the philosophers of various behavioural sciences frequently 
discuss the issue of underdetermination of theory by the evidence. Recent 
neuroscientific research on neural utility faces a particularly severe instance of this 
problem. The idea is that the available neural evidence typically underdetermines the 
identification of the processes by means of which distinct areas’ activations are 
combined into desirability signals. That is to say, different models of how neural utility 
is computed may be elaborated, and the available neural evidence rarely enables us to 
 208
discriminate between them75. Below I distinguish two issues associated with this 
problem. The first relates to how many stages comprise the generation of neural utility 
signals. The second concerns which neural areas are involved in those computations. 
Let me consider these two issues in turn. 
 
In exploring the neural underpinnings of reward evaluation, several cognitive and 
computational neuroscientists advocate the so-called common currency hypothesis, 
according to which the brain ranks outcomes and actions in terms of a unique neural 
currency (Landreth and Bickle, 2008). The idea can be summarized as follows. 
Economic agents often have to decide between complex outcomes (e.g. think of various 
courses of action). For principled choice to be possible, the value of the available 
options must be represented in terms of some common currency. In the words of 
Montague and Berns, without an internal currency in the nervous system “a creature 
would be unable to assess the relative value of different events […] To decide on an 
appropriate behavior, the nervous system must estimate the value of each of these 
potential actions, convert it to a common scale, and use this scale to determine a course 
of action” (2002, p.276)76. 
 
In such a context, two pressing concerns arise in relation to the task of identifying how 
many stages comprise the computation of neural utility signals. Firstly, there is the 
                                                          
75
 Philosophers speak of underdetermination of theory by the evidence in a variety of senses. For 
instance, as noted by Okasha (2000), such an expression has been employed to mean that the 
available data: are logically compatible with more than one theory (Newton-Smith, 1978); can 
be explained by more than one theory (English, 1973); are entailed by more than one theory 
(Quine, 1975); and equally support more than one theory (Bergstrom, 1993). In this section, I 
use the term underdetermination to indicate that the available data can be employed to support 
more than one theory. 
76
 See also Shizgal, 1997, and Shizgal and Conover, 1996, for some evidence in favour of the 
unique currency hypothesis based on brain-stimulation studies. 
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problem of ascertaining whether the activation patterns observed at a given moment 
reflect “aggregation of feelings at different points in time, or immediate feelings driven 
by anticipated [or remembered] outcomes” (Bernheim, 2009, p.31). And secondly, one 
faces the challenge of understanding how exactly the observed neural signals are 
aggregated over time. As noted by Bernheim, both problems appear to be quite 
challenging. For instance, resolving the former problem is complicated by the fact that 
the very act of anticipating or reminiscing specific experiences is likely to foster neural 
activations besides those associated with the hedonic correlates of those experiences. As 
to the latter challenge, the development of accurate empirical generalizations regarding 
the intertemporal aggregation of neural signals is constrained by the variability that 
some areas’ activations exhibit across subjects and choice settings. 
 
Additional concerns arise regarding the identification of which neural areas are 
involved in the processing of desirability signals. As we have seen in the first section, 
researchers (see e.g. Platt and Glimcher, 1998 and 1999) identified various regions 
whose activations correlate with the relative expected value of some rewards in specific 
decision contexts77. These findings, however, are obtained in highly constrained 
experimental settings and fall short of implying that the identified areas compute 
desirability signals across decision contexts. Moreover, various studies suggest that 
different kinds of reward tend to engage distinct neural circuitries, with dissimilar areas 
activating across choice settings (see e.g. Elliott et al., 2000, McClure et al., 2004a, and 
O’Doherty et al., 2002). 
                                                          
77
 Until recently, most neural evidence was obtained in studies of non-human primates engaged 
in unsophisticated experimental tasks (e.g. repetitive choices between two primary rewards). 
The limited complexity of the examined tasks, coupled with the anatomical and functional 
dissimilarities between humans’ and other primates’ neural architectures (see e.g. Allman et al., 
2002), constrain the generalizability of those findings to traditional decision problems. 
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The identification of an anatomically separate network of areas responsible for 
computing desirability signals is further complicated by the fact that the areas 
generating those signals often contribute to other cognitive and computational tasks (see 
e.g. Anderson, 2006 and 2007, and Cabeza and Nyberg, 1997 and 2000). To be sure, 
dopaminergic circuits are often taken to play a central role in the computation of reward 
evaluations (e.g. Schultz et al., 1997, and Schultz, 2000). In particular, several studies 
suggest that dopaminergic activity encodes deviations between anticipated and obtained 
rewards (Bayer and Glimcher, 2005, Morris et al., 2006, and Schultz and Dickinson, 
2000), with some authors going as far as to regard dopamine as “a key input into the 
construction of utility” (Caplin and Dean, 2008, p.669). Still, other theories of 
dopaminergic function have been proposed (e.g. Berridge and Robinson, 1998, and 
Redgrave and Gurney, 2006). Moreover, natural rewards do not always activate 
dopaminergic circuits, and other neural populations besides the dopaminergic ones have 
been shown to contribute to reward evaluations (see e.g. Hare et al., 2008). 
 
To conclude, in the recent literature at the boundary between economics, psychology 
and neuroscience, various measures of experienced and neural utility have been 
developed. In light of this diversity, it is highly advisable to distinguish different notions 
of utility rather than presume that “a single, unifying concept […] motivates all human 
choices and registers all relevant feelings and experiences” (Kahneman and Krueger, 
2006, p.4). As I argued above, there are profound dissimilarities between decision utility 
and neuro-psychological notions of utility. Moreover, several empirical and conceptual 
concerns arise in relation to experienced and neural utility measures. 
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Now, let us suppose - for the sake of argument - that we could measure experienced and 
neural utility in reliable and accurate terms. One may advocate using these measures to 
complement traditional decision theory. Even so, additional argument is needed to 
license the conclusion that decision theoretic analyses should be based on these notions. 
Indeed, there is a sense in which the search for true utility appears to be - not just 
incomplete, but also - futile. After all, we can expect to find increasingly accurate 
neuro-psychological correlates of observed choices across decision settings. Yet, it 
remains hard to see how those empirical investigations are supposed to foster the 
replacement of a mathematical construct such as decision utility. Paraphrasing what 
Davidson (1980, p.231) famously asserted regarding the notion of rationality, the 
consistency requirements associated with decision utility “have no echo” in neuro-
physiological theory. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
HOW NEUROSCIENCE COULD REVOLUTIONIZE ECONOMICS 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, the proponents of NE often manifest the 
ambition to implement revolutionary modifications in the economic theory of choice 
(see e.g. Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005, p.10, and Rustichini, 2003). In this 
respect, it would be of little import to object that NEs have failed to accomplish 
revolutionary achievements. For the issue is whether - and if so, in what respects - they 
are likely to do so in a reasonably near future. Now, the plausibility of NEs’ claims 
depends on how the notion of revolution is interpreted. In everyday language, the term 
“revolution” is employed in a number of different senses. What exactly do NEs mean 
when they speak of revolutionizing the economic account of decision making? What 
conditions would a modification of economic theory have to satisfy to qualify as 
revolutionary? In this final chapter, I distinguish four senses of the term “revolution” 
and argue that NEs are unlikely to foster a revolution in economic theory in any of these 
senses. 
 
Before proceeding, let me put forward three preliminary remarks regarding the contents 
of this chapter. Firstly, the list of senses of “revolution” I consider is not meant to be 
exhaustive. For instance, I shall not discuss here whether NE can prompt significant 
changes in economists’ modelling practices (see e.g. sections 2.B and 2.D on some NE 
studies which manipulate agents’ choice behaviour by means of pharmaceuticals and 
neurochemicals). Secondly, NEs are not equally unlikely to prompt revolutionary 
modifications in all the respects I consider below. For example, while NEs may promote 
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significant increases in the evidential base of economic theory (section 7.A), more 
severe challenges seem to hinder progress in neuro-psychological measurements of 
well-being (section 7.C). And thirdly, whether some scientific advance constitutes a 
genuine scientific revolution is often matter of retrospective judgement (Nickles, 2006). 
This, however, does not prevent us from providing a principled evaluation of what 
contributions NEs are likely to offer to NE’s parent disciplines. 
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7.A EVIDENTIAL BASE 
 
A first sense in which the term “revolution” has been used by NEs relates to a 
significant expansion in the evidential base of traditional economic theory. NEs 
frequently state that a better understanding of the neural substrates of choice behaviour 
extends the scope of standard economic theory by enabling economists to observe 
variables that are considered “inherently unobservable” in it (Camerer, 2008a, p.45; see 
also Bernheim, 2009, p.9 and Caplin and Dean, 2008, p.665). Indeed, some go as far as 
to characterize traditional economic models of choice as a “limiting case” of NE models 
containing behavioural, psychological and neural variables (Camerer, Loewenstein and 
Prelec, 2004, p.564). The idea is that NEs enable other economists to measure not just a 
greater number of economic variables (horizontal expansion in evidential base), but also 
novel kinds of evidence (vertical expansion in evidential base). 
 
Three progressively less restrictive views of the evidential base of economic theory can 
be contrasted. On a narrow interpretation, only observable choices constitute relevant 
evidence for the economic account of decision making. This view has been advocated 
by various leading economists (e.g. Samuelson, 1938 and 1947), but is currently 
defended only by few authors (e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008). A more ecumenical 
perspective takes both observed choices and psychological data (e.g. people’s 
satisfaction reports) to belong to the evidential base of economic theory. This view 
prompted several behavioural economists (see e.g. Simon, 1955, Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979) to combine psychological and behavioural data in constructing their 
models. According to a third, even more inclusive conception, also neural variables and 
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findings are to be used in building economic models of choice. In this perspective, NEs’ 
calls to incorporate neuro-physiological data can be seen as the most recent wave of an 
iterative expansion of the evidential base of economic theory that arguably started with 
the early works of psycho-physiologists (see e.g. Glimcher, 2010, ch.4). As Camerer 
puts it, “advances in neuroscience make it possible to measure and causally manipulate 
many processes and quantities that were not imaginable […] when the foundation of 
neoclassical economics was being laid […] To ignore these developments entirely is 
bad scientific economizing” (2008a, p.60-1). 
 
Now, let us assess the cogency of NEs’ claims. As we have seen in chapters two and 
four, neuro-psychological insights can help economists to predict and explain a wider 
range of choices (e.g. think of the violations of expected utility theory). In particular, 
several NEs aim to develop a framework which is more general than standard economic 
theory in the sense of covering both rational and irrational forms of behaviour (Vromen, 
2007, p.159). Yet, the mere fact that NE contributions allow for an increase in the range 
of phenomena modelled by economists does not imply that they will also foster a major 
expansion in the evidential base of economic theory. To be sure, it would be implausible 
to deny that NEs can measure and causally manipulate many variables besides those 
figuring in standard economic theory. Yet, the reason why economists focus on 
observed choices is not because they deem neural variables to be inherently 
unobservable, but rather because the very act of modelling requires them to concentrate 
on a subset of the features of the examined target systems. In this respect, the question 
remains as to how far the evidential base of the economic theory of choice should be 
expanded by economists. Let me explicate this concern. 
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As we have seen in chapter four, NEs have hitherto failed to demonstrate that 
economists will find it convenient to import many neural insights into their models. In 
particular, various NEs overstate the extent to which their studies expand the evidential 
base of economic theory. By way of illustration, consider the claim by Fehr and 
Camerer that while economists “treat preferences and beliefs as impossible or difficult 
to observe directly”, NE research “rejects the premise of unobservability (2007, p.419). 
Such an assertion does not appear to withstand scrutiny. For the abstract character of 
preferences and beliefs makes them an unsuitable target for direct neuro-psychological 
observation. Analogous remarks apply to those NEs who urge other economists to 
include neural constructs and findings into their models on the alleged ground that “the 
study of the brain and nervous system is beginning to allow direct measurement of 
thoughts and feelings” (Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005, p.10). 
 
More generally, the point remains that NEs rarely put forward compelling reasons to 
integrate other disciplines’ insights into economic theory. To see this, let us examine 
some NEs’ contentions concerning the purportedly biological character of economics 
(e.g. Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer, 2005, p.254) and the alleged need to include 
biological methods and findings into economic theory (Zak and Denzau, 2001, p.32). 
Prima facie, it might seem that economics, defined as the study of relationships between 
ends and scarce resources having alternative uses (Robbins, 1935, p.15), has significant 
conceptual affinities with biology (see e.g. Marshall, 1890 [1961], p.772). Still, it is one 
thing to maintain that biological insights could help economists to improve their models 
of choice. It is quite another thing to assert that “ultimately, economics is a biological 
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science” (Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer, 2005, p.254). This latter assertion appears to face 
the following dilemma. On the one hand, interpreting the term “biological” broadly - so 
as to imply that economic models represent the behaviour of living organisms of some 
sort - would render the claim trivial. On the other hand, opting for a narrower 
interpretation of such a term makes it unclear why exactly economics would constitute a 
biological - as opposed to psychological, neuroscientific, etc. - discipline78. 
 
Zak and Denzau’s (2001, p.32) assertion that the “methods and findings in the 
biological sciences need to be incorporated directly into economics” is even more 
disputable. To be sure, biological insights may well inspire and inform economists’ 
models of decision making (see e.g. Fumagalli, 2011, on some parallel debates about 
modelling trade-offs in biology and economics). Yet, this falls short of implying that the 
advancement of economics is conditional upon the direct integration of biological 
methods and findings. Furthermore, one wonders what sort of biological “methods” and 
“findings” economists would have to include into their models. After all, no sensible 
economist would find it necessary to incorporate hyper-complicate sets of genetic and 
phenotypic traits’ frequencies into her models of choice. Furthermore, it is hard to think 
of biological methods and findings whose incorporation is necessary for the 
advancement of economic theory. That is to say, economists are advised to resist the 
call of these biologically informed sirens, if they are to make the most of their 
modelling odysseys. 
 
                                                          
78
 It is interesting to note that various authors (e.g. Ghiselin, 1978, p.233) characterize biology 
as an economic discipline. Indeed, some go as far as to present their biological investigations as 
economic studies concerning “unusual sets of entities maximizing a rather unusual utility 
function” (Tullock, 1979, p.2). 
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At this point, one might wonder on what basis the proponents of NE put forward so 
disputable assertions. At first, it might be tempting to ascribe exaggerations and 
mistakes to the rhetoric of the discipline and to some authors’ desire for visibility and 
funding. Upon inspection, however, NEs’ overstatements can also be seen as symptoms 
of a deeper methodological malaise, which can be given a more philosophically 
informative diagnosis. As I argued elsewhere (Fumagalli, 2010), several NEs appear to 
presuppose that neuro-anatomical and neuro-physiological data constitute more 
explanatorily basic evidence concerning choice behaviour than the variables considered 
by economists. In the words of Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2005, p.27), “the 
traditional economic account of behavior, which assumes that humans act so as to 
maximally satisfy their preferences, starts in the middle […] of the neuroscience 
account”. 
 
As we noted in section 4.A, this assertion is vulnerable to several objections. In 
particular, there are reasons to doubt many NEs’ presupposition that insights from 
lower-level disciplines such as neurobiology and cognitive neuroscience are ipso facto 
more explanatorily informative for economists than observed choices. Moreover, 
insights from disciplines other than neurobiology and cognitive neuroscience (e.g. think 
of genetics) may well be more explanatorily informative than NE findings under the 
criteria of explanatory relevance that are implicitly presupposed by some leading NEs. 
For, as Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2005, p.27) concede, “even the neuroscience 
account begins […] in the middle” of other disciplines’ investigations. 
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7.B INTERTHEORETIC REDUCTION 
 
A second respect in which NE has been said to revolutionize the economic theory of 
choice relates to intertheoretic reduction. In the NE literature, several authors advocate 
the adoption of a reductionist approach to the analysis of decision making and urge 
economists, psychologists and neuroscientists to engage in a common reductive 
unification of the decision sciences (Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004, p.448; see also 
Glimcher, 2010, xv). The NEs’ case in favour of a reductive approach can be seen as the 
combination of two argumentative steps. The pars destruens goes as follows. The 
economic account of decision making heavily relies on folk psychology constructs such 
as beliefs and desires. Folk psychology, however, constitutes a conceptually primitive 
and predictively flawed theoretical framework that will be eventually reduced or 
eliminated by neuroscience (Churchland, 1981, 1986 and 1988; see also Feyerabend, 
1963, and Rorty, 1965)79. Hence, to the extent that economists build their models on 
folk psychology foundations, their explanatory and predictive efforts are doomed to fail. 
As Rosenberg puts it, “beliefs and desires […] do not describe natural kinds. They do 
not divide nature at the joints. They do not label types of discrete states that share the 
same manageably small set of causes and effects and so cannot be brought together in 
causal generalizations” (1992, p.235). 
 
The pars construens of the NEs’ reductive case aims to show that NE research provides 
a neural microfoundation of socio-economic behaviour (Fehr and Camerer, 2007, 
                                                          
79
 According to eliminative materialists, “our commonsense conception of psychological 
phenomena [is] so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that 
theory will eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience” 
(Churchland, 1981, p.67; see McCauley, 1996, p.437-440, on how the Churchlands came to 
qualify their eliminativist position). 
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p.419), thereby fostering the replacement of the theoretical constructs employed by 
economists. The proponents of NE often manifest the ambition to “replace the 
mathematical ideas used in economics with more neurally detailed descriptions” 
(Camerer, 2005) and “substitute familiar distinctions between categories of economic 
behaviour” with neural ones (Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005, p.15). The idea is 
that although “conventional economic language can indeed approximate a lot of neural 
phenomena […] at some point it is more efficient to simply adopt constructs as they are 
defined and understood in other fields” (Camerer, 2008a, p.45). Now, what sort of 
conceptual modifications may be promoted by NEs? As we noted in section 4.B, one 
possibility is that NEs prompt economists to employ altogether different constructs by 
showing that what was thought to be a unitary phenomenon (e.g. hyperbolic 
discounting) is more plausibly regarded as several distinct phenomena brought about by 
dissimilar mechanisms (Craver and Alexandrova, 2008, p.402). 
 
As noted by various authors (e.g. Bickle, 1996, p.64, and Churchland and Churchland, 
1996, p.424), historical cases of reduction line up on a spectrum, ranging from retentive 
cases where the vocabulary and the ontology of the reduced theory are at least partially 
preserved (e.g. think of the reduction of Kepler’s laws of planetary motion to Newton’s 
laws of motion) to eliminative cases where the reduced theory is displaced (e.g. think of 
the phlogiston theory of combustion). Now, how profoundly NE will reshape the 
economic theory of choice is an open empirical question to be settled by actual research 
rather than armchair speculations. This, however, does not preclude us from providing 
methodologically informed reasons to doubt that the import of neural insights should be 
massive (see Fumagalli, 2011). To be sure, one might think that NE accounts of 
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decision making will reduce or even supplant higher-level ones, leading economists to 
relinquish their beloved utility functions in favour of hyper-complicated vectors of 
neural areas’ activation patterns. Still, there are various reasons to resist NEs’ reductive 
or eliminativist calls. Before examining these reasons, let us consider some models of 
intertheoretic reduction proposed by philosophers of science. 
 
According to the so-called ‘unity view’ of science, scientific disciplines are structured 
as a layered edifice of levels connected via intertheoretic reductive relations (McCauley, 
1996, p.432-3; see also Wimsatt, 1976). In The Structure of Science, Nagel 
characterizes reduction as “the explanation of a theory or a set of experimental laws 
established in one area of inquiry, by a theory usually […] formulated for some other 
domain” (1961, p.338; see also Oppenheim and Putnam, 1958). Nagel distinguishes two 
types of reductions, namely homogenous and heterogeneous reduction. Homogenous 
reductions occur when all the descriptive terms of the reduced theory are contained in 
the reducing theory and have approximately the same meanings in the two theories. 
Heterogeneous reductions, instead, take place when the reduced theory contains terms 
that do not appear in the reducing theory or when the meaning of central terms varies 
across the two theories80. 
 
Nagel’s view has been the subject of several criticisms. For instance, some authors (e.g. 
Sklar, 1967) doubted that genuine homogeneous reductions occured in the history of 
science on the ground that what can be derived from the reducing theory are just 
approximations to the laws of the reduced theory. Others (e.g. Feyerabend, 1962 and 
                                                          
80
 Implementing heterogeneous reductions requires one to employ so-called bridge laws which 
connect the terms of the higher-level theory to those of the lower-level one. For a debate over 
the status of bridge laws, see e.g. Sklar, 1967, Fodor, 1974, and Schaffner, 1976. 
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1987, and Kuhn, 1962) challenged the purported meaning equivalence of terms in the 
reducing and the reduced theory by arguing that the meaning of a term crucially 
depends on the role it plays in a theory (see Papineau, 1996, for a critical discussion). In 
response to criticisms, some authors amended the Nagelian model by relaxing the 
requirement of exact nomological derivability between the reduced and the reducing 
theory (e.g. Schaffner, 1976 and 1977). Others developed alternative models of 
intertheoretic reduction which more radically depart from the Nagelian model. For 
instance, on the so-called ‘new wave’ reductionist account the reductive derivation does 
not target the to-be-reduced theory directly, but concerns an analog structure framed in 
the vocabulary of the reducing theory (Hooker, 1981, and Bickle, 1996 and 1998; see 
Endicott, 1998 and 2001, for some criticisms). 
 
At present, no consensus has been reached among NEs as to what conception of 
intertheoretic relations most accurately reflects scientific practice and theorising across 
distinct behavioural sciences. Indeed, one wonders whether any single picture faithfully 
accounts for the complexity of those interrelations. In this respect, various authors 
maintain that the very idea of reducing the behavioural sciences to a single theoretical 
framework imposes an exceedingly restrictive constrain on interdisciplinary progress 
(Sunder, 2006, p.323)81. As we noted in section 6.C, several anti-reductionist lines of 
argument have been developed in the philosophy of cognitive sciences. In what follows, 
I provide three additional reasons to question NEs’ reductionist claims. 
                                                          
81
 Whether scientific theories are reducible to one fundamental theoretical framework is a 
conceptually distinct issue than the one concerning what kind of regulative role, if any, 
reductionism plays in scientific theorising. According to some authors (e.g. Fodor, 1974, p.128-
9), reducibility to physics is often taken to constrain the acceptability of theories in the special 
sciences (see also Horgan, 1993). Others, instead, deny that reductionism imposes restrictions 
on theory choice in the special sciences (e.g. Bickle, 1996, Churchland, 1986, ch.9, and Hooker, 
1981). I do not expand on this debate for the purpose of my enquiry. 
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A first line of argument points to NEs’ divergences concerning which disciplines are 
supposed to provide the fundamental constructs for their still-to-come reductive 
framework. My reasoning goes as follows. Many NEs take their findings to yield a 
neural microfoundation to the economic theory of choice. Yet, as we have seen in 
section 5.C, it remains an open question “where the appropriate microfoundations have 
been reached” (Mäki, 2010, p.109). Moreover, many NEs’ reductionist claims rest on 
highly speculative presuppositions concerning the relationship between economics and 
other behavioural sciences. By way of illustration, consider Camerer’s assertion (1999, 
p.10575) that “because economics is the science of how resources are allocated by 
individuals […] the psychology of individual behaviour should underlie and inform 
economics, much as physics informs chemistry”. In his paper, Camerer does not 
cogently substantiate this parallel. Moreover, his simplistic comparison would hardly 
impress anyone having some knowledge of the complexity of intertheoretic - not to say 
interdisciplinary - reductive relations. 
 
My second argumentative strategy relates to the existence of multiple levels of 
description of human choice behaviour. As we have seen in sections 2.C and 4.A, 
several NEs seem to think that accounting for choice behaviour in terms of lower-level 
mechanisms and processes constitutes an obvious explanatory advancement. Yet, as 
noted by Kuorikoski and Ylikoski, higher-level explanations “do not [always] inherit 
their explanatory qualities from lower-level descriptions” and “an explanation is not 
necessarily improved when the explanans is itself explained” (2010, p.220-2; see also 
Ylikoski and Kuorikoski, 2010). Moreover, in the absence of principled reasons for 
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thinking that choice behaviour is most conveniently characterized at the neural - rather 
than some lower - level of description, one could employ reductionist considerations to 
advocate the inclusion of - not so much neural, but rather - genetic, micro-physical, etc. 
insights into economic models. In this respect, advocating the adoption of a reductionist 
approach may even backfire against the proponents of NE. For many NE experiments 
are grounded in folk psychology’s vocabulary and constructs (Quartz, 2008, p.468). 
 
A third anti-reductionist line of argument relates to the depth of NEs’ intended 
reduction. My reasoning can be explicated as follows. As illustrated by the history of 
science, fruitful coevolutionary interactions have taken place between distinct 
behavioural disciplines (see e.g. Craver, 2007, Ch.7, and Richardson, 2009, on 
psychology and neuroscience; see also Darden and Maull, 1977, on interfield relations 
in the biological sciences)82. However, some NEs advocate - not just some 
coevolutionary interaction between NE’s parent disciplines, but also - the elimination of 
various economic constructs in favour of neuro-psychological ones (see e.g. Camerer, 
2008a, p.45, and Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005, p.15). 
 
Now, intertheoretic transitions occasionally involve the elimination of particular 
theoretical entities (e.g. think of the crystal spheres of Ptolemaic astronomy and the 
luminous ether of pre-Einsteinian mechanics). In light of this historical record, some 
authors assert that our introspective certainty concerning the existence of beliefs and 
desires will turn out to be “as badly misplaced as was the classical man’s visual 
certainty that they star-flecked sphere of the heavens turns daily” (Churchland, 1981, 
                                                          
82
 See also Kincaid (1997, p.6) for a case in favour of non-reductive unifications according to 
which “scientific unity comes from integrating the special sciences with their lower-level 
counterparts […] using one to develop explanatory constraints for the other”. 
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p.70). Still, it is doubtful that progress in psychology and neuroscience is more 
plausibly reconstructed in eliminativist rather than coevolutionary terms (see Bickle, 
2003, Churchland and Churchland, 1996 and 1998, McCauley, 1986 and 1996, and 
Mundale and Bechtel, 1996, for a debate). More generally, one may concede that 
biological, psychological and economic entities are composed of lower-level micro-
physical entities, and yet deny that “biology, psychology, and economics are […] 
reducible as explanatory theories to their lower-level counterparts” (Kincaid, 1997, 
p.6)83. 
 
Now, the proponents of NE rarely put forward convincing reasons for substituting 
economists’ constructs. By way of illustration, consider the remarks that some NEs 
formulated regarding the concepts of risk preferences, time preferences and social 
preferences. Most economists treat these as distinct types of preference. According to 
Fehr and Camerer, however, it is “important” for economists to ascertain whether these 
preferences have the same neural substrates (2007, p.426). Now, let us suppose that 
significant overlap was found between the neural substrates of risk preferences, time 
preferences and social preferences. Even this would fall short of implying that 
economists should stop regarding these types of preferences as distinct. For the reasons 
why economists differentiate between those preferences relate - not so much to the 
alleged dissimilarity of their neural underpinnings, but rather - to the fact that they 
concern distinct economic phenomena. 
 
                                                          
83
 See also Ross (2010, p.661) for a critique of the claim that molar scale phenomena (e.g. 
people’s observed choices) are in principle fully explicable by reference to molecular 
phenomena (e.g. neural activation patterns). 
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To recapitulate, several NEs argue that the NE framework for modelling human choice 
behaviour will be forged by an iterative reduction of economics to psychology and then 
to neuroscience (Glimcher, 2010, xv). Indeed, some appear to presuppose that 
constructing neuro-psychological models of choice would per se constitute “a reductive 
unification of the decision sciences” (Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004, p.448). Even so, 
there are various reasons to doubt that NEs will foster a reduction of the economic 
account of decision making in neuro-psychological terms. In particular, NEs have 
hitherto failed to specify how exactly neuro-psychological evidence and insights are 
supposed to prompt the reduction - not to say the elimination - of higher-level economic 
constructs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 227
7.C WELFARE ANALYSES 
 
A third respect in which NE has been said to trigger a revolution relates to economic 
welfare analyses and policy evaluations. As we have seen in the previous chapter, a 
number of concerns arise regarding some NEs’ proposal to replace decision utility with 
neuro-psychological constructs such as experienced and neural utility. Now, let us 
suppose - for the sake of argument - that we could measure experienced utility and 
neural utility in reliable and accurate terms. Even so, the question would remain as to 
whether - and if so, why - decision theoretic analyses should be based on these notions. 
Various proponents of NE advocate the adoption of experienced utility and neural utility 
on the alleged ground that these constitute a better approximation to agents’ well-being 
than decision utility. The idea is that maximizing experienced utility or neural utility is 
objectively better for agents than satisfying their actual or informed preferences. In the 
words of Loewenstein and Haisley, recent NE research contributes to “the measurement 
of welfare and the design of economic and social systems that maximize welfare” 
(2008, p.44). Let us assess the cogency of this line of argument. 
 
Suppose we are facing a situation where there is some fact of the matter as to what an 
agent’s well-being is. One might allege that well-being is somehow reducible to some 
measure of experienced utility or neural utility, i.e. that well-being ultimately consists of 
specific hedonic experiences or some set of neural activation patterns. This rebuttal, 
however, does not appear to withstand scrutiny. After all, well-being depends not just 
on hedonic experiences or their neuro-physiological correlates, but also on “other 
aspects of life, such as autonomy, freedom, achievement” (Kahneman and Sugden, 
 228
2005, p.176; see also Nozick, 1974, p.42-45). In this respect, one may insist that 
people’s hedonic experiences and their neuro-physiological counterparts are important 
constituents of well-being (Kahneman, 2000, p.19). Even so, we do not have to embrace 
a radical form of eudaimonism to deny that experiences are valuable solely in virtue of 
their liability to generate pleasurable hedonic states or particular neural activations. As 
Bernheim vividly puts it, “we often consider ourselves better off when we have actual 
autonomy, liberty, and a firm grasp on reality even if, as a consequence, we must 
relinquish appealing illusions and experience less pleasurable neurobiological 
sensations” (2009, p.30). 
 
The proponents of true utility may protest that one’s intuitions concerning this issue 
presumably depend on what conception of well-being she endorses. In particular, they 
might contend that some measure of experienced utility or neural utility approximates 
the well-being of the agent more accurately than decision utility. After all - the thought 
would be - there are various reasons why an agent may fail to choose options which 
promote her objective well-being (see e.g. Elster, 1983, and Sen, 1987, on preferences 
based on mistaken beliefs)84. Nonetheless, also actions yielding high experienced utility 
or neural utility may fall short of maximizing well-being. To give one example, think of 
drug addicts and of pathological gamblers. A person can experience very pleasant 
sensations if her dopamine neurons suppress competing serotonergic circuits. 
Regrettably, this process often results in addictive forms of behaviour which have a 
disastrous impact on people’s well-being (Ross, 2008, p.132). That is to say, on many 
                                                          
84
 Similar remarks apply to the proposal to regard only choices based on informed preferences 
as indicators of well-being, for many suboptimal decisions result from - not so much inaccurate 
information, but rather - people’s computational limitations and self-control problems (see e.g. 
Bernheim and Rangel, 2008). 
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conceptions of what it is good for someone to do, the best actions are not the ones that 
maximize experienced utility or neural utility. As Read puts it, “a separate value 
judgment is necessary before Benthamite utility can be identified with the good” (2007, 
p.58). 
 
In such a context, the further question arises as to why economists should commit 
themselves to some particular conception of well-being. After all, traditional decision 
theory remains agnostic as to whether agents’ objective well-being consists in 
experiencing pleasure and avoiding pain, satisfying their actual preferences, etc. Now, 
let us assume - for the sake of argument - that decision theory did rest on the assumption 
that well-being consists in maximizing the value of some specific measure of utility. 
One may wonder which notion of utility should be regarded by economists as 
normatively fundamental, i.e. why agents should choose actions that maximize the value 
of that - rather than some other - measure. By way of illustration, suppose that agents’ 
objective well-being consisted in maximizing the value of some measure of experienced 
utility. Even so, several questions would remain such as: qua rational agent, should you 
maximize the value of instant, anticipated or remembered utility? Over what time 
intervals? Or maybe should you compute a weighted average of distinct kinds of 
experienced utility, each being measured over various time spans? If so, how should the 
various elements of such a function be weighed? Providing principled grounds to 
specify the maximandum of this optimization exercise appears to be disconcertingly 
difficult. 
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At this point, the proponents of experienced utility may allege that their analyses apply 
to “situations where a separate value judgment designates experienced utility as a 
relevant criterion for evaluating outcomes” (Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin, 1997, 
p.377). Yet, the issue at stake is precisely when this happens to be the case, and by 
means of what criterion we are supposed to identify these situations. To be sure, one 
might speculate that well-informed agents would often deem maximizing experienced 
or neural utility to be in their own best interest. Still, this conjecture leaves us in the 
dark in cases where different people have contrasting intuitions regarding what 
constitutes or promotes their well-being. In this respect, dissimilar views have been 
advocated as to whether experienced and neural utility provide a more suitable basis for 
policy evaluations than decision utility. For instance, Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin 
(1997, p.389) allege that consumer sovereignty is called into question when observed 
decisions fall short of maximizing experienced utility. For his part, Sugden (2004 and 
2008) questions the normative appeal of experienced utility as a criterion for policy 
evaluation (see also Sugden, 2006, p.217, for the claim that an agent may attribute a 
high importance to the opportunity of satisfying her own preferences irrespective of 
whether these preferences are stable under experience and reflection). 
 
I am not concerned here with evaluating these assertions. For the purpose of this 
enquiry, it suffices to note that the previous calls to ground economists’ analyses on 
experienced utility or neural utility measures involve presuppositions which transcend 
the scope of traditional decision theory and the evidential reach of neuro-psychological 
investigations (e.g. who is entitled to establish what constitutes agents’ well-being? By 
means of what criteria we are to adjudicate disagreements regarding this issue?). That is 
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to say, advances in neuro-psychological research may promote the development of 
indicators of well-being which complement traditional economic welfare analyses. At 
the same time, it remains an open question whether our growing ability to measure 
neural activation patterns will enable us to “objectively compare mental state between 
individuals” and implement “direct inter-individual comparisons of welfare” (Glimcher, 
2010, p.425). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 232
7.D INTERPRETATION OF MODELS 
 
Another respect in which NE is claimed to prompt revolutionary modifications relates to 
the interpretation of economic models of choice. As we have seen in section 2.A, the 
proponents of NE often criticize standard economic theory for failing to provide a 
descriptively accurate representation of the neural substrates of choice behaviour and 
for positing agents having implausible cognitive and computational abilities. Moreover, 
they advocate the construction of mechanistic models of choice and urge economists to 
employ neuro-psychological findings in building their models. The reasoning of NEs 
can be explicated as follows. 
 
Standard economic theory treats the human brain as a black box and does not make 
specific assumptions regarding the neuro-psychological substrates of agents’ decisions. 
If economic theory provided accurate predictions across choice settings, then 
identifying the neuro-psychological underpinnings of decisions could arguably be 
unnecessary for the economists’ purposes. Yet, economic theory faces widespread 
predictive failures. Moreover, identifying what neuro-psychological processes underlie 
decisions enables economists to improve the explanatory and predictive performance of 
their models. Hence, economists should make use of neuro-psychological findings in 
constructing their models of choice. 
 
As we have seen in chapter four, it is doubtful that the trade-offs between the modelling 
benefits and the modelling costs associated with a neural enrichment of economic 
theory make it convenient for economists to include many neural insights into their 
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models. For the purpose of this section, let us contrast the interpretations that NEs and 
other economists respectively give to their models of choice. On the one hand, 
economists usually remain agnostic regarding the actual number and the features of the 
neuro-psychological processes underlying people’s decisions. In particular, they do not 
take their models to provide a descriptively accurate representation of these processes. 
On the other hand, many NEs give to their models a realistic interpretation, according to 
which there really is such and such neuro-psychological process at work when the 
subjects make a particular choice (Glimcher, 2010, p.126 and 133). The idea is that: (i) 
the neuro-psychological processes postulated by NE models exist; (ii) they possess the 
features that NE models ascribe to them; and (iii) these features are characterized by NE 
models in fairly accurate terms85. 
 
In what follows, I shall use expressions such as “realistic interpretation of models” and 
“realistic representation” in the sense defined by these three conditions unless specified 
otherwise. Those conditions relate to three different respects in which the realisticness 
of scientific representations can be evaluated. A similar categorization was proposed by 
Mäki (1992, p.329) with regard to the realisticness of idealizing assumptions in 
economic theory. According to Mäki’s categorization, an assumption is: referentially 
realistic when it can be taken to refer to a non-fictitious target system; representationally 
realistic when it represents a feature that is actually possessed by the modelled target 
system; and veristically realistic when it characterizes those features in accurate terms. 
Adopting Mäki’s terminology, many NE modellers appear to regard their models as 
                                                          
85
 The calls in favour of a realistic interpretation of neuro-psychological models are often 
framed in a mechanistic vocabulary. However, this interpretation may be advocated on 
independent, non-mechanistic grounds. Moreover, one may adopt a mechanistic approach 
without thereby being committed to give a realistic interpretation to her models (see e.g. 
Matthewson and Calcott, 2011, p.737; see also Craver and Alexandrova, 2008). 
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referentially, representationally and veristically realistic representations of the neuro-
psychological substrates of choice behaviour. 
 
Indeed, some proponents of NE do not rest content with advocating such a realistic 
interpretation of their own models, but also urge economists to relinquish their as if 
representations of choice behaviour in favour of neurally informed models. For 
example, Camerer alleges that NE “replaces the […] fiction of a utility-maximising 
individual which has a single goal, with a more detailed account of how components of 
the [human neural architecture] interact and communicate to determine individual 
behaviour” (2007, C28; see also Camerer, 1998, p.177). Similarly, Glimcher (2010, 
p.142) invites economists to “take [their] powerful mathematical models at face value 
and begin to ask whether the hidden elements that they propose actually exist”, and 
Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec contend that neuroscientific evidence “suggests 
specific functional forms to replace ‘as if’ assumptions that have never been well 
supported empirically” (2005, p.10). 
 
In recent years, a growing body of empirical findings have been taken to show that 
human choice behaviour results from the interplay of multiple neuro-psychological 
processes (see e.g. Loewenstein et al., 2008, p.647, and McCabe, 2008, p.355). 
Regrettably, NEs seem to hold heterogeneous positions regarding what neuro-
psychological processes underlie people’s decisions. Below I identify some of these 
divergences and assess what implications they can be taken to have for the 
interpretation of NE models of choice. In particular, I argue that the availability of 
multiple NE models positing dissimilar neuro-psychological processes does not 
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undermine the merits of these models, yet calls into question the realistic interpretation 
many NEs give to those models. 
 
NEs postulate a number of distinct neuro-psychological processes in their models of 
decision making. For instance, McCabe (2008, p.355) argues that many decisions 
result from the interplay of two neural circuits, namely a stimulus-response system 
which encodes correlations between actions and rewards, and a goal directed system 
which enables the agent to evaluate options in terms of anticipated motivational states. 
For their part, Bernheim and Rangel (2004) model decisions as the outcome of the 
interactions of brain processes operating in either ‘cold’ or ‘hot’ mode. Still differently, 
Fudenberg and Levine (2006) represent agents’ choices as the result of the interplays 
of a long-run and a short-run self, and Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2004) propose a 
model where deliberative and affective systems jointly underlie choice behaviour. 
 
The proponents of NE hold heterogeneous positions regarding not just what neuro-
psychological processes underlie human choice behaviour, but also the role allegedly 
played by specific processes. To give one example, consider the claim by Camerer, 
Loewenstein and Prelec (2005, p.11) that human decisions result from the interactions 
occurring both between controlled and automatic processes and between cognitive and 
affective systems86. The affective system has been respectively claimed to help (e.g. 
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 Cognitive and affective processes have been differentiated both in psychology (e.g. Zajonc, 
1980 and 1984, and Zajonc and McIntosh, 1992) and neuroscience (e.g. LeDoux, 1996, and 
Panksepp, 1998). As to controlled and automatic processes, the main distinction can be 
explicated as follows (Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977, and Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977). 
Controlled processes typically involve serial computations and activate when a person 
encounters novel decision problems or unexpected events (Hastie, 1984, and Libet, 1985). 
Automatic processes, instead, frequently operate in parallel, are rarely accessible to agents’ 
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Damasio, 1994), constrain (e.g. Loewenstein, 1996) and prevent (e.g. Baumeister, 
2003) the cognitive system from making optimal choices (see also Benhabib and Bisin, 
2005, and Brocas and Carrillo, 2008, for different positions regarding how often 
controlled processes interfere with automatic ones). 
 
Indeed, NEs do not even concur on the issue of how many stages allegedly comprise 
human decision making. According to some (e.g. Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer, 2005, 
p.246; see also Glimcher, 2009), decision making is most appropriately regarded as a 
two-stage process whereby expected utilities are computed and then compared for all 
the available actions. Others, instead, argue that utility maximization can be plausibly 
characterized as a one-stage process (e.g. Vromen, 2010a, p.24). 
 
In such a context, the question arises as to what implications the aforementioned 
divergences have for the interpretation of NE models. The existence of multiple models 
representing a given target system does not per se cast doubt on the merits of those 
models. After all, distinct modellers often study specific decision problems at different 
levels of detail and for dissimilar purposes. Moreover, scientists frequently employ 
multiple models which ascribe different properties and features to the investigated target 
systems (see e.g. Morrison, 2000, and Weisberg, 2007a). Indeed, modellers occasionally 
acquire valuable predictive and explanatory insights by combining models which make 
inconsistent assumptions about the phenomena of interest (see e.g. Woodward, 2006)87. 
Even so, the availability of multiple NE models of choice which posit dissimilar neuro-
                                                                                                                                                                          
consciousness and prompt most of our daily, repetitive behaviour (Bargh and Chartrand, 1999, 
and Baumeister and Sommer, 1997). 
87
 See also Friedman (1953) and Nagel (1963) on how descriptively inaccurate models can be 
predictive and explanatory (see Wimsatt, 1987, and Odenbaugh, 2005, for analogous remarks in 
the literature on modelling in biology). 
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psychological processes does not fit well with the realistic interpretation many NEs give 
to those models. In particular, the diversity of the neuro-psychological processes 
postulated in NE models - coupled with the evidential concerns arising in relation to 
NEs’ observational tools (see chapter three) - makes it doubtful that these models 
provide descriptively accurate representations of the neural substrates of choice 
behaviour. 
 
A proponent of NE may rebut that the aforementioned distinction exaggerates the 
differences between the interpretations that NEs and other economists respectively 
give to their models. In particular, she might allege that both NEs and other economists 
are concerned with the algorithmic level of description of choice behaviour (see Marr, 
1982). Now, it is true that at an abstract level many economic and NE models alike 
represent choice processes as an algorithmic procedure linking environmental variables 
and decisions (Rustichini, 2009, p.48). Yet, even at this abstract level NEs and other 
economists respectively give to their models rather different interpretations. For 
instance, as noted by Vromen (2010b, p.174), NEs often take their models to “get the 
decision-making process right” at the algorithmic level of analysis. By contrast, 
standard economic theory does not rest on the presupposition that the functional forms 
posited by economic modellers provide a descriptively accurate representation of the 
algorithmic underpinnings of people’s decisions88. 
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 In the words of Rustichini (2009, p.49), the utility functions posited by standard decision 
theory are “a purely conceptual device, and testing whether the decision maker really selects his 
choice by maximizing [a specific functional form] is a misunderstanding of the method of 
economic theory”. 
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In this respect, it is telling that various leading NEs emphasize the contrast between the 
interpretations that NEs and other economists respectively give to their models of 
choice. To see this, consider the distinction between a “soft theory” and a “hard theory” 
of choice behaviour proposed by Glimcher (2010). On the one hand, economists’ “soft 
theory” abstracts from the mechanistic underpinnings of observed choices and does not 
take a position as to what neuro-psychological processes underlie people’s decisions. 
On the other hand, NEs’ “hard theory” posits that choosers who behave in accordance 
with the axioms of expected utility theory “do so because a group of neuronal firing 
rates in a valuation circuit encodes the cardinal subjective values (and/or expected 
subjective values)” of each available option (Glimcher, 2010, p.129 and 138). 
 
The proponents of NE may object that other economists as well routinely model 
specific decision problems in dissimilar ways. To give one example, economists 
postulated a variety of sub-personal entities to account for observed choices (see e.g. 
Fudenberg and Levine, 2006, on far-sighted and short-sighted selves, and Benhabib 
and Bisin, 2005, on controlled and automatic processes). Even so, the availability of 
multiple models positing dissimilar entities and processes does not have equally 
problematic implications for NEs and other economists. For while NEs take their 
models to provide descriptively accurate characterizations of the neuro-psychological 
substrates of choice behaviour, economists remain agnostic as to whether the processes 
postulated by their models have precisely identifiable neuro-psychological counterparts 
and have the features hypothesized by those models. Hence, the fact that distinct 
economic models posit dissimilar entities and processes to account for observed 
decisions does not per se cast doubt on the merits of those models. 
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Regrettably, NEs frequently regard economic models as if they were intended to 
provide descriptively accurate characterizations of the neuro-psychological processes 
underlying people’s decisions. This, in turn, leads them to formulate misplaced 
criticisms of standard economic models. By way of illustration, consider the contention 
of Loewenstein et al. (2008, p.647) that NE challenges “the standard economic 
assumption that decision making is a unitary process” and suggests instead that choice 
behaviour “is driven by the interaction between automatic and controlled processes”. 
Such a claim apparently overlooks that economists, in assuming that a rational agent 
behaves as if she maximizes her expected utility, do not take a position as to the 
number of neuro-cognitive processes underlying her choices. Furthermore, the alleged 
fact that automatic and controlled processes interactively underlie decision making 
does not directly bear against the economists’ conjecture that agents behave as if they 
were maximizing expected utility. For one can behave consistently with such an 
assumption even if decision making is not a “unitary process”. Hence, pointing out that 
choice behaviour results from the interaction of heterogeneous neuro-psychological 
processes does not per se undermine standard economic models. 
 
In such a context, a further worry arises regarding the evidential basis on which 
additional neuro-psychological processes are postulated in the literature. This concern 
can be explicated as follows. Neuro-imaging studies are often based on task 
comparisons that attempt to associate individual tasks with particular cognitive 
processes (Poldrack and Wagner, 2004). Regrettably, these studies often face severe 
problems of evidential underconstraint (see e.g. Van Orden et al., 2001). That is to say, 
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one can frequently account for the collected neural data by refining the characterization 
of formerly posited processes and by postulating additional processes. The problem is 
that almost any profile of neural activation patterns can be accommodated by means of 
these procedures. Hence, it is dubious that the models that are thereby constructed can 
be plausibly taken to provide a descriptively accurate representation of the neuro-
psychological substrates of choice behaviour (see Fox et al., 1998 and 2005, and 
Henson, 2006, for similar remarks). 
 
To be sure, convergent evidence from psychology and neuroscience can usefully 
constrain NEs’ conjectures regarding the neuro-psychological substrates of choice 
behaviour. Still, the point remains that neuroscientific findings have been hitherto 
employed prevalently for confirmatory purposes. As Kuorikoski and Ylikoski (2010, 
p.226) put it, many authors regard finding differential activations across tasks as 
supporting the existence of distinct cognitive processes, yet “the failure to find such 
contrasts is not regarded as disconfirming such hypotheses”. In this respect, one may 
well allege that “ontology is rarely if ever handed to us on a silver platter in any 
science” (Roskies, 2008, p.28) and that NEs will develop increasingly accurate 
characterizations of neuro-psychological processes. Even so, the existence of multiple 
NE models of choice which postulate dissimilar neuro-psychological processes casts 
doubt on the realistic interpretation that many NEs give to those models. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The recent advances at the interface between economics, psychology and neuroscience 
have encouraged various NEs to advocate substantial modifications in the economic 
theory of choice. As we have seen in the previous chapters, there are several reasons to 
doubt that NE research is going to foster revolutionary modifications in economic 
theory. Moreover, the proponents of NE have hitherto failed to provide compelling 
evidence or reasons in support of such an ambitious thesis. This, however, does not 
exclude that NE can promote significant progress in economic theory. In what follows, I 
evaluate the prospects of NE in light of some criteria of scientific progress, devoting 
particular attention to Lakatos’ distinction between progressive and degenerating 
research programs. I then conclude by summarizing the main objections we raised 
against NEs’ attempts to substitute economists’ constructs and develop a unified 
interdisciplinary framework for modelling decision making. 
 
As we noted in the Introduction, Kuhn (1962) provides an innovative and controversial 
account of scientific progress. In his view, psychological and sociological factors exert a 
pervasive influence on theory choice in science (1970b, p.6). To be sure, Kuhn does not 
exclude that scientists may formulate principled comparisons of the predictive and 
explanatory virtues of competing paradigms. Still, he takes rational discussion to play 
only a limited role in determining which paradigms emerge and denies the existence of 
shared superparadigmatic standards for assessing whether specific intertheoretic 
transitions constitute objective scientific progress. 
 
 242
Various authors follow Kuhn in doubting the existence of objective criteria for theory 
choice in science (see e.g. Barnes, 1974, and Bloor, 1984, on the so-called strong 
programme in the sociology of knowledge). Others, instead, criticize him for severely 
underestimating the extent to which rational debate can promote scientific progress (see 
e.g. Lakatos, 1971, p.104-5; see also Laudan, 1984, and McMullin, 1993). In the 
philosophy of science, various criteria for assessing scientific progress have been 
advocated. Let us consider the ones proposed by Popper and Lakatos in turn. 
 
According to Popper, a novel theory constitutes progress in science when it has “new 
and testable consequences” and successfully predicts phenomena that have not been 
previously observed (1963, p.241-3; see also Popper, 1959). Similarly, Lakatos (1970) 
defines a series of theories as theoretically progressive if each successive theory has 
some excess empirical content over its predecessors, i.e. it predicts some previously 
unexpected fact. A theoretically progressive series of theories is also empirically 
progressive if some of its excess empirical content is corroborated. Finally, a series of 
theories is progressive if it is “consistently theoretically progressive” - that is each 
successive theory predicts some new fact - and at least “intermittently empirically 
progressive” - that is, “every now and then the increase in content should be […] 
retrospectively corroborated” (1970, p.134)89. 
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 There are at least two respects in which Lakatos’ criteria for assessing scientific progress are 
less demanding than the ones proposed by Popper. Firstly, Lakatos requires intermittent - rather 
than continuous - empirical success. And secondly, while Popper holds that only previously 
unknown facts count when it comes to assessing theories’ progressiveness, Lakatos allows that a 
theory can be supported by previously known facts, provided that those facts were not employed 
in constructing the theory (Lakatos and Zahar, 1975). As Worrall puts it, “one can’t use the 
same fact twice; once in the construction of a theory and then again in its support” (1978, p.48). 
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Now, let us focus on Lakatos’ criteria for evaluating scientific progress. Over the last 
few decades, intense debates have taken place as to whether the development of 
economic theory can be plausibly reconstructed as the steady growth of a progressive 
research program (see e.g. Hutchison, 1978, and Hands, 1985a and 1985b). In 
particular, various authors have assessed specific episodes in the history of economic 
theory in light of Lakatos’ criteria of scientific progress (see e.g. Blaug, 1975, on 
Walrasian and Keynesian economics, Latsis, 1976, on the theory of the firm, and 
Weintraub, 1979, on general equilibrium theory). A proponent of NE may draw on 
Lakatos’ distinction between progressive and degenerating research programs and put 
forward the following challenge to other economists: “standard economic theory has 
obtained remarkable predictive and explanatory successes. Still, it also faces widespread 
explanatory shortcomings, and its predictions fail to cohere with the findings that have 
been accumulated in other behavioural sciences. Fortunately, NE has already achieved 
significant accomplishments and promises to foster significant progress in economic 
theory. Hence, economists should invest efforts and resources in NE research”. 
 
Prima facie, this reasoning provides NEs with a plausible basis to advocate the neural 
enrichment of economic theory. As I argue below, however, such reasoning is in need 
of two major qualifications. To begin with, it remains an open question whether NE 
research is as progressive as many NEs appear to think. And secondly, even if NE was 
shown to be progressive, this would not per se license the conclusion that NEs will 
implement revolutionary modifications in the economic account of decision making. Let 
me expand on these two issues in turn. 
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As we have seen in chapter two, NEs can improve economic models with regard to 
several desiderata, ranging from descriptive accuracy to predictive power and 
explanatory insightfulness. In recent years, some authors have begun to reduce the 
“conceptual gap” (Caplin and Dean, 2008, p.663; see also Caplin, 2008) between 
economics, psychology and neuroscience by integrating findings and modelling tools 
across these disciplines. In light of these contributions, it would be ungenerous to claim 
that most NEs “are in the dark” about how their research “will reshape economics” 
(Rubinstein, 2008, p.486-7). Still, as we noted in chapters four and five, NEs’ 
integrative efforts have a limited scope and do not substantiate their speculations about 
the completion of a single, general theory of choice behaviour. 
 
Our previous observations concerning Lakatos’ criteria of scientific progress suggest an 
additional reason for questioning NEs’ calls to implement a neuro-psychological 
enrichment of the economic theory of choice. This reason relates to the fact that 
economists rely on additional criteria of scientific progress besides those endorsed by 
NEs. By way of illustration, consider the transition from cardinal to ordinal utility 
theory. The latter has no additional empirical content with respect to the former. Still, 
many economists deem ordinal utility theory to constitute a major improvement in 
economic theorising, as it enables one to represent consistent choice behaviour without 
making any assumption regarding agents’ psychological states. 
 
What about the link between the alleged progressiveness of NE research and its 
revolutionary potential? Let us suppose - for the sake of argument - that NE constitutes 
a progressive research program in Lakatos’ sense. Even this, by itself, falls short of 
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implying that NE is likely to foster a revolution in the economic theory of choice. Let 
me provide two remarks in support of this claim. My first remark points to the fact that 
many NEs’ contributions, while being of great interest to neuroscientists, have a limited 
or indirect bearing on standard economic theory (see e.g. Rubinstein, 2008). In 
particular, few NEs have satisfactorily addressed the challenge that Bernheim (2009, 
p.27) formulates in relation to NE research: “Provide an example of a novel economic 
model derived originally from neuroeconomic research that improves our measurement 
of the causal relationship between a standard exogenous environmental condition […] 
and a standard economic choice”. My second remark is that many advances in NE 
research build not so much on NEs’ original contributions, but rather on previous results 
in behavioural economics. In the words of Craver and Alexandrova, much of the recent 
NE literature “focuses on behavioural, not neural, economics”, with the neural 
component being frequently “limited to scanner evidence showing what areas of the 
brain light up when one performs some behavioural-economic task” (2008, p.383). 
 
Regrettably, many NEs appear to overstate their own past and potential achievements. 
To render this point more vivid, let us compare the ambitious claims initially made by 
some leading NEs and what they assert in light of their attained results. Consider, for 
example, Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec’s manifesto How Neuroscience can Inform 
Economics. On the one hand, the authors prophesize that a “radical departure from 
current theory will become necessary, in the sense that the basic building blocks will not 
just consist of preferences, constrained optimization and […] equilibrium” (2005, p.54). 
On the other hand, when it comes to assessing how NEs have already informed 
economic theory, they put forward rather elusive claims such as: “Perhaps knowing 
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more about basic neural mechanisms […] can help explain these puzzles”; “there is no 
reason other models starting from a very different basis could not be constructed”; “it is 
hard to believe that some neuroscientific regularities will not help explain some extant 
anomalies” (2005, p.53-55). 
 
As I noted elsewhere (Fumagalli, 2010), it is striking how much more moderate NEs 
have become just a few years after their initial announcements. As Camerer (2008a, 
p.44) has recently conceded, “these early neuroeconomics papers should be read as if 
they are speculative grant proposals which conjecture what might be learned from 
studies which take advantage of technological advances”90. Now, I am aware that one 
should not derive momentous implications from literally interpreting isolated 
statements, and that some exaggerations may be explained in light of the need to obtain 
public attention and funding. Even so, one expects NEs to advance much more 
measured claims in the future. For some authors’ propensity to overstate their own 
achievements has generated a lot of unnecessary confusion in the literature, making 
many economists needlessly sceptical about the prospects of NE research. As Glimcher 
aptly acknowledges, NE “has rocketed into the public awareness at a rate completely 
out of proportion to its accomplishments” (2010, xii)91. 
 
                                                          
90
 See also Spiegler (2008, p.520) and Jamison (2008, p.407), who allege that it would be a 
remarkable accomplishment if NEs succeed in inspiring new economic models. Irrespective of 
its plausibility, such a claim constitutes a significant downplay with respect to the promises 
initially put forward by many NEs. 
91
 Analogous remarks apply to other NEs’ claims. To give one example, consider the assertion 
by Vercoe and Zak (2010) that NE promotes a methodological reversal from deductive to 
inductive economics which prompts economists to base their models on empirical findings 
rather than axiomatic speculations. Such a claim grossly underestimates the relevance of many 
inductive models that had been proposed by behavioural economists since the Seventies (see 
e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, and Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, on various versions of 
prospect theory). 
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Having said that, let us briefly recapitulate the main objections we put forward in the 
preceding chapters against NEs’ revolutionary ambitions. As I argued in chapter three, 
several concerns arise regarding the accuracy, reliability and robustness of many NE 
findings. Moreover, the inferences NEs make in their investigations do not always 
warrant confidence in the subsequently reported results. Some of these evidential and 
epistemological concerns will be resolved thanks to advances in NEs’ scanner 
technology and experimental practices. Others, instead, are likely to persist in spite of 
these progresses. Moreover, as illustrated in chapter four, NEs overestimate the extent 
to which neurally informed contributions enable economists to satisfy their modelling 
desiderata. In particular, the trade-offs between the desiderata that NEs and other 
economists respectively value severely constrain the incorporation of neural insights 
into economic models. 
 
These remarks appear to be all the more significant in light of the profound differences 
in the evidential bases, the theoretical constructs and the explanatory aims associated 
with NE’s parent disciplines. As we have seen in chapter five, these differences cast 
doubt on the relevance of many NE studies for the economic theory of choice (see also 
chapter six for a case study on the concept of utility). NEs’ attempts to develop a 
unified interdisciplinary account of decision making are further constrained by the 
divergences occurred among NEs themselves regarding how NE is to be conceptualized, 
how it should be expected to inform economics, and what disciplines will provide the 
fundamental constructs for the NE theoretical framework. As to NEs’ revolutionary 
claims, their cogency rests on whether NE research brings an innovative perspective on 
questions that have been intractable for, or beyond the reach of, other economists 
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(Smith, 2007, p.313; see also Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005, sec.4, and Gul 
and Pesendorfer, 2008). As I argued in chapter seven, NEs have failed to show that their 
studies are likely to prompt revolutionary changes in the economic theory of choice. 
 
Over the last few years, NEs’ attempts to combine insights from economics, psychology 
and neuroscience have prompted intense debates among the practitioners and the 
philosophers of these sciences concerning issues such as the relevance of different 
disciplines’ findings for economic theory and how to solve the trade-offs between 
specific modelling desiderata (see e.g. Economics and Philosophy, 2008, Vol.24, no.3; 
the Journal of Economic Methodology, 2010, Vol.17, no.2; and Biology and 
Philosophy, 2011, Vol.26, no.5). In such a context, the further question arises as to how 
NE should organize itself to maximize its potential for success. According to some 
authors (Craver and Alexandrova, 2008, p.384), NEs will find it more fruitful to pursue 
integrative - rather than revolutionary - research projects involving NE’s parent 
disciplines. The idea is that combining findings and modelling tools from these 
disciplines enables economists to build more predictive and explanatory models. As I 
argued in this enquiry, the greatest promise for the advancement of NE lies in adopting 
this pluralistic approach to the modelling of decision making, with economists, 
psychologists and neuroscientists pursuing integrated - yet not unified - modelling 
approaches. 
 
In commenting over the potential for success in NE research, several authors maintain 
that it is premature to judge NEs’ achievements (Quartz, 2008, p.466, and Smith, 2007, 
p.313), that “the ultimate proof is in the pudding” (Bernheim, 2009, p.38; see also 
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Schotter, 2008, p.77), and the like. For their part, Craver and Alexandrova (2009, p.382, 
italics mine) contend that any bets on NE’s long-term prospects are “not so much 
premature as ill defined”. In their view, “the field is too young for definition let alone 
wagering”, as we currently lack answers “to even the most fundamental questions for 
defining neuroeconomics”. As we have seen in the previous chapters, various 
conceptual and empirical issues wait to be carefully sorted out and clarified in the NE 
literature. These concerns, however, do not license wholesale methodological anarchy. 
On the contrary, they make it especially pressing for the practitioners and the 
philosophers of NE’s parent disciplines to assess the potential for success in NE 
research. 
 
To conclude, it is true that NE is still in its infancy and that considerable achievements 
may await its pioneers in the years to come. Yet, the time is ripe for beginning to 
distinguish between alluring marketing hype and well-founded hopes. As I argued in 
this enquiry, NEs can provide valuable incremental contributions by enriching specific 
economic models of choice with neuro-psychological insights. Still, they have hitherto 
failed to demonstrate that economists will usually find it convenient to include several 
neural insights into their models or substitute economic constructs with neuro-
psychological ones. Whatever success NEs will have in informing and constraining the 
accounts of choice behaviour developed by economists, psychologists and 
neuroscientists, NE is unlikely to provide a grand revolutionary synthesis spanning its 
own parent disciplines. 
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